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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
1, The statement of the problem .
This is a dissertation on the concept of the hiiman
self in the philosophy of William Ernest Hocking. Ihe
problem may be thought of as an interpretation"^ and evalua-
tion of Hocking's view of the human self; an interpretation
of its meaning, its relation with the body, its freedom,
its relations in society, and its place in the cosmos,
2. Self as synonymous with mind .
In Hocking's thought, self is a synonym for mind,
consciousness, soul, person, and vice versa. There is a
practical advantage in having synonyms. One will not have
to use the same word so often. But there are also two dis-
advantages. First, there is the danger that the multiplicity
1. Hocking regards one of his outstanding books.
Human Nature and Its Remaking , as "an experiment in inter-
pretation" . (ENR, xl) Interpretation is obviously more
than factual description.
(Note: The first reference to a book in each chapter
will appear as a footnote. Thereafter, if only page
references are to be given, the symbols for the book and
the page numbers will appear within parentheses in the
text. This practice will be follov/ed only for books
written by Professor Hocking. References to all other
writings will appear in footnotes.)'

2of synonyms will allow for, or will lead to, circular defi-
nitions and generalizations. This makes for ambiguity,
because at best, any vvord is a leaky vessel for conveying
concrete thought. In the second place these terms are dis-
tinguished usually in philosophy. Consequently, before
Hocking can read other writings, or before the uninitiated
can read Hocking, each must accustom himself to differences
in terminology.
In spite of the usual practice of emphasizing the slight
distinction between the terms self, soul, mind, and person,
many follow the practice of Hocking and identify them. An
outstanding example is John Laird in his Problems of the
Self . He writes that "the word, 'self . . . includes what
these other words include, and is preferable because it does
2
not dictate the road which the discussion must follow."
The connotation of the word "soul", for example, involves
theological speculation and may give rise to the untenable
soul- substance theory; "mind" suggests primarily intellect;
and "person" implies stress on ethical and legal considera-
tions. Yet each of these represents but an aspect of the
2. Laird, PS, 8.
5. Hocking professes a dislike for the term personality,
especially as applied to God, for this reason. (Cf. MGHE,
335-336.
)

3whole self. Thus the term "self" Is self- jus tifylng.
3, Other studies of this problem .
The problem of the human self is as old as human asso-
ciation. Politics is one of the oldest of the sciences; its
concern is with the facts of human interest and passion.
Long before Plato and Aristotle brought politics into the
field of philosophy, Chinese and Egyptian sages mingled their
statecraft with education and religion. Politics involves
psychology, ethics, and metaphysics, because there is needed
a science of human nature, a science of right and justice,
and a view of man's place in, or significance for, the cos-
mos. Looked at in this light, studies in politics are
studies of the problem of the human self.
Man has been more interested in himself than in any
other one thing. Yet man is still his own greatest mystery.
He seeks for whatever light he can find v/herever he can find
it, A significant contribution in this search has been made
4by Professor Hocking. And his interpretation of the self
Is made more readily available through this dissertation.
4. William Adams Brown in his reviev/ of Hocking's most
celebrated book. The Meaning of G-od in Human Experience
,
writes as followsl ^rie need, in short, a philosophy which
shall make personality in the sense in which we know it in
ourselves, and which is presupposed in the great spiritual
experiences of mankind, the most real thing in the v/orld,
the standard by which everything that deserves to be called
reality must be tested, " Professor Brown writes further
that Hocking has not only pointed out this need, but that he
has made a "distinct contribution toward meeting it." (Brown,
Art, (1913), 250-251)

4Other studies of this particular problem are not to be
5
found. Any number of reviev/s of Hocking's books have been
written, but few of these represent discussions of his view
of the self; for the most part the reviews are paeans of
praise and commendation. There are two French followers
of Hocking, Gabriel Marcel and Louis Dalliere, who have
7
sought to introduce him to French readers. These works
are referred to in the text, and bibliographical data are
given in the bibliography,
4. Sources of data .
The sources of data for this dissertation, for the most
part, have been the writings of Professor Hocking. Particu-
lar ideas have been studied in their historical setting.
Thilly's History of Philosophy , and Lange's History of
Materialism have been helpful; but in almost every case
reference has been made to the writings of the philosopher
concerned. Chief among those whose writings have been
5, In a dissertation, entitled An Analysis of the
Tliou^t of Alfred North Whitehead and V/illiam Brnest Hocking
Concerning Good, and Byil
.
Edmund Jobey Thompson insists that
the terms "good" and "evil" are adjectives and that V^hitehead
and Hocking are wrong in their use of the terms as nouns,
(AT^jH, lOSff.)
i
6, Rees Griffiths, a British writer, develops a posi-
tion similar to that of Hocking, in his book, God in Idea
and i^ixperience . He appeals to Hocking as an authority in
support of his view. (Cf. Griffiths, GIE, 189-196.)
7, Both v/riters emphasize Hocking's kinship to the late
French philosopher, Henri Bergson.

5consulted are Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kajit, Hegel,
Bradley, Royce, Dewey, Bergson, Alexander, Perry and Bright-
man, The purpose of such references has been to illustrate
and emphasize Hocking's position, or else to challenge, and
perhaps refute, his viev/,
5. Method of procedure .
This dissertation is first a study of the human self;
and second, a study which is based on the thought of William
Ernest Hocking. Therefore, it is not a mere exposition of
Professor Hocking's view, but rather a critical interpreta-
tion involving contrasts and comparisons with other positions.
The presentation, though chronological, as in the life
of the individual self, has also a logical emphasis. Should
the meaning of the self be discussed first or last? To dis-
cuss it first might seem to preclude the rest of the study;
yet it seems necessary to state at the beginning some idea
of what the topic means. Selfhood is accepted as the basic
category. To say that the category of selfhood is basic means
that the self is a principle by means of which the v/orld can
be best understood, and v/ithout v/hich the v;orld is unthink-
able. The self is the most concrete principle, or entity,
which can be discovered. It represents the alpha and the
omega of philosophy. Consequently, Chapter II is a treatment
of possible v/ays in which the self may be viewed, of the
meaning of the self, and of the basis for self-identity.
J
6"For psychology as well as for metaphysics the will must be
Qidentified with a persistent principle of preference."
Chapter III is a study of the development of the self,
and its relations to the body. What is the natural endowment
of the self? And what place does the body have in the life
of the self ? Ready acceptance is accorded findings in the
fields of biology and physiology because such information is
necessary for any adequate understsxiding of the self.
The question in Chapter IV is the freedom of the self.
After recognizing the metaphysical nature of the problem,
such questions are raised as: What does freedom of the self
mean? What obligations are involved in freedom? What is
the source of this obligation? And what privileges, if any,
correspond to these obligations? Suggestions as to answers
for these questions are given.
As a study of the problem of communication. Chapter V
is something of an Interlude, and is the least integral part
of a dissertation on the human self. Yet it is integral as
proving the incompleteness of the self apart from its fel-
lows; frequent reference is made to this chapter. Hocking's
treatment of social experience is one of his most significant
contributions to idealistic philosophy. Sections four and
six in this chapter are more nearly expositions of Hocking's
8. Hocking, Art. (1916)*^, 502.

7own view than is the situation in any other part of the
s tudy
•
The question was raised above as to where the treat-
ment of the meaning of the self should be placed, first or
last. The suggestion as to the meaning which is given in
Chapter II is developed throughout the text; it finds its
completion in Chapter VI, which is a study of "The Cosmic
Significance of the Self." What is the basis for the self's
claim that it is cosmically significant? God is the being
who insures the objectivity of man's ideals and his values,
and who makes it possible for man to achieve immortality.
Hocking's thought is interpreted critically throughout;
yet it has seemed advisable to give a summary statement of
criticism. This appears in Chapter VII, which is an "Eva-
luation of Hocking's Concept of the Human Self."

CHAPTER II
THE MJilAlJING OF THE SELF
1, Two ways of viewing, the self .
The self may be viewed in two ways. To view the self
Internally, it is that continuous self-consciousness which
accompanies the awareness of other things; it is mind and
stands over against nature as the field of its objects. It
is "the counterpart of the whole of the observed v/orld.
. . . ego and non-ego are on a par with each other. . . .
the self is half of the world it perceives.""^ But to view
the self externally is to reduce these proportions. The
self is viewed as body, as a small part of nature, along
with the other selves or bodies. This external view is
scientific and objective, v/hereas the internal view is sub-
jective.
The meanings of these views are as different as are the
proportions Involved. In the external view the self, as an
object in nature, becomes a natural object and is studied
in terms of cause and effect. But the criminal's plea that
"nature did it" has no meaning in a court of law. The in-
ternal view means that the self is more than an object of
nature; the basis for this subjective importance is negative:
1. Hocking, SIBF, 7

9The self simply cannot be explained as an object of nature
and nothing more, (SIBP, 14) The evidence as regards these
views seems to be in favor of the self as body. "From every
salient angle of his being evolution ties man with silken
threads back into the embroidery of nature." (SIBP, 16) The
same type of evidence comes from psychology, the science or
the mind. Psychologists have gained most of their informa-
tion about the human self through a study of the human body,
or physiology. Descartes differentiated the natural sciences
and the science of mind. Just after Descartes, theories in
these two sciences, psychology and physiology, began to over-
lap, Lamettrie, who wrote L ' homme machine, was influenced
by Descartes 's mechanical interpretation of animal life. If
the animal is a machine, then man, who is also an animal, is
2
a machine. Whitehead says that "the effect of physiology
was to put mind back into nature." But it v/ould hardly be
possible for the psychologists, as natural scientists, to
4deal with the self as other than an object of nature.
But in spite of this evidence it is not possible to
abandon the internal view of the self, "To identify any
2. Cf. Thilly, HP, 288, 587f. Cf. Lange, GM, Book
I, Section 4, Chapter 2.
3. Whitehead, SMW, 206,
4. Hocking, TDL, 64.
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state of mind v/ith a state of matter In motion is the sort
of proposition one can make only when he has renounced the
meaning of words and stopped thinking." (SIBP, 22) The re-
lation betv/een nervous energy and mental energy cannot be
stated in terras of the laws of physics. There is no inter-
mediate term between a physical event and an idea. There
still exists a chasm between the physical object and the
mental image. Even though the self be explained it is still
"that which" is explained, and is thus more than the explana-
tion. "The mind with which natural science can deal is but
a Near-mind." "Ho physical explanation of the self can
alter the fact that the self is what it appears to itself
to be." (SIBF, 28)
It remains to clarify the position of the internal view,
and to show why the self should be regarded as more than a
thing of nature. In the first place, if the self is body
then the self is spatial, and all its relations are spatial
relations. But this is not so with the mind because the mind
is space-free: there are several space worlds for the mind,
neither of which interferes with any other. The same is true
in regard to time. It is true, however, that the mind is
less time-free than it is space-free. It cannot escape the
actuality of a now in time; and all the activities of the
5, Hocking, P6IG, 209.
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mind take time. Be that as it may the time-spans for
physical events and. mental events are different time-spans.
Although both series of events are in time and take time, the
physical event is altogether in the present; all the facts
pertaining to it are present facts. The mind, on the
other hand, retains the past through memory, and anticipates
the future. "It has its whole history in its field of time
vision." (SIBP, 32) IChese contrasts become clearer v/hen the
body is recognized as a set of facts and the mind is viewed
as a set of meanings. It is true that meaning does exist in
the body; it exists but merely as a stimulus-response con-
nection, or at best as a stimulus-conditioned- response
connection.
In defending the external view of the self much stress
is laid upon the place of habit, which is apparently a
physical connection in the brain. Yet the formation of
habit is possible only with the consent of the self. Regard-
less of how strong the habit may be, the self must own it,
V/hile if the self desires some new and different end the
physical connection in the brain may be broken. Ihis con-
nection is in the brain, and it remains only a connection
until the self, as mind, is present to read meaning into it.
6. Hocking, HIJR, 128
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The self as body is meaningless until the self as mind brings
meaning Into it. (SIBP, 38f.) Since the self as body is
meaningless it is lacking in value also. It is determined
according to cause and effect; and is thus without moral
quality. It is morally neutral until the self as mind ap-
pears. At this moment the self begins to enjoy value and
also to make plans for achieving more value.
From this it may be said that the external viev/ of the
self though inhospitable to the internal view is neverthe-
less meaningless without it. Indeed the external view is
established by assuming the internal view. In order to es-
tablish their position naturalists and psychologists take
the internal view for granted; then they forget the initial
assumption; and come later to deny it. If they are pressed
hard, however, these traitcrs-to-consciousness will admit
that they themselves are minds. If they are, why is not
every self mind as well as body? Man is unwilling, somehow,
to accept a naturalistic portrait of himself, i.e., as mean-
ingless, lacking in value, and moral quality, as a true
account. He insists that the self must mean what it is ex-
perienced as being, (SIBF, 46) Man refuses to accept the
viev/ that he is body only. He is also mind. Both must be
considered if any true account of the self is to be given.
The relationship between these two, body and mind, will be
discussed in Chapter Three,
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2, The twofold nature of the self .
This is a discussion of three ways in which the nature
of the self may be said to be twofold.
(1) The self as within the world; the world as within
the self. Physicalists viev; the self as within the v/orld.
Idealists view the world as within the self. (TDL, 51-85)
The former begin and end with physical objects; they find no
real place for the self or mind, (The self just makes its
own place.) The idealists begin with sense data, and have
difficulty in accounting for the real physical objects, the
physical world.
The two statements, "The self is within the v/orld", and
"The world is within the self", appear to be contradictory.
The actual differences involved in the positions seem to
justify this appearance. As v/ithin the world the self is
finite in space and time. Death becomes the concluding event,
the time-boundary, of the self. On the other hand, as con-
taining the world, the v/orld becomes a finite aspect of ex-
perience: there may be other worlds for the self. In this
case death as a v/orld-event is not a time-boundary of the
self, because it transcends time.
Neither the disinterested scientist nor the logician
will decide which statement is true. iSo far as they are con-
cerned either one is admissible. But if both are admissible
the contradiction must be only apparent, and both views must
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be true. The self is within the world, yet the world is
also within the self. The self may be defined as the taJcer
of the v/orld in experience.
How caJi tills be? The self comes out of the physical
world, and drav/s its reality from it. !I3ie flickering self
is continuously dependent upon the natural world. Thus the
self is within the world and is only as real as its world is
real. On the other hand the standard of truth and reality
is found in thought and feeling. The reality of a thing
depends upon its inner nature, "the way it feels to itself."
(TDL, 59) A thing v/ithout feeling is an empty sort of being.
Then the physical v/orld, unless it is self-conscious, is not
as real as the experience of pleasure or pain. In contrast
to the subjective philosophy of Kant, the reality of a thing
is not the thing apart from knov/ledge, but the thing conceived
as fully known. "Things are as they reveal themselves in
7their fullness to the knowing mind."
Pascal wrote that even if an unconscious universe were
to destroy man, man would still be greater, more real, be-
cause the universe would not know what it was doing but man
Q
would know that he was dying. From this standard one
7. Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 130.
8. Pascal, PEN, 49.
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reckons that the world is only as real as the self is real,
because the self bestows reality upon the physical world by
being conscious of it. Pringle-Pattison is of this view.
He thinks that the world was made real by the advent of con-
sciousness. Man is integral to the v/orld as the means whereby
its self-consciousness, and thus its reality, is achieved.
It is through Intelligent man that the world beholds and
9
enjoys itself.
Accordingly, both statements are true. They are Judged
true by a dialectical standard. The dialectic leads from an
empty physical object to a self-conscious subject, and thence
to a consciousness of the object. The final truth, reality,
must include both of these statements.
To select one of these statements as true is to be dog-
matic; and to face the impossible task of overcoming the view
represented by the other statement. Either one represents a
thesis; the other an antithesis. Unless a synthesis is
reached the views are forever irreconcilable. The dialectic
leads naturally to a synthesis. Ihe synthesis might read,
"The self arises from, and depends upon, the natural world,
yet the world depends upon the self for its self-conscious-
ness." Dewey refuses to follow the dialectic all the way
through. He has a dogmatic thesis. He simply stops short;
9. Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 110, 190.
I
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he calls a halt to the process. This accounts for his
naturalism and for his antipathy to the self or mind.
Dewey's error may be due to his iinexamined assumptions.
There are three of these. The first, that there is a natu-
ral world which exists independently of and prior to the
organism^^, is the basis for his naturalism. Ihis is his
metaphysics as nearly as he has one. Nature is one inter-
acting system. Anything not related in this is imaginary.
He insists that "there is no breach of continuity between
operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical
operations. ""^^ Thus arises his view that the self, if there
is such a thing, is v/ithin the world.
The second assumption, based on the first, is that life
is; and that life is spontaneous and habitual until a prob-
lematic situation arises. Mind appears as a function to set
1things right when it is experienced that something is v/rong.
For Dewey, this is added emphasis that the self is within the
world. It does seem though that a self or mind which can
initiate changes, and reorganize nature, should be accorded
some status of reality. This seems all the more proper as
10. Dewey, LOG, 25, 33.
11. Ibid., 19.
12. Dewey, RIP, 88; QC, 187; EM, 245; LOG, 172.
I
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Dewey admits that
the constancjT- and pervasiveness of the operative
presence of the self as a determining factor in
all situations ... is more intimate eind omni-
present in experience than the air we breathe. -^^
The third unexamined assumption actually represents tho
synthesis suggested above, but not so for Dewey, He assumes
that there are other persons with whom the self has experience
14i.e., environment is cultural as well as physical.
The synthesis, that the self, contained in the world,
also contains the world, is grasped through an understanding
of the principle of empirical duality. This principle
develops out of self-consciousness: the self is represented
in a tv;ofold relationship to things and other selves. The
apparent contradiction between the statements: the self is
within the v/orld, and the world is v;ithin the self, resolves
itself into a complexity of human nature. The self becomes
a twofold being, the observer and the observed. The self
which contains the world contains the self because the world
contains all selves and their relations with each other. The
observing self becomes an observed fact within its own world.
These two selves, within the same human self, shall be called
the reflective self and the excursive self.
13, Dewey, EAN, 246.
14. Dewey, LOG, 42. If environment is cultural, it is
mental. Thus the self or mind Includes the world.
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(2) The excursive self and, the reflective self . The
excursive self is the self as v;lthin the world. As the word
excursive implies, it "is a self of behavior, entangled in
affairs . . • these affairs have the values of excursions."
(TDL, 72) William James spoke of the stream of conscious-
ness. Now if consciousness were only a stream there could
not be excursions, there would be only one excursion with no
attachment, and no accumulation of meaning. One is reminded
of the difficulty which Hume had in accounting for the stabi-
15
lity of consciousness or the identity of the self.
The reflective self, on the other hand, is back of the
excursive self as the promoter and judge of the excursive
activity. It is akin to the intellect for Leibniz. In reply
to Locke's theory, that the mind to begin with is as white
16paper void of all characters, Leibniz said that "there is
17
nothing in the mind save the intellect itself."
An excursion is the realization of a decision; it has a
certain unity which is more significant than a mere sensation
15. For Hume the self is "nothing but a bundle or col-
lection of different perceptions which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux
and movement . " (Hume, TEN, I, 534)
16. Locke, ECKU, Book II, Chapter 1.
17. Leibniz, NUiHU, 111. " There is nothing in the soul
which do es not come from the senses . But you must except
the soul and its affections. Nihil est in intellectu
,
quod
non fuerit in sensa
.
excipe ; Nisi ipse intellectus .
"
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or feeling. Both of these may be, and usually are. Involved
in an excursion. "It constitutes a paragraph of personal
history, with an integral time-epoch of its own, long or
short." (TDL, 73)
The self represents a union of opposites. The self may
be called a reflective-excursive system. (TDL, 74) In the
following discussion this uniting of opposing qualities may
become more explicit. By v/ay of outline, it may be stated
that the excursive self is an actual, finite, limited and
discontinuous creature or creation; and that the reflective
self is a potential, infinite, and continuous creator.
The excursive self is actual in that it represents an
excursion, the realization of a decision. The reflective
self is potential in that some other decision might have been
made. In the same way the excursive self is finite because
it represents the finitude of a realized decision. The re-
flective self, on the other hand, as facing a multitude of
possibilities is unaware of limit, and is thus relatively
infinite in potentiality. The excursive self is dated; ex-
cursions are made at particular times; thus the excursive
self is limited and discontinuous. But the reflective self,
although its excursions are temporal, includes the time-order
as an unbounded v/hole v/ithin which the excursions take place.
Again, unless the self were both inclusive and continuous as
regards time there could be no experience of succession but
I
2U
only a succession of experiences or excursions. It is the
reflective self which gives meaning to, or reads the meaning
of, time. Bowne writes concerning this creativity of mind
that "the essential relation of antecedence and sequence is
established by the mind itself, and only thus does it become
18
a relation for mind." Apart from the self time is pure
time, past is pure past, future is pure future, and nothing
more; the deposits in nature have temporal quality only for
the reflective self. Because the excursive self is dated
the reflective self also has a temporal character; it con-
tinues through time; it is eternal in the sense that eternal
is the "essence of the time order." (TDL, 77) Yet it observes
the temporal flow, and is thus distinguished from it, because
the self which is able to observe its ov/n lapses must some-
19
how continue through them.
These selves are creature and creator; but in order to
avoid the implication of the soul as a substance, and the
transcendental ego, it should be noted that the excursive self
and the reflective self are inextricably united in life. Uie
human self is a nest of potentialities, and a capacity for
realizing them. The excursive self is empirical; it is the
organization of the potentialities which are actually realized.
18. Bowne, TTK, 68.
19. This raises the problem of personal identity,
which is discussed elsewhere. Cf . section five below.
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This represents what has been created or is the creation.
Yet the true self is not just what has been achieved or
created; it is all this ajid more. It involves also the re-
flective self which, as the promoter, guide and judge of
this achievement (the excursive self) is its creator.
(3) The self and the subconscious . In discussing the
relation of the subconscious to the self, it is necessary-
first to make mention of the language commonly used in dis-
cussing subconsciousness. It is tragically misleading. The
language used gives rise to the idea of a false division, or
one that does not exist. Also, a superhuman resource is
suggested while the real source is one's own waking self.
Biere is no subconsciousness which is out of consciousness;
subconsciousness is a division within consciousness. For
once Alexander and Hocking are in agreement. Alexander write
of this matter as follows: "Under consciousness I include ,
those vague and indistinct mental processes on the extreme
margin of consciousness which are sometimes described as sub-
20
conscious." The real contrast is not between the conscious
and the subconscious, but betv/een the central or artificial
self and the subconscious self. The subconscious is not a
distinct gland of psychical life, which accumulates its own
20. Alexander, STD, II, 4.
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stores and occasionally overflows into the central self;
rather, it
is the deposit of our own logical sense, our own
value-consciousness and moral judgment, our own
metaphysical instinct, in short of our own whole-
idea in its unceasing criticism upon the judgments
of our partial, strenuous, and artificial self.
It contains the opposite, or antithesis, which our
artificial self at any moment needs to justify it
and make it completely true; it contains, there-
fore, the next turn in the dialectic of exper-
ience. (MGKE, 538)
This serves to correct also the second misconception,
i.e., that in the subconscious the self has a mysterious and
superhuman resource. The subconscious does have infinite
resources, but they belong to the self; even in normal wak-
ing capacity the self rightfully possesses these resources,
21
and some day it will learn to command them,
i. The subconscious is usually viev/ed as a sort
of cellar v/hich is a storehouse for rejected states of mind;
repressed memories reside in it; and it is the source of
unorthodox impulses, offshoots of an animal inheritance,
v/hich strive for expression. It is a cauldron of negations
or repressions.
21. Although he is not concerned with this matter of
the subconscious, James v/rites in his essay on "Energies of
Man", that "few men live at their maximum of energy . . .
anyone may be in vital equilibrium at very different rates
of energizing." The individual lives usually "far within
his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he
habitually fails to use. He energizes belov/ his maximum
,
and he behaves below his optimum . " (James, SPP, 42, 44,
Italics his.
)
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But the subconscious contains also imprints of all past
experiences, whether they are forgotten, or reraembered and
not referred to. These imprints may represent marginal
learnings. This content is called the apperceptive mass.
Although the self may not think of it, it is that v/ith which
the self does think. The self changes constantly because of
new experiences; it is never the same after another exper-
ience, and each experience helps to determine, although the
self may not be av/are of it at any particular time, the atti-
22tude toward all future experiences. The subconscious is
intimately related to, if not identical with, the self.
ii. This relationship is seen more clearly perhaps
in considering the negative content of the subconscious,
the repressions. The term, repression, implies conscious
activity. How do repressions come about? The self is its
own censor. Suppose an undesirable idea arises; the self
evaluates the idea, rejects it, and represses it. The re-
pression, a conscious act, will remain repressed only as the
self continues to repress it. There is no such thing as an
unconscious impulse. The subconscious impulse must be
lighted by conscious attention before the self can recognize
the impulse as its ov/n.
22. This is a big order for the subconscious, but it
would be true from either side of the subconscious, i.e.,
as a storehouse of conscious repressions, for these have
to be repressed continuously, or as a body of marginal
learnings accumulated unawares.
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ill. Another area In which the self and the sub-
conscious are intimately related Is what may be called the
"undefined possibilities" of the self. (TDL, 67) As integral
to itself the self is conscious of undefined possibilities
or indefinite powers. They can hardly be defined, because
their limits are learned in experience. The self, as a con-
scious agent, involves a sense of power. The self is not
normally conscious of definite limits; the only explicit
consciousness is that this power belongs to oneself, in
fact that this power makes the agency of the self real. The
quality of this power is subconscious. It gives rise to the
general sense of potentiality with v/hich the self faces each
new situation. It belongs to the apperceptive mass which
was spoken of as the content of the subconscious.
It follows, therefore, that the contents of the sub-
conscious are a part of the self. From this point of view
it may be said that the self, as a felt organization of
powers which evaluates, selects, or rejects among its ob-
jects and its impulses toward these objects, is subconscious
to itself. The subconscious, "so far from being a sort of
mental sub-basement, is at the center of selfhood," (TDL,
VI)
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3, The self as a will to power .
(1) The notion of will to power . The will to power Is
the undiscovered unity In the entire life of Instinct. It Is
assumed to "be an actual iinlty, not only because It is neces-
sary for the concept of selfhood but also because It Is recog-
nizable In the life of the self.
Allport refuses to identify the cardinal trait with the
personality, yet he admits that the unity of the self depends
23
upon the presence of this ruling passion. Hocking does
identify the two. In doing so he has an advantage. He is
freed from the task of relating this master sentiment, this
supreme ideal, to the self, because it is the self. And all
minor traits or interests are subordinated to, and get their
significance from their relation to, this central Interest
or instinct. This accounts for the fact that Instincts are
relatively few in man. There is only one which represents
the life program. This one, called here the will to power.
Includes the others; and through it the minor ones find vica-
rious expression and satisfaction. This will to power may
be described as a craving for potency. Life may be viewed
as a process in v/hich man seeks to satisfy and to understand
the meaning of this craving, or will to power, as it relates
to dally living.
23. Allport, PER, 338. Cf. the section on "The theory
of instincts".
J
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It v/as noted, in the preceding section that selfhood In-
volves unity, Ihere must be an identical concern In fortune
which successive experiences, hov/ever different in content,
affect for better or for worse. This identical concern is
24the self. To view this situation from the other side, it
may be said that "wherever there is a self , there all exper-
25iences are referred to a common interest . " Thus it may be
assumed that the many impulses or instincts have a common
source. All of them arise from the striving of the will to
power. The self is that which causes this striving, and
directs it.
The self experiences want, but it does not know in ad-
vance just what v;ill bring satisfaction. Experience reveals
26
those ways in which satisfaction may be had. First, the
self learns through experience what goods are to be had.
(HNR, 91) Until the self has experienced hunger it cannot
desire good in the form of food; until it has experienced, o
learned from the experience of others, that the stove is hot
the self cannot desire good in the form of avoiding contact
with the hot stove.
24. Cf . section five below.
25. Hocking, HNR, 90. Italics his.
26. an experience of nature, and the bodily organis"i>
which makes this experience possible, are necessary for the
realization of satisfaction. The tenn experience means
either the whole of experience or particular experiences.
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In the second place, it is in experience that the self
learns to choose between concrete goods. "Ehis one is selected
in preference to that. And this preference implies the exist-
ence of some standard, or of one motive. The individual's
concept of his own good becomes increasingly distinct in the
course of life. The self perceives good and evil; and it
builds out of many partial goods a conception of good which
is regarded as its own good; this is its ideal. (P6IC, 212)
This ideal determines the self's policy which is applied in
27future experiencing. The application of this policy repre-
sents the will of the self. Vk'HI comes into being whenever
the self begins to control instinctive impulses according to
its policy. The v/ill to pov/er represents the self's struggle
to achieve potency and reality. There are several distinct
stages in the dialectical development of this v/ill to pov/er.
It remains to point out these stages, and to call attention
to the need or impulse characteristic of each particular
28period.
(2) Stages in the development of the will to power .
i. Hie will to power during the stage of infancy
expresses itself in the building of primary biological habits.
The outer world is assumed as an addressable servant.
27, The ideal may change continuously,
28. Cf. Hocking, MAS, 512-322.
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External reality Is commanded, and used. In the development
of organic capacity. Because of the submissive response the
initial assumptions are affimed and encouraged.
ii. The period of childhood represents an era of
violence. Obstacles are met, but the will to power, tmused
to detours or negatives, or conflicts with other wills, fights.
The impulse in this stage is that of self-assertion and pug-
nacity.
iii. The next stage of the dialectic may be called
an era of ambition; it occurs in adolescence. Self-assertive-
ness has reached, in its trial and error process, a cooperative
mode of expression, or at least a non-competitive one. But
there is still competition in that each will assumes for it-
29
self the outstanding or commanding role. The impulse or
desire is to shov/ oneself superior over his fellows; this can
be done best by a subordination of other wills. The conceit
of boys is paralleled by the vanity of girls.
iv. After adolescence the frustrated impulse to
subordinate becomes a desire to nurture, to help. This de-
sire has been dimly but increasingly present for a long while.
As it increases, selfishness becomes colored with altruism.
The former craving to achieve power over others dies and
rises as a longing to have power for others.
29. The "inferiority complex" is most prevalent, and
most dangerous, in this period.
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V. The last stage into which the human will emer-
ges, but one that is never completed, is that of maturity.
As the Yvill reaches this level, it becomes self-conscious.
This is the Begriff stage of the dialectic of the will to
power. The will has come into a v/orld of ideas, and it comes
to recognize that "all forms of power are subject to the
power of ideas." (ilAS, 316) The v/ill to pov/er is transformed
into a will to power through ideas. Competitive power is ex-
clusive: the more power one has the less there is for others,
PoT/er through ideas, on the other hand, is universal, because
the more one has, the more there is for everyone.
(3) Problems met and attitudes assumed bj the will to
pov/er . The world of ideas has to be thought in order to be
lived in. The newcomer rethinks the world, and as he does so,
he has ideas of his own; individuals come to have their own
attitudes. Defects are noted, which lead to proposals for
alteration. It becomes the task of the will to power to re-
build the world, in order to incorporate its ideas into it.
In this process of rebuilding the world, even as In the
development of the will to power, individuals suffer disillu-
30
sionment, and often have to undergo complete transformation.
Not alone must the individual meet and settle conflicts with
the ideas of others, which sometime oppose his ideal good
30. This may well be considered as another statement
of that development.
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with actual evil, but he must reckon also v/ith the chance and
hard fact of the world. Another problem which must be con-
sidered, and which often proves to be the most difficult task
of all, is the fact of one's ov;n limitation. It is far more
difficult for one to realize that he may be limited in ability
than to see that he has erred in judgment or technique. Man
is frequently unwilling, or unable, to learn this lesson; a
cruel and heartless v/orid has to force it upon him.
Individuals vary; they vary in their experiences, and
in their attitudes toward life sind the world. The various
31
attitudes, though, may be classified. There are those who,
sincere in their position, become tasters of pleasure and
glory in individual expression. Others go to a different
extreme; because the world is too much with them they retreat
into subjectivity. Theirs is a melancholy aloofness. It is
not in our power, they reason, to remake the world. We must
rule our own spirits, and take the world as it comes. Still
others make a triangle of the extremes; they abandon v/orldly
ambition in order to turn their hearts and minds heavenward,
i'ower there will be guaranteed by sacrifice here. A fourth
class is composed of those in whom the dialectic of the will
reaches the stage of maturity. These are they v/ho reject
the conception of power because of its contamination with
31. Illustrations will be cited in the following dis-
cussion of "Satisfaction for the will to power."
)
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self-assertion in favor of the conception of service. This
latter is associated with the will to power through ideas.
(4) Satisfaction for the will to pov/er . Regardless of
the stages in the dialectic or the attitudes toward life and
the world, there is still the fact of the will to pov/er.
What is its aim? And how can satisfaction be achieved?
i. The will to pov/er is a hunger for a feeling of
present v/orth as a person among persons. Whiting Williams
has a chapter in his book. Mainsprings of Men , on "The Main-
spring: Ihe Wish for Worth." He makes the statement that
" the prime influence on all of us . . . _is our wish to en.joy
32
the feeling of our worth as persons amon^ other persons .
"
The feeling of v;orth is the honest man's excuse for existence.
Integral to every philosophy is the desire to make the world
conscious of this p^O'ticular system of thought, or to estab-
lish it in the self-consciousness of the world. The will to
power may be refined; it is never surrendered. The satisfac-
tion of the will depends upon the universalizing of its
effect.
The tasters of pleasure cone to admit qualitative
differences, and to recommend the higher as better and more
32. Williams, MOM, 147. Italics his. Gf. -op. 139-
157.
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lasting. The subjectivist, whose attitude is akin to that
of the Stoic, recomraends his view as the way to happiness.
The builder-up of heaven tries to formulate his ideas so that
35
they will be acceptable to his earthly fellows. The mature
person finds his satisfactions, and his sorrow, in trying to
36help his immature brothers achieve maturity,
ii. Satisfaction for the will to power involves
more than a feeling of present v/orth; there is also the hope
that the exerted influence will be permanent. The satis-
faction realized by the v/ill to power as its effect is
33. For example, ifipicurus. In a letter to Menoeceus
on the conduct of life, l^picurus begins by recognizing the
necessity of seeking v/lsdom. It is never too early nor too
late. The youth needs wisdom in order thathe may be mature;
the old man in order that he may be youthful. When Epicurus
says that pleasure should be the aim of life he does "not
mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sen-
suality," By pleasure he means "the absence of pain in the
body and of trouble in the soul". (Laertius, LEP, II, 657)
Diogenes Laertius writes that Epicurus recognized mental
pleasure as above bodily pleasure, and pains of the mind as
v;orse than pains of the body. (LEP, II, 661) Cf. also Mill,
UTI, 11,
34. Spictetus, DIS, 3ff., 44ff., 84ff., et passim ;
Aurelius, THO, passim. The v/ise Stoic distinguishes between
the things which are in his pov/er and those which are not in
his power. The former he must use as best he can; the latter
he must use according to their nature. (Epictetus, DIS, 5)
All things considered critically, the lav/ of life is to "act
conformably to nature." (DIS, 84)
35. The most ardent evangelists are the heaven-bound
travelers
,
36. Cf. the story of Edward Rowland Sill in Royce, SMP,
465-467.
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universalized is temporary. Happiness comes only as this
effect is lasting; it depends upon at least an immortality
of influences. The hunger for a present feeling of worth
is paralleled by the desire that this worth, if not the
feeling, will last forever.
In some degree of clarity, a concrete or historic
immortality is the unabandonable goal of the will;
It is what all men most deeply desire, so far as
the will can be fulfilled in human existence.'^*''
Thus the self as a will to power becomes the self as a hope.
(5) A note on various interpretations of the v/ill to
povjer
.
Hocking is not the only one to speak of the will to
power as the ruling instinct of man. It is necessary to men-
tion and to compare some of these theories with Hocking's
interpretation. The main comparison v/ill be v;ith Nietzsche,
whose use of the phrase, the will to power, is the most wide-
ly known.
McDougall is in agreement with Hocking as he suggests
that the many Instincts may be regarded as channels through
which the vital energy, i.e., "some primordial undifferentlat-
38
ed Capacity to strive", is expressed in or through the or-
39
ganism. The phrase, vital energy, suggests Bergson with
37. Hocking, MAS, 320.
38. McDougall, OP, 113.
39. C. G. Jung thinks that the basis of this unity is
a primitive libido. For Jung this term is so general that
1I
1
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his 1' elan vital . Life is a kind of mechanism, but it is
a mechanism of the v^hole: there is an indivisible continuity.
Bergson' s view is akin to finalism, as opposed to mechanism.
The impetus or urge of each species is a universal vital
impulsion. In each species this vital energy is used in the
interest of adaptation. In his theory of adaptation Bergson
is close to Hocking's view of mastery and achievement by the
will to power. Adaptation does not mean merely elimination
of the unadapted; it is a reply, a response, which effects
changes in the organism due to the positive influence of
42
outer conditions. Evolution proceeds in many directions
because of resistance in the environment but also because of
the explosive or ongoing force which life bears v/ithin it-
self, ihe impetus of life consists in a need of creation.
This is akin to the creative activity of the will to power,
yet the elan vital is metaphysical and universal, not psy-
chological. The v/ill to power is also metaphysical, but it
gives more prominence to the empirical self.
39. (continued)
it might be replaced by "interest" (Jung, AP, 347, 348) For
Freud this libido has specific reference to sex. Jung's
view is more nearly satisfactory; Freud takes what is but an
aspect, and mistakes it for the whole.
40. Bergson, iiC, 54ff.
41. Ibid., 33.
42. Ibid., 62ff.
43. Ibid., 105ff.
44. Ibid., 273.
1I
)
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Schopenhauer referred to the instinct of man as "the
45
will to live." This phrase, while being both metaphysical
and psychological, iraplies that the impulse is directed pri-
marily inward, toward self-preservation. In so doing the
phrase fails to account for the outward direction of the
drive. The instinct is to achieve, and to master. Although
in his exposition of the will to live Schopenhauer gives some
place to this expanslveness , the phrase does not imply it.
The will to power escapes this defect; and this is the phrase
which Hocking uses to describe the unitary or unified basis
of man^ s striving.
IJietzsohe, however, used this particular phrase before
Hocking did. Since the meanings attributed to it are not
exactly the same, their expositions of the will to power will
be compared in more detail. According to Nietzsche this ex-
pression is completely adequate as a description of the basic
urge in human nature.
The triumphant concept "energy " , with which our
physicists created God and the v/orld, needs yet
to be completed; it must be given an inner will
which I characterize as the "Will to pov/er " - that
is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest
power; or the application and exercise of power
as a creative instinct. ... It is possible to
trace all the instincts of an animal to the will
45. Schopenhauer, WWV, sections 21, 23, 60. There is
a certain relation betv/een his view and the viev^r of Buddha,
for whom the basis of all suffering v/as desire, and desire
arose from the single craving for individuality. Salvation,
in each case, involves an escape from this innate striving.
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to power; as also all the functions of organic
life to this one source,"^^
Hocking does not "regard the v.ill to pov/er as an adequate
name for the central instinct". (MR, 97) It is more sug-
gestive, and more nearly adequate, than such expressions as
will to live or v/ill to reality. But there is no name that
"will be found wholly satisfactory". (ENR, 476)
Nietzsche's regard for the adequacy of this phrase led
to a more important defect in his theory, "He thought of
power as intrinsically competitive, a good which can be
47gained by one only at the expense of another." Hocking
rejects the implication of competition in the concept of
power. Power over nature is a common aim. But in social
relations pov/er over may be also a power for, for example,
the teacher and a student, or the parent and a child, "The
rightful position of one man toward others cannot be described
46. Nietzsche, WP, II, section 619. Italics in text.
Of. Nietzsche, WM, II, 104.
47. Hocking, ENR, 17. Hocking does not point out the
relation between these two defects. But to regard the name
as adequate is to narrow the impulse which it describes.
The pov;er becomes exclusive, and so competitive. It is a
terrible mistake, Nietzsche claims, "to regard the herd as
an aim instead of the individual. The herd is only a means.
• . . The individual is something quite new, and capable of
creating new things . He is something absolute, and all his
actions are quite his own. ... The 'ego' oppresses and
kills.
. . It v/ould fain give birth to its God and see all
mankind at its feet. . . . hvery living organism gropes
around as far as its power permits, and overcomes all that
is weaker than itself." (Nietzsche, WP, II, sections 766-
769. Cf. Nietzsche, m, II, 203-204.)
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without this conception." (PINR, 97) Sociability is Included
along v/ith curiosity among the necessary interests of man.
^HNR, 85) Since the will to power describes only the "com-
mon and uniting element of instinct" (HNR, 476), the unity
which it represents may include a number of drives or in-
terests. According to Hocking, the will to pov/er achieves
its satisfaction, amid changing conditions, through the con-
trolled expression of these several minor instincts. If the
will to power is hindered by hunger, the food-getting instinct
with v/hatever it involves, is brought into play. A sense of
mastery is present in that the will makes something its own,
and in that it controls its ovm future. If hindered by ig-
norance the mechsinisms involved in curiosity enable the will
to achieve mastery through knowledge or understanding. Pug-
nacity arises in the fact of opposition or antagonism. Fear
is a negative expression; it arises if and as the will is
unable to bring about conditions making for mastery. Vvhen
lonely the instinct of sociability effects a readiness for
social intercourse. Sex-love is explained according to the
v/ill to po'wer as "potency in search of a sanction". It be-
longs to the stage of physical and mental maturity. It
represents a "quest for a missing element in one's own self-
confidence", v/hich involves a "readiness to assume responsi-
bility for the welfare of another human being." (HNR, 96)
Nietzsche and Hocking are closer together than has
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appeared so far. In his insistence that pov;er should involve
a sense of responsibility Hocking goes out of the natural
world into the realm of ethics,^ If the craving for mas-
tery were paralleled by a longing to serve unselfishly there
would be less strife and more cooperation in the world.
Nietzsche's view that the will to power is basically selfish
and competitive may be more profound than Hocking's.
The condemnation of Nietzsche arises out of a misunder-
standing of his philosophy, even as his own condemnation of
Christianity arose from a misunderstanding of Jesus Christ.
49
Nietzsche is usually misinterpreted. His philosophy is a
mass of paradoxes, for example, the half-title of Also sprach
Zarathustra may be translated as! A Book for Everybody and
48. Viihat Nietzsche's theory lacks in sociability is
more than made up in his ethical demands. This will be
pointed out in what follov/s.
49, iiiven as capable a thinker as George T. Vi/. Patrick
writes of him as follov/s
:
In Nietzsche, the "Yes-sayer", it Cthe philosophy of
energy and affirmation"} appears in its extreme form.
Let us say "Yes" to our desires, to our instincts, to
our natural passions, to our inner needs. Let us say
"Yes" to our longings for empire, to our Kultur . Let
us say "Yes" to our political, economic, and commercial
ambitions. Let us say "Yes" to our individual traits,
to our budding genius, to our personality, to our need
of self-expression. (IP, 181)
Patrick goes on to say that the Great Vi/'ar was the fruit of
this philosophy of expansion and affirmation. Doubtless the
present conflict could be blamed on it v;ith equal right. But
is such the case? It may be that the accepted interpreta-
tion of Nietzsche has helped to engender strife and v/ar.
But could not the interpretation be wrong?
)
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Nobody . There is grave danger in paradoxes. Hiey lend them-
selves to multiple interpretations, Leighton defends Nietzsche
as follows;
He did not glorify brute strength in itself, nor
did he intend to glorify war in itself. Nietzsche's
chief significance consists in the vigor and per-
sistence of his assaults on the leveling, vulgariz-
ing tendencies of modern society.
Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman, Uebermensch , is
his own highest and most noble thought. Yet this represents
the basis for his ostracism. As Brightman interprets it,
the Uebermensch "is an idealized picture of a being who v/ills
51
most powerfully the highest possibilities." Nietzsche
sought to create the idea of something better. He is an
ethical perfectionist. The combat is not military, nor phy-
52
sical; it is spiritual. Hie Superman scorns consequences,
i.e., he is not defeated regardless of what happens. Tradi-
tional neighbor-love is selfish: the love of the nearest
should be abandoned in behalf of a love of the furthest,
53
Fernstenliebe . The future and the furthest should be the
motive of every today. Man is his own worst enemy; he must
50. Leighton, ISO, 196.
51. Brightman, ML, 166.
52. "yVhat Nietzsche would have the permanent standard
is spiritual power, power of will and mind, intellectual and
aesthetic pov/er. " (Leighton, ISO, 201)
53. Nietzsche, ASZ, 88-90.
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become willing to suffer and to die in order to rise: he
54
cannot become new until he has first put off the old man.
As for Hegel, and for Jesus, msin must die and rise again.
And of those who would marry and bring children into the
world, Nietzsche would demand: Are you entitled to desire a
55
child? The idea of the Superman implies the love of the
furthest; and demands that propagation shall be not only
onward but also upward.
The relationship between Hocking and Nietzsche, in
their expositions of the will to pov/er, is not so distant
as it first seemed to be. Indeed their interpretations are
intimately akin, perhaps more so than either of them would
admit,
4« The self as a hope .
The self may be a system of behavior. But the essence
of the self is hope. It is a purposing system of behavior
which develops as a persistent hope is realized. Hope is the
mother of this purposive activity. iiVery experience adds
color to this hope v/hich is the one object of all activities.
Particular experiences are meaningful in terms of their re-
lation to this central and dynamic source.
54. Nietzsche, ASZ, 91-94.
55. Ibid., 102-104. Cf. above, and Hocking, HI>fR, 96.
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Vihat is this hope which is the essence of the self? It
is an actual hold on a possible good. Royce attempts to de-
56
fine the self as "a Meaning embodied in a conscious life".
Hocking agrees with Royce, but he insists that "the primitive
background of self is rather of the nature of hope." (P6IC,
212)
Existence, to a self, means a perception of good
and evil as possibilities; and a building, out of
many partial goods, of a conception of good which,
as related specifically to my capacity for enjoy-
ment, is 212; good . 57
The self is sustained in life by the good which it actually
enjoys, but also by the conviction that some higher good is
possible, and will be realized.
both the possible good and the self's relation to it
are non- empirical. Neither of them is subject to any em-
pirical measure or laboratory test. "The object of this
hope simply cannot be discovered in the present world of
facts." (SIBF, 46) It represents a possible good, and the
possible does not mean the actual. The essential activity
of the self is to realize this possible good.
This possible good may be defined a little more clear-
ly. Possible should be distinguished from the necessary,
i.e., the detemined, and also from the purely unreal. If
the possible is, the possible must be something, and must
56. RoyCG, WI, II, .
57. Hocking, P6IC, 212. Italics his.
)
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have some relation to actuality. The possible is an essence
which has been conceived as desirable by some mind. This is
the means whereby an essence becomes a possible, and a pos-
sible tends to become actualized. As a promise of value the
self seeks to realize the possible good. "Mind is the only
organ for making future possibility actual." (P6IC, 211)
And on the other hand it is characteristic of mind to con-
ceive of possibilities and to actualize them.
The self's relation to this possible good is also non-
empirical. The actual hold upon it is variable, 'Hie inten-
sity of this hold, which may be called the tension of hope
,
represents the depth of the self; and thus represents its
58freedom, Tliis tension gives rise to initiative and re-
sourcefulness. The activity inspired by this tension of
hope "eludes scientific measure, because it lies not within
the world of nature, but plies betv/een nature and the world
of actual possibility." (P6IC, 213)
Although this activity cannot be measured in science it
does make the world different. In its activity the mind
adds first to the possible, then to the actual. And as the
possible is actualized there is a contribution to the realm
of being.
58. Cf . the sections, "Freedom a matter of degree" and
"The meaning of life."
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5. The basis for self- identity .
The human self is a union of opposites. It combines
change and identity. "The self spans past and future," (TP,
442) The immediate task is to point out the basis for the
identity of the self within its dialectical development.
The self suffers lapses of consciousness; it flickers; it
is transitory. Whitehead refuses to admit the self as real
for this reason. Personal identity can be recognized in
only one way, according to John Laird; that is, by "a judg-
59
msnt of comparison." But then the task is to find the
basis for the comparison.
The self is usually identified by the environraent
,
by
the surrounding physical objects. Yet the identity cannot
be proven in that way, because it is the persistent self
which recognizes the physical objects as the same from day
60
to day. The self remembers the objects. Then is not self
identity based on memory? Memory is helpful, but "the con-
tinuity of memory does not itself constitute the identity of
selfhood, but the pertinence of the contents of memory to
its continued questions," ( TDL, 200)
59. Laird, PS, 245.
60. Yet self-identity and vfo rid- identity go hand in
hand. Unless there v/ere a permanent frarae of change in the
v/orld the self -would be unable to find itself at home in the
world, (Cf, Hocking, MGHE, 186-187,)
)
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Personal identity is constituted loj the identity of
questions over the lapses of consciousness. "For psychology
as well as for metaphysics the will must be identified with
a persistent principle of preference." The identity must
be presupposed in order that the questions may be recognized.
According to Hocking the most persistent aspect of the self
is a feeling of value-strain. The world is recognized as
not being what it ought to be. The feeling of strain is
betv/een v/hat is recognized as actual and the ideal which is
desired. As a hope, the self is this persistent value
strain. The self's experience of time is the experience of
this value-strain. Its failures and successes are recognized
and owned. This feeling of strain is itself the comparison
of which Laird speaks. And the continuity of the self de-
62pends upon the identity of its feeling of restlessness.
61. Hocking, Art. (1916)"^, 502.
62. (Cf. Hocking, Phil 9, 12/14/39.) In identifying
the self and the feeling of value-strain. Hocking seems
only to have translated the problem into another language.
There are lapses in the "feeling"; then how is the feeling of
strain recognized as identical with the feeling of yester-
day? It seems that memory is the basis for personal iden-
tity. Because it is through memory that the self relates
what was to what is, as well as v/hat is to what was and
what will be. In so doing the self combines past and future,
and attains its identity.
1I
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6, The catep;ory of selfhood .
Selfhood is the basic category in the thought of Hock-
ing. Selfhood represents perhaps the most fundamental
64
problem in metaphysics. In his emphasis upon the reality
and importance of the self Hocking is at variance v/ith the
outstanding metaphysician, and idealist, F. H. Bradley.
After finding that his ideas "as to the nature of things
65
. . . v/ere in their essence indefensible", Bradley says
that he turned to the self, hoping to find in it a principle
66
with which the world might be comprehended. He admits
readily that the self exists. It is recognized as an
63. Hocking does not make specific use of the phrase,
"the category of selfhood"; he speaks of the "concept" of
self or selfhood (Art. (1928)1, 146), yet the terra "concept"
is so freighted with meaning that "category" is a better
word.
A category may be defined as that v/ithout which a
given universe of discourse is impossible. But without
selfhood no given universe of discourse is possible. To
try to get behind or beyond the self (or mind) is futile.
The self as mind is the most concrete entity which can be
discovered; the discoverer is more concrete than his dis-
covery. (P6IC, 215) The self might v/ell say, "When me they
fly, I am the wings." (TP, 264; Cf. 427, 441.) Thus the
term "category" is not onl^'- justified, but is required in
order to interpret the true meaning of Hocking's thought.
64. Of, Laird, PS, 3. "If and so far as metaphysical
problems are really felt and correctly attacked, the problems
of the self deserve to take precedence of all others."
65. Bradley, AR, 101.
66. Ibid., 75.
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empirical fact. But the vital point for metaphysics is to
find out v/hat the self is. Through his investigation of
the self Bradley comes to the conclusion that the concept
of selfhood is "too full of contradictions to be the
genuine fact." "Self . . . turned out to mean so many
things, to mean them so ambiguously, and to "be so wavering
in its applications", that it must be regarded as appear-
ance rather than as reality. This is just the reverse of
Hocking's view. He believes that the sharp contrast be-
tween the living and the non-living, the animate and the
inanimate, is best described by the terra self. Selfhood
69
is the outstanding characteristic of animate things. iin-
pirical selfhood is the only certainty that can be had.
There is nothing in all the world which is more profound
or higher than selfhood. (TP, 441) "Mind is the most
concrete entity we can ever discover, for the discovery
of an entity supposedly more concrete would reveal the
67. Bradley, AR, 75. He considers seven possible
meanings of the self: as total contents of experience at
one moment; as average contents of experience; as elements
making for personal identity; as monad; as what interests;
as opposed to not-self; as mere self. (AR, 77-101) In the
end he is tempted to imitate the Preacher and cry: "Appear-
ance of appearances; all is appearance."
68. Bradley, AR, 101.
69. Hocking, TP, 52.
)
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discoverer as one stage more concrete still." (P6IC, 215)
Bradley admits that
The self is . . . the highest form of experience
which we have, but, for all that, is not a true
form. It does not give us the facts as they are
in reality; and, as it gives them, they are ap-
pearances, appearances and error.
71Bradley's criterion of reality is coherence. The self is
simply unable to harmonize and understand chaotic exper-
72ience. Some principle higher than the self is needed in
order to achieve the end of metaphysics, which is "to under-
stand the universe, to find a way of thinking about facts in
73general which is free from contradiction."
Ihere is support for Hocking, in contrast to Bradley,
in the thought of Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne insists that
reason can find no equilibrium "until it elevates itself
above the mechanical categories and rises to the conception
of self-determining and intelligent personality as the
.74
supreme category in being and causation. According to
Bovme the category of selfhood is that for v/hich Bradley
seeks in this principle higher than the self.
70. Bradley, AR, 119.
71. Ibid., 136, 147.
72. Ibid., 115.
73. Ibid., 120.
74. Bowne, TTK, 106.
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An ultimate ground of things . • . can be found
only in free intelligence. This is the only sim-
plicity which can originate complexity; the only
unity which can produce plurality; the only uni-
versal which can specify Itself into particulars;
the only real explanation of anything. ^
In Bradley's view, it takes the Absolute to hold "all
possible content in an individual experience where no con-
76 7Vtradiction can exist," Nov/ the Absolute is not a self.
The Absolute is the Whole of sentient experience conceived
as a non-relational unity. ^ It is not personal in the
ordinary meaning of the term. "It is personal but more.
79
It is . . • super-personal."
But to go into the realm of the Absolute and the Super-
personal is to go beyond the categor^J" of selfhood as applied
to the human being. The Absolute was brought into the dis-
cussion because the dialectic of Bradley's thought demands
it; and also, in order to show the more significant kinship
between the cosmic Self and the hioman self, in the thought
75. Bowne, TTK, 233.
76. Bradley, AR, 147.
77. Ibid., 529.
78. Ibid., 530.
79. Ibid., 531. Cf. 551-533. Super-personal means
having aspects of experience which man cannot have but which
are suggested by the limitations of finite experience as be-
ing necessary to a living Whole. For Hocking God is per-
sonality, perfectly conceived. (MGHE, 336)
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of Hocking. Meanings apart from understanding and appre-
ciation are abstractions. That there is some kind of mental
life at the core of reality is implied by the existence of
objective meaning in the world. From this, it may be said
that the world is a self. It is not a graspable being; it
is infinite in depth and mystery. To say that the v/orld is
a self means "that the mental life v/ithin the world has its
unity, and that all the meanings of things cohere in a single
will." (TP, 441) The human self is an imperfect image of the
cosmic self. The category of selfhood is necessary for an
understanding of either. This category is the most meaning-
ful of all concepts. Selfhood is the perfect example of a
class of concepts which applies to a part of the v/orld and
81
also to the whole of it.
80. The cosmic Self for Hocking is the equivalent of
Bradley's Absolute. The two thinkers do not mean the same
by the term "Absolute". Bradley means by it something which
is more than, and includes God. "Grod is but an aspect, and
that must mean but an appearance, of the Absolute." (AR, 448)
Hocking v;rites as follows: "I do not say that the Absolute
is equivalent to God; I say that God, whatever else he may
be, must needs also be the Absolute." (MGHE, 206) Hocking
is speaking of an Absolute Being. Bradley's use of the term,
as "all there is", is more accurate.
81. Hocking, Art .( 1928) 146. In answer to the ques-
tion, "May not all the selfhood in the world be a manifesta-
tion of something more profound or higher?", Hocking writes:
"No. For there is nothing higher than selfhood, and nothing
more profound. Spinoza's substance, with an infinitude of
other attributes, unless it were conscious and self-conscious,
would be lower in being than the simplest of mankind." (TP,
441)

CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF AND THE BODY
1. The natural endowment of the self ,
V/hat is meant by "natural endowment"? This phrase has
reference to the original properties of human nature; it has
to do with v/hat may be called the "potentialities of here-
dity". Potentiality is a good word in this connection be-
cause these qualities or properties become evident only in
the course of the self's development: not all of them are ob-
servable in the infant. Then v/hy can it not be said that
heredity is of little importance, and that the active en-
vironment is all but omnipotent in determining v/hat the organ-
ism shall become? Such a statement is not true. The fact
remains that "human babies are born with dispositions which
fit them to become men rather than pigs or ostriches, and a
psychology which cannot duly estimate that fact is truncated
at the start. ""^
In order to discern the natural endowment of the self it
is necessary to study the mature person, and to deduce what
he was originally from what he nov/ is; and also, to study the
development of the individual from infancy to maturity. This
is the procedure which is follov;ed. The immediate concern is
1. Hocking, ENR, 47

51
simply to point out the initial properties, and to make a
preliminary statement about them. Each of them will be dis-
cussed in a separate section. In fact they are the basis
for the v/hole dissertation.
2
There are three elementary aspects of the self. First
and perhaps most tangible, there is the body as a storehous
of energy, of impulses to act, a mass of instincts. To "be
alive is to act. The impulses determining or motivating
the activity are variously described, John B. Watson, a be-
haviorist, denies the existence of instincts, yet he goes on
to proclaim the same thing under a different name; he calls
4
them "imlearned responses". John Dewey sponsors the notion
of generalized habits, in which "habit means special sensi-
tiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli,
standing predilections or aversions." Perhaps Hocking's
theory of instincts can be described best by likening it to
QAllport's theory of biophysical traits.
2. These are reckoned as basic because they play such
fundamental roles in the life of the normal person.
3. The body is the only tangible feature. The rest of
this chapter is concerned with the relation between the self
and the body.
4. Watson, BSH, 90ff.
5. Dewey, HNC, 42.
6. Cf. Allport, PER, Ch. XI, and also the following
section in which the two theories are contrasted.
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The second basic characteristic of the self is conscious
will. This element is not so obvious as the first, yet it is
nevertheless present. Allport is convinced that behind the
confusion of terms and failures of empirical observation
"there are . • . bona fide mental structures in each person-
7
ality that account for the consistency of its behavior."
Allport points out further that there is usually a master
Q
quality or cardinal trait by which the individual is known.
This cardinal trait, for Hocking, is the conscious will. It
represents the necessary interest of the self by which unity
of life is possible. "Tliis central and original impulse is
simply that vital push by which the human being strives for-
ward into the business of living." (HIIR, 48) This cardinal
trait as the conscious will is, or becomes, the self as a
9
will to power.
The third, and most debatable, of these initial proper-
ties is conscience or moral sensitivity."^^ Conscience is a
7. Allport, PER, 289.
8. Ibid., 337-338.
9. Cf . the section on "The self as a will to power".
Hocking identifies the conscious will as a will to power and
the self, but Allport denies that the cardinal trait is ever
identical with the personality. Cf. Hocking, HNR, Cl^iapters
X, XI; Allport, PER, 338.
10. Cf. the section on "The source of obligation, and
conscience". Cf. Hocking, Hl^R, Pt. Ill, especially Chapters
XII-XV.
1
53
principle of judgment, and also a principle of self- judgment
.
Hocking writes that the traits of the individual human mind
give some such picture as follows;
Every man, in acting, is aware not only of the
specific act, but also (more or less dimly) of the
principle on v/hich he acts, - this av/areness is
what makes him a 'rational' being. He is aware,
further, of the moral quality of this principle:
i.e., he feels the difference betv/een the kind of
act that is v/orth following up and recommending,
and the kind that is not 77orth recommending.-^-'-
The particular evidence for holding that conscience is native
to the self arises from the impossibility of importing a
sense of ought, or obligation, apart from an innate capacity
for the ought, "Pressure from outside is alien to the nature
of conscience: if I adopt a suggestion from outsiae and con-
firm it, as an obligation of mine, it is by an original dis-
covery and a free act," (HNR, 109) Yet it must be admitted
that conscience is capable of varying development; the develop-
ment depends upon the active environment and the conscious
12
will of the self involved. But this does not refute the
claim that conscience is a natural endov/ment of the human
self.
11. Hocking, I.IAS, 155.
12. Cf. the section on "The remaking of the self." Cf.
also Hocking, HNR, 421f.
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2» The theory of instincts ,
(1) Hie notion of instinct . Instinct has served as a
name for all the elements of heredity, particularly the unex-
plainable ones. An instinct is a non-isolable, hypothetical
ingredient of hunan nature. The concept has had a long,
hard road, with varying degrees of acceptability. It has
served to distinguish animal and human pov/era, and at the
same time to sugges-t traits common to man and the other ani-
mals. It has been indispensable as a haven of refuge for
man* s ignorance in his endeavor to understand himself. In-
stinct remains, however, as the most concrete and ultimate
iinit of description in the analysis of original human nature,
(HNR, 49-51)
Hocking accepts the naturalistic view of man, and follov/s
it as far as it will go. There is much to be gained from a
biological understanding of human nature. In this way the
naturalistic view proves its v/orth, but also shows its limi-
tations. According to the biologists, instincts are inherited
v/ith the body as a set of dispositions to reflexive activity.
These reflexive acts follov/ something of a serial order to-
ward a significant conclusion. One is the stimulus for the
other, and so on in turn. The end or conclusion is the sur-
vival of the organism or of the species.
Instincts as dispositions to typical reflex actions often
become habitual modes of response to stimuli. In becoming
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habits Instincts are shaped by the experience of the organ-
Ism. Each of the major instincts involves the v/hole organism,
so that the organism must give its consent as it turns from
one activity to another. This suggests that the nervous cir-
cuit involved in instinctive activity is not entirely mechan-
ical but is subject to the conscious supervision of the or-
ganism. Such is indeed the case. "An instinct is an element
of consciousness as v/ell as of sub-consciousness." (HNR, 55)
Instinct may be defined as "any specific form of the will-to-
power which reaches its end by the use of innate motor mech-
13
anisms, common to the species." (HNR, 476-477) This is
especially true in the human organism. The nervous circuit
represents the physical link betv/een the stimulus and the
response to it; but desire or aversion represents the con-
scious link between the stimulus and the response, and tends
to determine the latter. Consciously the stimulus repre-
sents some intrinsic value because of what it involves or
means. As a fact of consciousness instinct involves an idea-
content as v/ell as a tendency-to-action; instinct intensifies
(or lessens) the intensity of stimuli as it "endows them
with a meaning to be worked out in a course of conduct."
(HNR, 60)
13. Cf . Chapter II, section 3, "The self as a will to
power.
"
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(2) The range of instinct in man. Accepting as the
definition of instinct: any Innate, untaught or unreasoned
skill, v/hat is the range of instinct in man? Hobbes taught
that the natural state of man is bellum omnium contra om-
14
nes, while Grotius thought of man as "dominantly amicable."
(HNR, 65) In contrast to these viev/s. Hocking favors the
position of Montesquieu for whom man is a generalized crea-
15ture. The human infant seems to be relatively free of any
such specific skills. He is dependent for a longer time
than are other animals upon his parents. Bergson is of the
opinion that man has either gone beyond or else has rejected
instinct in favor of intellect. This reference to intellect
might be called the central instinct of man, at least for
Bergson: instinct being the faculty of using or constructing
organized instruments, whereas intelligence is the faculty
1
6
of making and using unorganized instruments.
Instinct in man is inconspicuous because of the supple-
mentary functions and artificial interests which tend to
balance it. This seeming paucity of instincts in man is
14. Hobbes, Works, II, 2-6, 11; III, 110-113.
15. Montesquieu, OCM, III, 89-100.
16. Bergson, EC, 148ff. The tendency of intellect is
to analyze and then synthesize, to dissect and then to re-
construct, into a practical system, (Cf. EC, 162, 167f.)
Hocking does not accept Bergson' s position as regards the
central instinct of man. (Cf. HNR, 63, 68, 80.)
)
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intensified because of the variety of response of which he
is capable, and because of the coalescence of instincts
through vicarious expression and satisfaction. Yet instincts
are present in man in no small proportion; "he is the field
of their conflict and adjustment." (HNR, 66) Regardless of
the shape of stimuli or responses instinct is "a something
17
which demands a hearing and finds it." Instinct does not
require a stimulus because it is itself the stimulus. Ttie
existence of instinct cannot be denied simply because it
cannot be understood, or because it varies in expression.
Hocking despairs of making any satisfactor^T" list of in-
stincts; the impulses in man are so mixed and fused that
listing is arbitrary. He is convinced, however, that there
are units of behavior in the human organism, which are used
in various combinations; they do not appear as so many speci-
fic instincts, but rather as general ones. As one general
instinct is expressed several apparently specific instincts
may gain satisfaction. S.g., food-getting involves biting,
chewing and swallowing. Essentially there are two highly
generalized groups of instincts: the positive instincts are
expressed in terras of assertive activity and expansion; the
negative, in retraction and aversion. (HNR, 72)
17. Hocking, MAS, 214. Italics his.
18. Hocking, MGHE, 25.
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Rather than speak of them as instincts. Hocking prefers
the qualifying term "central" instincts, or better, a dif-
ferent phrase, constitutionally "necessary interests", (HNR,
83) If one is to get beyond the trivial, i.e., reflexive
activity, the term instinct becomes strained. These central
instincts or necessary interests, which include curiosity
and sociability, represent the most significant tendencies
in human nature. Yet at the same time they are the most
elusive to observation and experiment. Effort to assimilate
them has led to confusion and to the downfall of the theory
of instincts. (HNR, 86)
i. The dilemma in the conception of instincts.
There is an inescapable dilemma in the conception of instinct
as it is applied to human psychology. The meaning of the
term is unavoidably hybrid, involving both physical behavior
and conscious interests. But this duality which obtains in
practice must be rejected if a technical definition is to
be given. It involves a choice between the two aspects,
(HNR, 441)
The primitive realm of instinctive activity was animal
behavior. Thus the psychologist rejects the conscious as-
pect, and thinks of instinct as an innate behavior pattern,
which makes for adaptiveness and provides unlearned skills.
This gains added v/eight from the fact that to define instinct
from the side of experience is av/kward. Instinctive activity
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is embarrassing to the conscious self; instinct comes to
mean natural aptitude, v/hile so-called instinctive activi-
ties are rationalized as interests, such that fear becomes
a rational response to objective conditions.
Instinctive activities are not merely uncanny tricks.
The whole normal round of animal life, breeding, food-getting,
nest-building, and migrating, is governed or determined by
instincts. These same categories of interest are found in
human life, as love, hunger, and self-defense. These repre-
sent the basic interests of man; and all his activity may be
explained in terms of them. These interests, however, are
ultimate facts which cannot be explained in terms of instinc-
tive modes of motion, or in terms of behavior mechanisms,
(HNR, 446) To define an interest in terms of a mode of action
is to leave a chasm between the behavior mechanism and those
19
acts which are determined by the interests involved. The
mechanical operations, which the psychologist attributes to
instinct, may explain the activity but they leave untouched
or unexplained the basis or reason for the activity.
The physiological explanation of instinct decreases the
usefulness of the explanation. Unless instinct is to be re-
stricted to the trivial in human life there is a mental in-
gredient which must be recognized. There are behavior
19. Hocking, SIBF, 22,
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patterns or physiological dispositions which attend or cor-
respond to particular nervous processes. But this does not
explain the process itself or the cause for it. To explain
a thing as instinctive seems only to postpone the prohlera
because instinct itself is an enigma.
ii. The solution of the dilemma. The case for the
physiologist becomes more difficult still as he tries to
20
account for the "instinctive regulation of ins tine
t
.
"
Instincts are adjustable; but to call the adjustments instinc-
tive also merely postpones the problem. A better course, and
perhaps a solution to the dilemma, is to try to interpret
21
the instinct- aim. The ins tine t- aim, if anything is, is the
constant nucleus of instinct. The physiologists have been
looking for something v/hich isn't there, or at least, which
cannot be found through physiological investigation. Any
adjustment of instincts is effected by higher or more funda-
21
mental instincts. The secondary instincts, which regulate
20. Hocking, HNR, 461. Italics his. He suggests else-
where that the instinct of man is "an instinct to reflect
upon instinct and supersede it. " (MAS, 147. Italics his.)
This is paralleled by Bradley, v/ho, after defining metaphy-
sics as "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe
upon instinct", goes on to add that "to find these reasons
is no less an instinct." (Bradley, AR, xiv.) It is akin to
Bergson' 3 view noted above, i.e., that the central instinct
of man is to refer to intellect.
21, Cf. note above.
I
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the others, have as their stimuli " finely differentiated
22
conditions of the central nervous current . " Reactions to
such complex situations making for adjustment and regulation
cannot be explained apart from central or internal stimuli.
These secondary or regulative instincts may "be called gen-
eral Instincts, in that they are more general than the
primary ones. The general instincts tend to unify the
particular ones, and to use the specific mechanisms as means
23
to an end.
This integration, or this organizing, does not stop at
ordering the particulars in terms of the general; it continues,
tending to ujiify the entire life of instinct. It is true that
v/henever the organism acts, whether Instinctively or not, it
acts as a v/hole. In the course of development the number of
stimuli increase to such an extent that response to all of
them is Impossible. The stimuli become canaidates for res-
ponse. The organism must then select and give its consent to
the stimuli to which it shall respond. As this situation
arrives all instinctive activity becomes subject to a still
more general instinct which represents "the persistent but
unspecified craving, or ambition, or v^ish of the entire
creature." (ENR, 470)
22. Hocking, HNR, 466. Italics his.
23. For example, the general instinct of food- getting
Involves biting, chewing and swallowing*
)1
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The object of this unspecified craving which tends to
imify the entire life of instinct becomes more definite as
maturity is reached. The physiologist is unable to discern
the nature of this object according to any laboratory tech-
24
nique. He must depend for his chief data on introspection.
This dominant instinct or persistent craving represents a
value- trend v/hich can be understood better through experience
of it (and reflection on the experience) than through any
classification of physiological dispositions attending it.
The experiencing of value can never be explained by in-
stinctive activity; but instinctive activity can be understood
best in terms of value. The human self is not possible apart
from a unity of instinct because such unity is a condition of
selfhood. A person must be willing to own, and be able to
justify his deeds. If conduct is to be referred to value
there must be a single standard of value which is above the
competing impulses. This standard in human life does not, and
should not, become static. There should be growth toward a
single Value. There is always a plurality of impulses, and
so of values, but there is an assumed discoverable unity of
24. Gordon W. Allport refuses to join the discrediting
chorus of the behaviorists
,
logical positivists, and psycho-
analysts concerning the evidence of immediate experience.
They propose "the Unconscious or the physico-chemical Bodily
Constitution ... as the true matrix of personality, the
only region worth exploring." In spite of their contention
Allport insists that "the core of the objective method is
still the reliance each scientist places upon the testimony
of his own fugitive and overlapping conscious states." (PER,
159. Italics ^his.)
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values. This is in fact one version of the problem of the
many and the One. The stumbling block preventing a concise
list of instincts or impulses is not their mechanistic
nature, but is "the fact that they are not distinct and sep-
arable entities . They are in reality various aspects of
25
one fundamental instinct or necessary interest,"
The recognition that instinct are aspects of one neces-
sary interest is the first step in the interpretation of the
ins tlnct-alm. To seek to interpret this aim is to go beyond
the realm of physiology, but this must be done if the dilemma
is to be resolved. To interpret the instinct-aim is extremely
important for man because he, most of all, lives under arti-
ficial conditions. If it be interpreted, and the several in-
stincts become organized around this aim, it is not necessary
that each instinct be expressed in and for itself. All of
them are aspects of the individual's unitary purpose; the
unused instincts achieve at least a vicarious expression or
satisfaction; to achieve the one purpose brings satisfaction
to all the instincts as parts of the organic whole.
Interpreting the instinct-aim is a process of learning
what one wants. And because "one's values tend to become
'reasonable'," (MAS, 216), it is also a process of learning
why one wants what he v/ants. The dialectic never ends
25. Hocking, HNR, 87. Italics his.
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because there are always new whats, and thus nev/ whys. In
the process, however. Instincts come to be looked upon as
a part of the self, not merely as a part of its inheritance.
And behavior, instead of being effected by ancient causes,
becomes a process of achieving rational purposes.
The process of interpreting the instinct-aim begins in
experience. Instinct initiates behavior, but then by use of
memory the behavior is reviewed; and the next experience is
26thereby determined to be different. In the dialectic of
experience the instinct-aim comes to be recognized as the
self. Henceforth, the self acts, and directs the acting. In
time there is no instinct which remains outside the self's
conscious aim or purpose, for nothing endures v/ithout the
sanction of the self. Only that is secure in instinct which
is secure also in conscious will. Instinct is a non-rational
aspect of human nature. It is not an irrational part because
it is potentially rational. Hocking appeals to Hegel to de-
fend the view that instinct is an early stage of reason.
Reason, or Vernunf
t
, is explicit not at the beginning but at
the end of history. Thus Hocking states that, for Hegel,
26. The reality of time is a guarantee that no two ex'
periences can ever be the same, but the memory of the first
act colors the second.
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"Vernunf
t
is instinct becoming self-conscious".
(3) Hocking and Allport ; instincts and traits . Gordon
V/. Allport develops essentially this position in his recent
psychological interpretation of personality; his theory of
traits represents what Hocking has in mind in his view of in^
2!
stincts. There is only a slight difference in terminology.
Allport calls his a biophysical in contrast to a biosocial
29
theory of traits. It is held in the view that traits are
more than mere names, yet everj trait-name would not neces-
sarily imply a trait. However, back of the multiplicity of
names "there are none the less bona fide mental structures
in each personality that account for the consistency of its
30behaviou" Psychologists are tinable to study human nature
without assuming these traits or tendencies. They cannot
discover instincts or traits in the laboratory or by
27, Hocking, MAS, 218. Italics his. Mere instinct re-
presents the sein stage of the dialectic. The term, becoming,
is appropriate because the dialectic only moves toward truth;
it never does reach truth completely. Each new synthesis
brings a broader grasp of the truth, and although the truth
which is discovered is eternal, the truth is never known
completely,
28, Hocking is more philosophical, and recognizes the
metaphysical implications of his views, whereas Allport de-
sires to dispose of the metaphysical question, (PER, 287)
The differences in their very similar interpretations will
become evident in the course of the discussion.
29, The terra biophysical does not connote sufficiently
the important role of consciousness.
30, Allport, PER, 289, Italics his.
IA
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deductive reasoning. They are derived by inference from ob-
served consistency of behavior,
"The doctrine of traits emphasizes concrete individual-
31ity," This is the reverse of the theory of instincts in ,
v/hich stress is laid upon the common element or that which
is universal. That was pointed out above, hov/ever, as Hock-
ing' s objection to the term instinct. The term becomes
strained if one goes beyond the merely trivial in human
32
nature. Hocking prefers the term interest, or value-strain,
rather than instinct. It is more characteristic of the human
33
self, Likev/ise Allport writes that traits have "less to do
v/ith fleeting mental sets than with lasting mental structures
such as interests, tastes, complexes, sentiments, ideals, and
34
the like," A trait is defined as
a generalized and focalized neuropsychic sys tern
( peculiar to the individual ) , v/ith the capacity to
render many stimul i functionally equivalent , and
to initiate and guide consistent ( eculvaTent ) forms
of adaptive and expressive behavior ,
Allport goes on to say, however, that this is not a novel
31. Allport, PER, 340.
32. Cf. mm, 83, 477.
33. It v/as noted that Hocking accepts the biological
or natural theory of human nature in order to gain what it
has to offer, to use it as a basis, but he does not stop
there. In following it he finds its source, and its limi-
tation, and is thus more able to correct natural theory,
34. Allport, PER, 290,
35. Ibid,, 295. Italics his.
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conception, and points out a number of concepts proposed by
other authors which are intimately related to his ovm view.
Three of the kindred concepts are used by Hocking: ideal,
interest, and subjective value. (Hocking calls the last
value- strain.
)
There is agreement then in the fact that the traits
or interests are unique, individual, or personal. Such a
statement as the following might be made by either writer.
"What motivates each person is not some element common to
all individuals, but his own particular pattern of tensions."
Hocking, in fact, defines the self as a hope; it is a system
of purposive behavior which emerges from a persistent hope.
(SIBF, 46) And the self's tension toward this hope deter-
37
mines its depth of selfhood, its freedom, and its reality.
As was noted, instincts or traits are not identifiable
according to boundary (HNR, 87); they can be identified as
aspects of the v/hole, and by their focus or meaning in the
whole. Allport writes as follows: "This focus is essentially
the telle significance of the trait, that is to say, its
3
meaning to the individual as a mode of survival and mastery."
36. Allport, PER, 321. Cf. Hocking, SIBF, 46, 64ff.,
161 ff., P6IC, 212-215.
37. Hocking, SIBF, 169; P6IC, 213; HNR, 166; MGHE, 141,
541; TP, 450; TDL, 108-109.
38. Allport, PER, 327. Italics his. Gf. Hocking, HNR,
55ff., in which he speaks of desire as "the conscious link
betv/een a particular perception and a particular action."
(HNR, 56. Italics his.)
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39
"The consistency of a trait is entirely a matter of degree."
Since the trait is personal it depends for its consistency
upon the person whose trait it is, or upon the whole of
which it is a part.
Both Hocking and Allport recognize the necessity for
unity in the self or personality. It is a "condition of
40
selfhood". There is "the assumption of a dlscoverahle
41
unity . " It is assumed because it is recognizable amid the
multiplicity of traits and desires. Both men would accept
Stern's apt description of personality as "a multiform
42dynamic unity," Personality is a unitas multiiple^c .
In discussing this unity, hov/ever, there comes to light
the difference between Eocking and Allport, between the meta-
physical and the psychological interpretations of personality.
In both theories the unity depends upon the presence of some
eminent or cardinal trait, of some general instinct, or of
some supreme interest or ideal. In Allport' s theory this
cardinal trait, "though pervasive and pivotal . . . still re-
mains within the personality; it never coincides 'with it."^*^
39. Allport, PER, 332.
40. Kocking, HNR, 475. Of. Allport, PER, Oh. XIII.
41. Hocking, HNR, 475. Italics his.
42. Stern, PS, I, 161-165; II, 4-5.
43. Allport, PER, 338.
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But for Hocking this persistent craving or hope, which once
might have appeared to be a stranger, "becomes, or is, the
44
self.
5. The moment of selfhood , and of self- consciousness .
The moment of selfhood represents a lower level than
self-consciousness. The former means simple awareness, or
consciousness, whereas the latter involves a consciousness
of the self, a turning of consciousness within. The moment
of selfhood cannot he &n object of experience, but the
45
moment of self-congoiouan©sg Is, n©0©Si&rlly.
According to Royce the self is a product of social life.
Its origin is in time; its development is such that it de-
pends upon nature and the social order for both its content
and character. Even the reflective side of life is a social
product. "V/here the analogy of our relations to our fellows
ceases, reflection ceases also." Indeed all self-conscious
functions are, "in their finite, human and primary aspect,
46
social functions, due to the habits of human intercourse,"
44. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 58; SIBF, llOff.
45. Hocking, SIBP, 120. "The very conception of a
beginning of conscious life carries with a paradoxical
reference to something pr ior to that beginning." Hocking
would identify the moment of selfhood and the moment of
self- consciousness. (Cf. LIAS, 237)
46. Royce, SGE, 194, 196.
)
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Royce insists that the individual comes to be self-conscious
through the persistent influence of other individuals. Hie
child is more aware of the conscious acts of someone else
than of his own acts. His self-consciousness really feeds
47
upon his relations v;ith those about him. Hocking would
accept this theory, in principle. Instead of beginning as
solitary beings and acquiring community, "we begin as social
48products
, and acquire the arts of solitude " . Yet he insists
that self-consciousness is not a product of society. Con-
tacts and criticisms sharpen self-consciousness, but they
would have no meaning for an individual unless he were already
self-conscious. "The measurement of self presupposes the in-
tuition of self." (liAS, 237) If the self is nothing without
society hov/ can it be anything with it? There is a gradual
increasing in sensitivity and discrimination. Men become
self-conscious by degrees; and men become individual persons
by degrees.
History proceeds under a veil of semi-consciousness
. . . the human mind is never fully awake. To be
sure, it alv/ays fancies itself in possession of the
full day of "consciousness"; its present degree of
awakeness is felt as standard.^^
Terry and Alexander identify the mind with its neural
47. Royce, WI, II, 170ff.; SGE, 201.
48. Hocking, MGHE, 299. Italics his.
49. Hocking, PLR, 39.
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basis. But in "both instances the effort to escape the prob-
lem leads to more questions than answers. Perry states that
as property of the physical organism, "elements become mental
content when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic
50
of the central nervous system . " Alexander writes with
equal illumination that "a neural process of a certain level
of development possesses the quality of consciousness and is
51
thereby a mental process." At best these statements serve
only to postpone the problem, because the question arises
immediately as to what this specific manner is which charac-
terizes the central nervous system, and as to the level of
development necessary for a neural process to become a mental
one. And a more difficult problem is to give the reason for
the development, whereby elements may become mental content,
52
and v/hereby a neural process can become a mental one. But
the question may come into the mind of the reader, "Well,
what better solution can be given?" A more direct solution
is that of going iraraediately to the point to which Perry and
Alexander finally would be driven, and to recognize that in
the permanent form of life there must be the possibility of
50. Perry, PPT, 298-299, Italics his.
51. Alexander, STD, II, 5. Cf. pp. 3-30.
52. This v/hole matter will be discussed more fully in
section five belov/.
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mind or consciousness. Based on this recognition the ad-
54
vent of selfhood is not inexplicable,
John Dewey offers approximately the same answer as do
Perry and Alexander, But for Dewey there is no such thing
as mind; there is mind- as-function in the control of environ-
ment. Dewey attributes the appearance of this mind-as-function
to natural events. Under certain conditions, i.e., problematic
situations, the mental emerges. The organic emerges from
the physical; and later the mental emerges from the organic,
These three terms denote "levels of increasing complexity and
55intimacy among natural events," According to Dewey, "Mind
is primarily a verb. It denotes all the v/ays in which we
deal consciously and expressly with the situations in which
we find ourselves," Yet in another place he recognizes
the causal status of the self, "Hie constancy and pervasive-
ness of the operative presence of the self as a determining
factor in all situations , , . is more intimate and omni-
57present in experience than the air we breathe," If Dewey
53, Cf. Chapter VI, 5, (1), (2),
54, It may be said that this "recognition" is itself
the problem. Nevertheless it is the most coherent solution,
in fact the only one which is not self-contradictory,
55, Dewey, EAN, 261,
56, Dewey, AE, 263.
57, Dewey, EAN, 246.
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would only be true to the implications of this statement
his position would be almost identical with that of Hocking.
But the problem remains of pointing out specifically
the moment of selfhood, and of self-consciousness. The
moment of selfhood represents that period in the life of the
organism when focus of attention becomes possible, when a
unity of apperception is exercised. The moment of self-
consciousness comes later in the development of the organism.
It represents that period when the self can focus its atten-
tion upon its own self. Self-consciousness is realized with
the appearance of memory, v/hen the self becomes able to re-
late what v/as to what is, or to relate v/hat is to what was
59
and to what v;ill be. Instinct initiates behavior; memory
supervenes; and future acts are carried out differently.
Instinct gives place to or becomes the self which acts and
60directs the action. The self has become able to recognize
states of mind as its own; it has become able to reflect on
its acts, and to judge them. The role of self-conscious
mind as judge is evident in the normal development of an
58. It is doubtful whether Hocking is right in identi
fying these tv/o moments. (Cf. MAS, 237.)
59. Gf. Hocking, TDL, 17-18.
60. Hocking, IIAS, 216ff . Thus the self becomes the
"determining factor in all situations" which was mentioned
above. (Cf. Dewey, EAN, 246.)
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emotion. There are seven steps:
!• The exciting idea in the mind;
2. Beginnings of disturbance in skeletal muscles
and viscera, with increased adrenal flow;
3. The mind becomes aware of these changes (an
incipient Jaraes-Lange effect);
4, The mind consents, or does not consent, to the
further development of these expressive changes
in the muscles under its control. Then if
consent is given;
5, Increased muscular activity and increased ad-
renal secretion;
6, Mental awareness of these changes (full James-
Lange effect);
7. Development and exhaustion of the emotion. (SIBP, 64)
There are two divisions in this outline. One through
three is preliminary; four through seven is the full-fledged
emotion. Point four is the most critical of all; its import-
ance can hardly be over- emphasized. It may be called the
threshold of consent . It is determined at this point the
degree to which the whole organism shall be involved. The
authority of the self-conscious mind is not complete, however,
but is determined by the degree of unity already achieved in
62
the total life of instinct.
61. "Ihat which in human nature is fundamental, intimate,
genuine, private, ana wholly owned, is feeling." (MGHE, 44)
Feeling represents an "instability in consciousness" (MGHE,
65) ; it is e-motion; it is akin to instinct, mentioned above
as initiating behavior; feeling sets the organism in motion.
62. Of. the section of "Freedom a matter of degree".
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The theories of Perry and. Alexander concerning the ori-
gin of mind were rejected, but the fact remains that there
is a neural basis for the self»s life. It is absurd to deny
that the body has a place in the development of the self.
It remains to point out the self's dependence upon the body.
63
4. The place of the body in the development of the self .
The body is an integral part of the mind or self. It
enters into the experience of the mind as a visible, spatial
object to which is referred certain needs and wants, certain
powers and capacities, as well as the mind's steady sense of
being. The body is not merely an additional fact to the mind,
it "is required by the mind as a part of its own being."
(SIBP, 80) The mind could not be itself without its body.
The mind, as a system of meanings, involves facts as well.
The mind is a hope; it is a hold on possibility, but it in-
volves also a present actuality; it is an actual holding of
possibility. The mind is an achiever, a worker for ends;
as purposive it must work as causal in the midst of causal
relations. The body is an inseparable organ of the mind;
64
all its categories are necessary for the mind's structure.
63. Cf. the sections, "The natural endowment of the
self" and "Social experience and experience of nature."
64, The following discussion belongs also to part
5(2) belov/, a treatment of the mind problem in which the
body is considered as language of the self.
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In the first place, mind needs a body because to be a
person or self requires "a clear distinction between thought
and deed." (SIBF, 81) The transition from thought to actu-
ality is a mystery. It is the body in which, and by means
of which, that thought first becomes actuality. Emotion is
the concretion of thought, displaying meaning in the body,
and preparing for actualization through bodily activity.
There is not a time-sequence between the will-to-act and the
action. The act is contemporaneous with the fiat. There
may be a long period of tentativeness , of contemplation, but
the moment of decision is the moment of action. The muscu-
lar movement is the v/ill in action. Will is the stamp of
approval for objectification, saying to the thought: "Be
thou actual." The self without a body would be without a
will, and so without an actualizing capacity. The will-to-
be is far more constant than is the will- to-do. It is im-
possible to separate or distinguish immediate existence and
particular existence. And the body is to the mind that
sphere of existence which is completely particularized,
(SIBF, 83-85)
The mind requires a body, in the second place, because
it requires an accumulation of pov;er or capacity behind its
deeds. As the mind passes from one act to another it keeps
something permanently. It remembers the act, but it also
knows how or is able to perform the act again; it has acquired
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a skill, or formed a habit. Yet a habit is a creation of the
mind; it becomes an artificial law of nature. (SIBF, 90)
The body takes care of the physical detail; the mind is thus
freed from the routine. Habits are kept in mind, although
unattended; they reside in the allied or friendly subconscious.
Reside is the proper word, because each habit is a kind of
65
self, with its own meaning and body. The self of the habit
is its motive or meaning, not its body, and each habit has a
will to live and seeks its reincarnation. In new situations
familiar or time-worn approaches, or habits of response, come
to mind and so vie with each other in seeking to be tried, to
be reincarnated. The mind builds itself through creating and
using its habits.
But in the building of itself, the mind must have some-
thing to begin with. The mind cannot create, nor can it under-
stand its sources. For it, to be is to accept being. Appar-
ently, the body is the first agent. It seems that the body
is continuous while the mind is discontinuous and completely
new, and only gradually supervenes. Yet are there not also
hereditary determinants of character? The new mind is a new
will to pov/er, "embodied in a few elementary dispositions to
action." (SIBF, 120) At first these dispositions, or instincts.
65. Viewed in this light the real self becomes a group
of latent selves. Each habit is a product of the self, and
is its usable property. (SIBF, 90-93)
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are as a stranger in the house; but the stranger is really
66the host. These dispositions constitute an initial tech-
nique, a mental end.o\vment of the new mind. And the self has
some understanding of this endowment, of its meaning. This
insight is possible through the overlapping of selves, and
through the fact that there are mental as well as physical
67
endov/ments in heredity. There is evidence against the
view that the mental life experiences a bodily sojourn in
reproduction. There is continuity in both mind and body.
And this continuity provides that with which the new mind
begins its building of itself.
There is a third, and perhaps more evident, reason that
the mind needs the body. The body serves as an instrument
of give and take v;ith the v/orld beyond. The mind is a system
of purposive behavior; and behavior requires a space-time
v/orld. The mind must live in this world, from which it re-
ceives the material and themes for its activity. To make
intercourse possible there must be a kinship of structure;
if the world is bodily the mind must be bodily. The mind
interacts v/ith the world by way of its body: it could not
"give and teike" 7/ith the world except for its bodily appear-
ance in nature. (SIBF, 94-95)
66. Cf. the sections, "The self as a will to power"
and "The theory of instincts".
67. Gf, preceding note, and also the section, "The
natural endowment of the self."
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This nay raean, and must mean, one of two things: if
all parts of the Interacting system must be alike, then they
must be either physical or else mental. Either the body
goes back to nature, and the self's reality becomes nil,
or nature is brought along with the body into the realm of
the self. The body is a part of physical nature. Now if
the self's need of the body makes it a part of the self,
nature must also be a part of the self. But this would be
solipsism, and that is an untenable position.
As the self is in interaction v/lth the physical v/orld,
it is apparently in contact with a not-self, yet at the same
time it is creating after the pattern of v/hat it has per-
ceived. Nature is material-for- experience, i.e., it is
something for the self, but at the same time it appears to
be something on its ov/n account. This self-sufficiency or
independence of nature must be examined.
There are three distinct marks of nature's otherness.
(SIBF, 126ff,) First, the givenness of sense-data: They are
not invented, nor are they deduced by reason; sense data are
discovered and known only In the actual experiencing of them.
These data are the original stuff of the experience of nature.
The physicists insist that these qualities, colors, sounds.
68. Cf. Chapter II, 1, 2 (1),
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smells, tastes, are not in the self, but in the objective
world, They are ingredients of nature, of the space- time
world. If sense-data are of nature then surely they are not
caused by nature. To regard nature as their cause is to bi-
furcate nature and to resign sense-data to the self. Since
sense-data are nature, to seek a source beyond them is to go
beyond nature, to that upon which nature is itself dependent.
And if the self is dependent upon sense-data, nature is also
dependent, so that the self is ultimately dependent upon
69that which supports nature.
The second distinct mark of nature's otherness is its
strict orderliness. This, for the Kantian school, is a
mark of independence or objectivity. Nature seems to be a
continuing series of causal relations. But what initiates
the series? Hie final resort is to the self. The will is
an actualizing agency for the self, (SIBP, 83) V/ill says to
a thought, "Be thou actual", and as the thought is actualized,
consequences follov/ from it. Nature drav/s the consequences,
yet the self initiated them. The self does not know all the
consequences in advance, but it finds out through the inherent
consistency of experience, and thus finds the wider reaches
of its own meaning. This is made possible through the
69. Cf . Chapter V, 4. Cf . also Hocking, MGHE, 285;
SIBF, 128, 135.
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strict lawfulness and impartiality of nature, which, though
seeming to set nature apart from the self, is really neces-
sary in the nature of the self. (SIBF, 130ff.)
In the third place, nature appears as a not-self because
it is so public; Nature is a common object; it is property
for all selves, and hence private property for none. It is
real as over against personal fancy and imagination. It is
real in that it serves as the world of common life. The pub-
licity of nature shows the need and the value of its orderli-
ness. To serve well as a common object for many selves its
impartiality must be as that of an ideal law.
Nature is other than the self, and was before it; nature
does not belong to any single self, but it may be a common
object for all selves. In fact, social intercourse, or any
conscious enterprise, would be impossible but for some such
impassive and impartial base which nature affords.
Nature's independence and objectivit7f are relative and
derivative. Nature is over against each self as an independ-
ent realm because all other selves stand over against each,
particular self; and the distinctness of all other selves
lends to nature it objective character. (MGHE, 285) Ihere
is nothing about nature which the self cannot adopt and use.
The factual, legal, and social evidence for the otherness of
nature really shows it as fitted for taking part in the life
of the self.
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Nature does not belong to finite mind naturally; it
must be "possessed". It is other than, and prior to, all
finite minds. The search for nature's meaning is an eternal
quest. But man has already learned that "nothing in nature
is ultimately alien." (SIBP, 142)
Ihus nature, along with the body, comes into the fold
70
of the self, Ihis section has been largely an interpreta-
tion of Hocking's view. But his theory must be given some
sort of historical setting.
5. Theories of the relation between mind and body .
Mind and body seem to be distinct; no observer ever
gets both the mental and the physical in the same field at
once. The body is present in consciousness in two different
ways, as it is felt (here it is as a part of the mind, an in-
dispensible part of experience), and as an object of nature.
It is one and the same body, whether present as a part of
mind or as object of nature. Hov; is the body related to
the mind?
There are two technical theories of this association,
the theory of parallelism and the theory of int eractionism.
(TP, 223-236) In parallelism it is held that brain-events
71
and mind-events correspond to each other exactly. Yet
70. Gf. Chapter II, 1, 2(1); Chapter V, 6.
71, This is made possible, according to Leibniz, through
pre-established harmony. (Of. Monadology , sections 78ff
.
(PWL, 321); cf. also PWL, 98-99.)
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it is hardly possible that two independent realities, or
processes, each going its own way, could be in such complete
correspondence. Parallelism is best represented in the
thought of Spinoza; according to Spinoza mind and body are
72but two aspects of one reality, substance. But any dual-
istic parallelism v/ould be deterministic. Freedom would
have to be surrendered. The brain- event, as separate from
the mind- event, is determined by the physical order. Since
the mind- event is not caught in an^r such nexus, it must
correspond to the brain- event; therefore the mind-event is
really determined by the nhysical order. In parallelism,
there is no valid reason for the mind's existing.
Interactionism is truer to the facts of experience; in
it the mind is restored to a place of usefulness. In this
theory mind-events interact with brain-events. Each is in-
dependent of, yet affects, the other. This is apparently a
true picture of the situation. The mind devises, and chooses.
Then the living body moves tov/ard the attainment of the end.
In case obstacles are met other means are invented; the mind
persists in its work even after interruption. Also the mind
reads betv/een the lines of physical facts; it interprets the
meanings of the symbols and responds to them. Ideas, created
by the mind, are brought into play. The body represents the
72. Spinoza, ETH, II, Props. X-XIII.
•
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facts of the situation; the mind grasps the meaning of these
facts, and replaces the expected physical or mechanical re-
action with an intelligent response.
The interactionist
,
hov;ever, does not explain the inter-
acting, because he cannot. If pushed for an explanation he
is lost. Interaction is just assumed, and thus the question
is avoided. But the difficulty cannot be escaped so easily.
It is the task of the dualistic interactionist to show how
mind and body, as independent realities, can affect each
other. In the physical world cause and effect are alike in
kind and equal in quantity. But in this case a volition is
equated in quantity with an energy-change in the cortex.
(TP, 231) Ihis problem has been fatal for many dualists.
Descartes' 3 attempt to bridge the gap by means of the pineal
73gland is an instance of unbridled speculation. The dual-
istic vitalist, Hans Driesch, has developed a more respect-
able theory. There is, according to Driesch, between the mind
and the brain an intermediate, purposive principle, which de-
lays changes in the brain and alters their outcome but does
74
not change their quantity.
Such attempts do not result in solutions; they serve only
to postpone and to complicate the problem. Ultimately the
73. Descartes, Passions , Articles 31, 32, OD.
74. Driesch, SPO, 295.
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dualism must be surrendered. Mind and body seem to be dis-
tinct, yet the distinction is only seeming. The, huraan self
75
is one. "li/hat my body, as a whole, does, I do." The body
and the mind are one in the whole self. It is necessary,
therefore, that there be some kind of monism. How is the
monism achieved? Is mind a mere product of body? Or can
body be viewed as language of mind? Tb.e idea that both are
expressions of a neutral third postpones the question but
does not ansv/er it.'''^
(l) The body problem ; Mind as function of body . Accord-
ing to Dev/ey the most critical need in contemporary thought
is a "thoroughgoing revision of ideas of mind and thought and
their connection with natural things that v/ere formed before
77
the rise of experimental inquiry." Dewey thinks that the
idea of mind is illegitimate. For example, after v/riting
that "Nature is an environment only as involved in interaction
78
with an organism, or self, or whatever name may be used".
75, Hocking, TP, 234, Italics his.
76. In keeping with his neo-realism. Perry views the
duality of mind and body as a difference of organization.
In Perry's theory of the neutral entities, "Mind and body
are both complexes capable of being analyzed into more primi-
tive terms." (PPT, 310) But there 'is still the problem of
grasping these "more primitive terras". Hocking says that the
theory of neutralism is the most empty of hypotheses, (Phil
9, 3/19/40)
77, Dewey, QC, 168.
78. Dewey, LOG, 106.
)
86
he adds in a note that the name must not be a "purely mental-
79
Istic one, like consciousness . " There is no such thing as
mind; but there is mind- as-function in the control of environ-
ment •
80Dewey's professed monism is naturalistic. He rejects
81the mind-body problem. For him, "There is no breach of con-
tinuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations
82
and physical operations." Speal^ing before the College of Phy-
sicians in St. Louis, Dewey said, "We cannot be scientific save
as we seek for the physiological, the physical factor in every
83
emotional, intellectual and volitional experience." "It is
difficult to state the exact physiological mechanism which is
84involved. But about the fact there is no doubt."
But the nind-body problem cannot be rejected; it has
85been clear cut since the time of Descartes, The mystery
must be thought through. Lovejoy in his renowned essay on
79. Dewey, LOG, 106n. Italics his.
80. The title of one of his outstanding books is Ex-
perience and Nature . But see Lovejoy, "Pragmatism vs. the
Pragmatist." (Drake, ECR, 55-81)
81. Dewey, LOG, 25, but cf. 115, 117, and Ratner, JDP,
829. He admits that the mind-body problem reflects divi-
sions of a more practical kind.
82. Dewey, LOG, 19.
83. Ratner, JDP, 827. From "The Unity of the Human
Being", pp. 817-835. This is the first time this article
has been published.
84. Dewey, EAN, 179.
85. Hocking, Art. (1940)^, 239-240.
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"Pragmatism vs. the Pragmatist", declares that the only way
Dewey can escape dualism (and this enigma of the mind-body re-
86lation) is to acknowledge all exis tents as mental. The body
problem resolves itself into a problem of the brain. Hie
contention is that although the brain and mind may be differ-
ent, mind is a product of the brain, or as Dewey would put it,
87
"Mind is primarily a verb"; it is a function of the living
QQ
organism. In order to shov/ the inherent fallacy in such a
theory mention may be made of some specific differences be-
89tween the brain and the mind.
i. The mind can and does observe itself, while the
brain not only does not, it cannot. The self can even think
about its own brain,
ii. The brain may be located in space; it is spa-
tial, v/hereas the mind cannot be definitely located in space.
The mind rather includes space,
iii. Temporally, the mind is in the present; but it
extends to include the past and the future, while the brain
is in the present only.
iv. The brain may be represented as a set of facts,
and no more; but the mind is more: it is a set of facts plus
their meanings. These meanings for the brain are only
86. Cf. Drake, ECR, 62.
87. Dewey, AE, 265.
88. Cf, the section on "The moment of selfhood, and of
self-consciousness.
89. Cf. Kocking, TP, 98-102. Cf. above, p. 12.
).1
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connections, and these connections, to the brain, are mean-
ingless. But to the developing mind every fact, or every
connection, has meaning.
V, Furthermore, v/hile the brain is a system of
meaningless facts, the mind is a system of meaningful facts;
and these meanings represent values. The peculiar concern
of the mind is moral values, i.e., judgments of right and
wrong. This, perhaps, is the characteristic difference be-
tv/een the mind and the brain. In the system of facts, called
the brain, there is no regard for the pleasant or the painful
nor for the right or the v/rong. But for the mind this dis-
tinction is primary. "V^e cannot sink mind in the brain with-
90
out spiritualizing the universe." If there is to be a
monism it must be a monism of mind.
(2) The mind -problem ; Body as lanpruage of mind . A
monism of the body cannot account for mental activity. If
one starts v;ith a physical monism there is no valid reason
for the origin of consciousness. But to begin with conscious
ness the facts of physiology are accepted as necessary in-
gredients. The self, at first, is identified by the body;
but in the process of development there is a shifting of the
center of gravity: the body becomes a part, a necessary organ
90. Thilly, Art. (1910), 33
)
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of the self. The ultimate stuff of human nature. Hocking
thinks, is more nearly like thought than like physical energy.
The hody reflects every shade of thought and motive in the
life of the self. It presents externally what the mind
internally is. (MGHE, 262ff.)
The body is the symbol of the mind, not the mind
of the body. The mind is the substance of which
the body and its energies are the visible behavior-
language, the accessible and measurable signs, but
still, - the shadows, (HMR, 108)
The brain constitutes the point of insertion of mind in mat-
ter. "The body is the manifestation in spatial metaphor of
the v/ill- to-live as inborn and as modified by experience and
choice." (LIGPIE, 263n) Hocking's theory was not inspired by,
but finds historical confirmation in, the philosophy of
Schopenhauer. According to Schopenhauer body represents
the objectivity of the will.^'^
The body problem v/as resolved into a problem of the
brain, but in the mind problem the proportions increase. It
concerns the entire phenomenal v/orld, everything of which the
self may be conscious. The brain as a part of the phenomenal
v<rorld is included also. Physical monism is untenable because
no reason can be given for the advent of mind. Unless nature
91. Of, the section on "The place of the body in the
development of the self", and Chapter V, 4, 6,
92. Schopenhauer, \W, Sections 18, 60.

90
can be accounted, for, the mental monism must be rejected
al so •
What Is nature, and v/hy does It exist? Nature exists
as a v/orld of sense. It represents the field of concrete
action In contrast to pure contemplation of abstractions.
Nature exists to provide mind v/lth Its concrete objects, and
Its field of concrete action. Vvlthout objects mind v/ould be
empty, and so could exist only In Imagination. (MGHE, 255ff.)
Without a field of concrete action vi/llllng v/ould be merely
the shuffling of abstractions In Imaginary contemplation.
Either mind or body, apart from the other, is abstract. But
the body is abstract and meaningless in any case. The mind
Is concrete, and can account for the existence of body,
93
whereas body cannot account for mind.
The apparent self-sufficiency of nature has been shown
to be illusory; that upon which nature depends is mind. (TP,
248) The human body represents the objectifIcation of the
will. In like manner nature represents the objectificatlon
of the will of God. The self's discovery of its physical
body is a late one, but from the first nature is viewed as
94
the body of the Other, "The . . . individuality and
93. Of. the listing of differences betv/een mind and
body, above.
94. Of. the section on "Experience of God as basis for
social experience"; cf . also Hocking, Phil 9, 3/19/40.
r)
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permanence of Nature implies a corresponding individual per-
manence in the Subject v/hose comnunicated being this Nature
is." (MGKE, 293) The human body is viev/ed as language of
the human mind. In like manner nature is viewed as the
body of God, and thus as Divine langiiage. (MGHE, 300)

CHAPTER IV
FREEDOM OF THE SELF
1. The nroblem a metaphysical one *
The problem of freedom is a metaphysical problem. It
arises only for beings who act as a result of choices of
will; it arises for them only as they begin to consider
their relations to the whole in which they are immersed; it
arises from a consideration of the parts and the vtrhole,"^
Unless the parts have some metaphysical status, freedom
cannot be attributed to them: the parts become caused by
the whole and are but links in its chain of causes.
The nroblem arose in protest, because of man's un-
willingness to recognize himself as a mere link in any
causal series. The self feels itself the sponsor of its
deeds. This sense of sponsorship is inseparable from the
concept of selfhood. Sponsorship has both positive and
negative implications. It implies that the self is the
sponsor; and that no one else is the author of the deed.
There was a moment when the act came into being; and the
self determined its origin.
Determinism has had support from two fields which are
otherv/ise antagonistic toward each other. Many absolutists
1. From notes taken in Phil 9, taught by Professor
Hocking, Harvard, 1939-1940.
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in theology have believed in determinism, at least theo-
2
retically, because they believed in predestination. In-
cidentally, predestination is implied in theological abso-
lutism. Inconsistency becomes a virtue as predestinarians
recognize their responsibility to help God answer their
deliberated petitions.
In an effort to relieve God of man's crimes, theolo-
gians and philosophers have declared that man is somehow
free within God's will. "Nevertheless, under the influence
of Saint Paul, they have added that because of Adam's fall
4
all men sin, and die. Whatever good is accomplished is
often attributed to God; whatever evil is done is always
5
attributed to man. These positions are not fully consist-
ent, but they have been accepted by pious individuals on the
basis of the inscrutability of God's plan. Divine determin-
ism has thus far outweighed human freedom in their thinking.
2. Pantheism is not being treated separately because
wherever it is relevant to this discussion it appears as
absolutism. Hov/ever, Spinoza, the arch pantheist, is men-
tioned in the next section. He serves to illustrate ex-
treme determinism coupled with an outstanding emphasis on
moral striving.
3. Gf . Josiah Royce, WI, II, 303, 330. Royce seems
to be a pantheist despite his claims to the contrary.
4. Paul. Cf. I Corinthians 15:22. Of. also the refer-
ence to the Catechism in the section on "Sin", pp. 122, 123,
5. Paul. Cf. Romans 7.
•
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Especially is this true in the case of Augustine,
The other outstanding support for the deterministic
7position has come from naturalists. They view nature as
the whole in which man is immersed; and they viev; man as
bounded by nature, at the beginning and at the end, a mere
glink within nature's chain of causes.
Man has rejected this naturalistic determinism even
more vigorously than he has the theological type. Although
he would not be unwilling to attribute his evil to nature,
he protests being determined by an absolute un-intelligence.
In the other case God represents absolute intelligence, and
man could take refuge in his own ignorance of God's plan.
But in naturalism the implication is that there is no plan.
Man refuses such a verdict, and appeals to the facts which
he finds within himself. The self which can contemplate
6. Gf. Augustine, CG, 3-11, 25ff., et passim .
7. An increasing number think that the course of
history is deter^iined by the economic interest. This posi-
tion is that of economic determinism. (It is akin to
materialism and naturalism.) Hocking regards his entire
Volume, The Spirit of World Politics , as a "running attack"
on the illusion of economic determinism. (SV/P, 520) It is
well "to remember that neither economic change nor its
consequences are inevitable. There is no such mysterious
thing as an economic force apart from the conscious desires
of men." (Hocking, Art. (1940)3, i068) Men determine hist-
ory; they are not determined by it.
8. Just as is the case with theological determinism,
adherents are not consistent throughout.
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the chain of causes in nature refuses to be reduced to a
link in the chain. The self recognizes its dependence upon
nature, but it v/ill not admit that the dependence is complete
or absolute. Prom the point of view of causality events
are determined from the past; from the point of view of
metaphysical freedom and purpose they are determined from
the future. Physical events represent a causal series, but
mental events represent a purposive sequence; mind, wherever
known, is disposed to choose, and to act accordingly.
Whether these two, the causal series and the purposive se-
quence, be judged as mutually exclusive, it is a fact of
experience that both do exist. It seems that purpose "has
9found some way of living together with the causes". To
account for this basic fact of experience is a metaphysical
problem.
2. What it means to say that the self is free.
To say that the self is free means that in deliberat-
ing the self is faced with real alternatives; the self has
the power of choosing between alternatives which are real;
the self conceives its own alternatives; and then gives
actuality to possibilities which it, itself, has first made
or created. For example, there was no possibility of
9. Hocking, TP, 108.
10, Hocking, P6IC, 212.
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Mozart's music until Mozart visioned it or imagined it.
After the possibility came to be, it was actualized, and
thus the music came into being: a new creation. The self
"confers actuality upon the dream of its ov/n making, ""^"^ To
say that the self is free means that it is not determined
according to the lav/s of cause and effect. "The fate and
character of each conscious act comes for a moment under
the control of 'self; and nei the r nature nor environment
nor God decides what meaning that act shall bear."^^ The
meaning is determined by the individual person.
The essence of self is hope; all the experiences of
the self have meaning in terms of their relation to this
hope. The activity of the self is inspired by the hope;
it is not determined, Ihus it may be said that the whole
self is free: freedom is characteristic of the entire self
of behavior.
The hope v/hich is the essence of the self is the source
of meaning; lasting influences in the life of the self bear
a relation to it. They must pass the threshold of consent
13
which marks the entrance of meaning.
11. Hocking, TDL, 90.
12. Hocking, HNR, 150.
13. Hocking, SIBF, 148
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The whole self is free, unlike for Descartes, for
whom the mind, as a purposive thinking substance, was free,
while the body, as causal, was determined: the whole is free.
One does what his body does. But for the sake of convenience
it seems well to discuss first the freedom of the self as
the self is aware of it, or from the internal point of view.
Nature, however, is the sphere in which the self's free acts
are performed, The body by means of which these achievements
are v/rought is an object of nature. It is necessai^y then to
show how these free acts fit into the scheme of nature, or
to discuss the self's freedom from the external point of
view. After the self has been placed in nature it will re-
main, in the third place, to determine the degree of freedom.
(l) Freedom from the internal point of view . "The self
is a new fact in the world; its perception of good is its
own." (SIBP, 147) The meaning which the self has, or is, is
a new creation: the self as artist has produced it. This
new creation is self-created.
The self has its ov;n tension of hope; it sets up its
own hierarchy of control, which culminates in some personal
but unique conception of a possible good, and v/Mch serves
as the source of meaning. Tlrie self may Increase indefinite-
ly in its mastery of meaning, yet in this process of growth
14. Cf. Descartes, DIS, Pts. V, VI,
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the identity of the hope, v/hich is the essence of the self,
is not destroyed. The expanding self brings new materials
into its organization of behavior, and thus furnishes itself
with new problems to be solved as well as with new means of
solving them. It is not possible to predict what reactions
a man will make. There can be prediction on the basis of
character, but exact prediction is impossible, either for a
stage of history or for an individual. Given all the pos-
sible data there is still an unknown in regard to prediction.
Bradley maintains that every experience, each self, and any
particular stage of history represent something new and
15different. Alexander clairas that prediction is possible
theoretically but not practically. Exact prediction is not
possible because minds project nev/ combinations and are
-I c.
creative.-^
The time when the self is most aware of its freedom is
in the act of reflection. Freedom from the internal point
of viev/, as well as from the external point of view, depends
upon reflection or self- awareness . The ability to make its
own self an object of contemplation increases the self's
awareness of its freedom. Reflective behavior is different
from mere behavior. Reflection enables one to adapt himself
15. Bradley, ES, 22-24.
16. Alexander, STD, II, 326.
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to new and untried situations; it enables one to increase
the alternatives open to tiim and to moke them concrete.
Reflection gives rise to the power of hesitating, i.e.,
the withholding of decision. Hesitation before deciding
enables the self to deliberate on the question at hand.
Reflection gives rise also to the power of immediate ac-
ceptance, or of non-hesitation. These powers are poignant
17
as evidence for freedom in the life of the self. Deli-
beration does not occur, and indeed cannot occur, in a
purely causal universe. When one billiard ball strikes
another there is no hesitation; the movement is observedly
definite, and is determined by cause and effect. According
to the law of inertia any object continues in its present
state until it is disturbed.
The power of hesitating Involves an av/areness of the
Causal process. If one is able to reflect on a situation,
he must hesitate; and if one is able to hesitate the motive
which finally wins is either admitted as stronger and ac-
ceded to, or else is made stronger, by the hesitating self.
Nature is known as an object of thought; reflection on the
field of natural causation is possible; and hesitation is
necessary for this reflection and knowledge; therefore, the
self, the knoY/er, cannot be reduced to the place of a mere
17, From notes taken in Phil 9, Harvard, 1939-1940.
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link in the chain of natural causes.
On the other hand the pov/er of immediate acceptance or
non-hesitation enables the self to say readily: "This appeals
to rae; 1 will to join myself to it," This depends upon previous
reflection during which the self has determined what it wants;
otherwise the self would not know v/hat appeals to it.
An objective consideration of the difference between the
self as observed and the desired self intensifies the tension
18
of hope, and increases one's freedom. During this act of
judging itself, the self has power to move in the desired
direction. In fact one is already beyond the defect or limi-
tation he perceives in himself; he must be beyond it before
he can observe and judge it. This does not mean that the
thief merely by recognizing that he is a thief actually be-
comes an honest man. Yet it is necessary for him to have
some idea of honesty, and some appreciation of property
19
rights, before he can recognize himself as a thief. Thus
18. Brightraan speaks of three selves, or personalities,
which are really "three stages in the movement of personality
toward the idea: The empirical personality, the preferred
personality, and the ideal personality." (IvIL, 249-250) These
are legitimate distinctions v/hich Hocking fails to make. The
difference between the tv;o positions is mainly terminological,
19, "The longest step tov/ard cleanliness is made when
one gains - nothing but dissatisfaction v;ith dirt. Surely
the work is not finished - but the obstacles that remain are
material only." The big task was to get "the idea of clean-
liness . . . the practical questions are all resolvable into
this one, - the maintenance and development of that idea."
(Hocking, MGHE, 198. Italics his.)
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infinitude is possible for that self v/hich knows itself to
be finite. Socrates was v/ise because he knev/ himself to
20be ignorant, if the self knov/s itself to be caused it
is free, Spinoza v/as free because he knew that he was de-
termined, "The laind has greater power over the emotions and
is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all
21things as necessary," The mind's power over the emotions
consists in its knov/ledge of them. It is a paradox that
Spinoza, an arch determinist in theory, was a deeply pious
22
man and an ethical perfectionist.
Psychologists are able to give a causal explanation of
error, of why an individual goes wrong. But they cannot
explain causally why an individual gets the right answer,
or why he goes right. There is a cause for going wrong;
but there is a reason for going right. Psychologists "can-
23
not explain our reasonable deeds and thoughts,"
Picture a man to himself as a set of reactions; then
show him the portrait; and the canvas will be destroyed.
Through the aid of reflection man is able to and actually
20, Plato, Apology , 21,
21, Spinoza, ETH, Part V, Prop. VI.
22, This paradox is paralleled by many Calvinlsts
(for exatnple, Presbyterians). Theoretically they believe
in predestination, but after they get off their knees they
work as though everything depended upon their own efforts.
23, Hocking, TP, 104, Of, MAS, 202, P6IC, 205.
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does free himself from every discovered causal series. The
difficulty in predicting what a person will do is that if
the person knows v/hat the prediction is he v/ill do something
else. The most futile of all undertakings is that of apply-
ing a cause-and-effect psychology. (SIBP, 153) A cause-and-
effect psychology cannot be applied to men, especially if
they find out what is being done. Let them get an inkling
of the scheme, and a new, secret one must be developed. (TP
105, 309)
It is an observable fact that men cannot be controlled
by controlling their physical situations, or even by coercing
their bodies. They cannot be determined; they can be in-
fluenced, but influence is not determination. The physical
reactions of men, however, may be controlled by their con-
scious or reflective choices. Their reflective choices are
just that: choices made through and after reflection. Re-
flective choices are made in terms of what is near and dear
to the self, i.e., in terms of the hope which is the self.
Men Can be motivated only by value- thinking, not by causal-
thinking. The leader of men must assume that they are free,
rational, and responsible; he cannot cause them; he must
reason with them by discussing reciprocal rights and obli-
24gations*
24. Hocking, TP, 309, This does not appear to be true
of Adolph Hitler. Since the leader must treat men as "free.
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Unless the reflection is a Juggling of abstractions
these choices issue in action; and this action takes place
"by means of the body in the realm of nature. It remains to
show how this freedom can be possible in a world of law.
(2) Freedom from the external point of view . External
freedom, or freedom from the' external point of view, is hot
different from the internal freedom just discussed. To
understand freedom from the external point of view, however,
is the part of the topic which usually gives the most trouble,
Kant was v/illing to grant a freedom from the internal point
of view, which is purely psychological; but he could not
attribute any metaphysical status to freedom because from
the external point of viev/ man is an object among objects,
and is determined according to the laws of nature, A large
part of this section is a discussion of Kant's view of
freedom.
According to Kant freedom from the internal point of
view and from the external point of view are different. It
will become evident, in the course of the discussion, that
the two are views of one and the same thing: of accounting
for the pursuit £ind realization of value in a literally
24, (continued)
rational, and responsible". Hocking would not think of
Hitler as a genuine leader of men. By taking away their
freedom he crushes them. According to the position here
taken it is inevitable that Hitler's situation is a pre-
carious one.
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indeterminate future. It was noted in Section One of this
chapter that the problem of freedom is a metaphysical one.
The present question may be stated as follows; Is there
any place for the freedom which has been described in the
scientific view of man as a part of nature?
Much effort has been expanded in search of a mechanical
explanation of freedom; but to explain it mechanically is
to explain it causally, and so to deny it, Kant affirms
freedom by conceiving of causal necessity as an external
reading of sequences of internal acts which are free and
purposive.
Freedom is the basic postulate, the most important of
all. It is the keystone of Kant's whole system of pure
reason, theoretical and practical. According to the former,
man is an object among objects, and is determined. But
according to the pure practical reason man is a moral agent,
and thus is free.
Kant's fundamental problem v/as that of mediating the
antagonism between the claims of science and the moral and
religious consciousness. All of man's life, moral and spiri'
tual as v/ell as physical, was about to be included within
the realm of nature and necessity; this would have meant
the surrender of all the convictions which underlie man's
higher life. Kant was awakened by the approach of this dis-
aster, and bestirred himself to examine the presuppositions
)
105
of science, the Krl tik der relnen Vernunf
t
, and of morality,
^rltlk der praktischen Vernunf
t
,
In the second edition of the first critique, KrV, Kant
writes, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny know-
25ledge, in order to make room for faith." And in the
second critique, KpV, he states that "when pure speculative
and pure practical reason are combined in one cognition, the
latter has the primacy", provided always that in this ex-
tension of employment there does not arise a conflict of
reason within itself. But the fact remains that there is a
conflict between man as determined and man as a moral agent.
The solution results from the primacy of the practical rea-
son. In the third critique, KU, Kant assigns different
fields to the lav/s of nature and to acts of free viflll; these
fields are mutually limited in operation; the relation is
one of interaction. The idea of freedom, hovtrever, still has
to give way in case of a conflict.
The realm of freedom, for Kant, represents a timeless
realm; a free act is a timeless event. The free acts are
timeless events v/hich serve as the eternal basis of the
temporal series. The timeless events are internal, whereas
25. Kant, KrV, B XXX.
26. Kant, KpV, 155.
27. Kant, KU, XVIII-XIX
)
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the temporal series is external. The timeless is free, but
the temporal is determined. I'his theory may give inspira-
tion and emotional satisfaction but it is intellectually
untenable. In a world which is empirically determined, the
first act leads directly to the concluding effect. How can
the free act of a self be realized in a world v/hich is
causally determined and yet remain a free self? Neither
the sense of duty nor the sense of responsibility can obtain
in such a world. The peculiar concern of the mind is moral
values, i.e., judgment of right and wrong. Physically,
crimes are simple, e.g., lifting a purse. But if this act
is mechanically determined there is no crime, and the idea
of moral reproach is absurd. (TP, 100, 101) According to
Kant' s theory, empirical freedom, freedom that makes a dif-
ference within the field of fact, is impossible. (SIBP, 157)
Nature would not be dependable if freedom were an ex-
ceptional event, being made possible by a non-natural inter-
ference v/ith the lav/s of nature. Freedom cannot be explained
through science, nor can it be explained as being in opposi-
tion to the accepted truths of science. How then can an
empirical, i.e., a metaphysical, freedom, the pov/er of de-
liberate choice, the existence of real alternatives, be
accounted for in viev/ of the lav;s of nature?
Note the phrase, "be accounted for". It may be that
28. Kant, KrV, B578-585.
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the reality of freedom is inexplicable. But causality, as
well as freedom, is a candidate for being understood. Both
concepts represent only theoretical interpretations of the
facts of experience. David Eume stands out in the history
29
of philosophy because of his study of causality. The
causal axiom is that every event must have a cause. However
there is no v/ay to prove this. The causal relation cannot
be perceived. The causal axiom is a belief v;hich arose
through mental habit or custom. "Causality is imputed to
,,30 ^the world order, rather than seen in it," The third anti-
31
nomy is concerned with this problem. Kant develops a
theory which has been rejected already. His error lies in
his initial assumption; he assumes causality, and then tries
32
to explain hov/ freedom is possible. If causality and free
dom are put on the same footing perhaps a more tenable vievr
of freedom can be developed.
The concept of causality involves the idea of law. Ex-
ponents of causal determinism usually resort to the field of
physics for their support. Their stronghold is the
29. Hume, THN, I, 375-383. Gf. ENQ, 26-31. His
treatment of the problem is reported to have had tremendous
influence on Kant. Authorities differ as to the extent.
30. Hocking, TP, 110. Italics his.
31. Kant, KrV, B472-479.
32. Ibid., B560-586.
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irrevocability of physical laws. But physical lav/s are
relative to more general lav/s. The "basic law would be one
that dealt with the ultimate physical units. Physicists,
hov/ever, are unwilling to assign any definite limit to the
analysis of physical events. Ihey recognize that they may
not be dealing with the basic lav/ of the v;orld; they have
learned to assume that the laws with v/hich they deal are
only relatively true. Physicists disov/n the problem of
33freedom, and say that it must be solved in experience.
Arthur H, Compton, a physicist, v/rites as follows:
My experience of the effectiveness of purpose is
more direct and cogent than any logical arg\iment
based upon scientific generalizations. . . . That
it pays to try is more basic in our psychology
than is even the will to live.^^
Unless purpose is effective, or if the power of re-
flection is ineffective and meaningless, it is extremely
difficult for scientists to explain consciousness as a bio-
logical emergent. Professor Compton admits that "the evo-
lution of consciousness itself is not to be expected if
35
consciousness is ineffective." Life, all of it, including
33. "The new quantum mechanics ... is not determi-
nistic, in that it leaves open a range of possibilities,
within which the actual event may occur." (Compton, ENS, 41)
This statement does not imply freedom any more than it im-
plies chance, yet it is "consistent with the postulate of
true freedom." (Compton, HMS, 42)
34. Compton, ms, 49.
35. Ibid., 50.
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human life, has emerged out of nature. (TDL, 235) It is not
known at what stage mind made its apr)earance. Its existence
as an objective fact is perplexing to the biologist. He has
no instrument for observing it or for measuring it. (TDL, 240)
In the process of evolution useless emergents are eli-
minated. If that is true then mind has earned its way. It
is biologically useful. The biological utility of conscious-
ness appears most clearly as the organism, the self, deals
with new and unclassifiable situations. (TDL, 243) These
situations are infinitely variable, and as whole situations
they are such that a machine could not possibly solve.
Although physics is the favorite field of determinists
,
physicists disov/n the problem of freedom. It may be well
to take the physicists seriously, and seek for an account
of freedom in the realm of experience. Since they disclaim
finality for physical laws, freedom may be the taking hold
of, or obedience to, a higher and more ultimate law. Evi-
dence for this view is strengthened in that nature is in-
finitely divisible. This means that the ultimate law is
not a physical law.
36, There is an increasing number who think, or admit,
that the course of history is determined by the economic
Interest or drive. Theoretical materialism and theoretical
communism are characteri/.ed ty economic determinism. (Cf
,
Engels, LP, 62) Closely akin to this, in theory at least,
is John Dewey's position. It is characterized by social
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The ultimate law as man finds it in himself is a law of
meaning. Things happen in terms of what they mean to the
self in its pursuit and realization of value. As hopes and
meanings increase, the course of things is changed.
The laws of physical nature are relative to the
law of meaning; and so far as meanings do not
change, these relative lav/s may be treated as
absolute. Nature is a realm of common and stead-
fast ingredients of will: its reliableness is
implied in the law of meaning. The steadfastness
of the known lavi^s of nature, so far as they apply
to existing situations, is not at all incompatible
with the utmost liberty of change, so far as they
do not apply. (SIBF, 161)
Mind or the self is a tension of hope and the activity
inspired by this tension of hope "eludes scientific measure,
because it lies not within the world of nature, but plies
betv/een nature and the world of actual possibility." (P6IC,
213)
War involves a clash of physical forces. If that were
all then the side with the greater physical force would win.
But war involves also a conflict of wills. And morale is
the element v/hich largely determines the outcome of war.
Morale is the human quality of enduring initiative and
36. (continued)
or cultural determinism. (Cf. Devrej
,
LOG, III; Morris,
SIM, 322.) Hocking writes that his entire volume. The
Spirit of V/orld Politics , is "a running attack" on the
illusion of economic determinism. (520) The fundainental
tendency of human nature is to remake itself according to
expectation. (Hocking, PLR, 64)
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sacrificial loyalty. Morale does not win a war in and of it-
self, but it is often that last strav/ v/hich brealcs the oppo-
nent's back, or it gives to the men in the army that added
strength necessary to prevent the breaking of their own backs.
Morale cannot be tested by methods of the psychological lab-
oratory, not only because the situation involved is irrepro-
ducible, but also because the logic of morale is the logic of
37human faith and hope.
In his renowned essay, "Energies of Men", James writes
of physical and mental energy. His thesis is that "few men
live at their maximum of energy . . . anyone may be in vital
38
equilibrium at very different rates of energizing." The
individual lives usually "far within his limits; he possesses
pov/ers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He
energizes below his maximum
, and he behaves below his opti -
39
mum , " The emphasis throughout is that there is a mental
energy which can and v/hich should control, stimulate, smd
supplement the physical energy.
The body is admittedly a thing of nature. It is that
object by means of which the self interacts with the world.
It draws consequences, or rather suffers them, and in so
37. Hocking, MIE, 8, 9, 23.
38. James, SPP, 42.
39. Ibid., 44. Italics his.
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doing affords a stream of well-ordered events as data for
action. But these events have subordinate places; and they
are fitted into the hierarchy of action v/hich is constructed
by, and ruled "by, the free choices of the self in its pur-
suit and realization of meaning and value. This is the ex-
perienced fact. "Nature, as world of law, is a subordinate
and partly hypothetical fact, and must adjust its theories
to our primary datum." (SIBF, 166-167)
(3) Freedom a matter of degree . Freedom is a matter of
degree. The degree of freedom enjoyed by the self is deter-
mined by the body, and by the self's conscious choices,
[Through bodily strain and mental fatigue freedom may be
reduced so nearly to zero as to disappear. In such a situa-
tion the self becomes a part of nature; it becomes a linlc in
the chain of natural causes; its movements are determined ex-
ternally. Toward the end of a day's work the self becomes
less free and more mechanical. This decline in freedom, how-
ever, is only temporary; the complete freedom can be recovered,
unless the strain has been too hard or too long, through a
period of rest and relaxation.
The major role in determining the degree of freedom is
played by the self in its ov/n choices. It is the self which
recognizes the strain and fatigue, and chooses to rest as a
means of regaining its efficiency and freedom. The ultimate
freedom of the self is its freedom to control the degree of
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its own freedom. This supreme privilege offers the oppor-
tunity for unlimited growth in self-control, but at the same
time it affords the possibility for the disintegration of
selfhood. This latter situation is so real that to speak
of it as possible is hardly sufficient. It results from the
free choice, which may be simply an unwillingness to do any-
thing about it, of drifting "into that state of helpless
control by habit and impulse in which it becomes literally
true that we 'have no choice'." (SIBP, 169-170)
A self which cannot reflect, or which will not, is not
free, but is subject to the causal laws of impulse, of habit,
and of nature. It may be said that the degree of freedom de-
pends upon the pov/er of reflection. Mechanical reactions
rule until one becomes aware of the process. The degree of
freedom depends upon the degree of self-consciousness, and
the power of self-survey. There is distance between a self
and its recognized limitation or fault. "Self-consciousness
deposes nature from master to servant of the free self." (TP,
295)
The self v/as defined as "a purposing system behavior
40
which develops as a persistent hope is realized." The ten-
sion of the self tov/ard this hope constitutes the depth of
selfhood. The degree of the self's freedom is determined and
measured by the liveliness of the hope which is the self, by
40. Cf. Chapter II, section 4.
1I
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the tension of the self toward it, and by the extent to which
this hope, or vision of possible good, colors and enriches
all the activities of the self.
But what if the hope v/hich the self is seeking is illu-
sory, and what if the hope represents actual evil? It is
supposed, in the first place, that in the self- surveying and
self-criticism contradictions will have been removed. The
self should know and approve of v/hat its hope involves; un-
less the self is to come on evil days its ideal must be a
41
reasonable one.
Again it may be noted that freedom is a metaphysical
problem. One's view of freedom depends upon his metaphysics;
or from the other side, one's metaphysical theory will deter-
mine his attitude in regard to freedom. If the vision of
possible good is admittedly fictional, and if the hope is
purely self-created and self- sustained, the freedom which
the self enjoys is only an imaginary one. It is a house
built on sand; when the storms come it will be destroyed;
and the destruction will be complete. "Freedom can grow
great only as hope can find its possible good an object of
genuine belief." (SIBF, 173)
41. In the preceding section morale vias discussed as an
evidence of freedom. But morale is not to be identified as a
spirit which arises from true righteousness of cause. There
is a relationship between these two, but it cannot be stated
as a rule. Morale is inevitably low unless those involved
are convinced that the cause is a v/orthy one. Such convic-
tion, however, can rest on error as well as on truth.
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3. The source of oblif^atlori t and conscience *
(1) The, source of obligation . The feeling of obliga-
tion exists as a fact of experience. This feeling may be
expressed in the phrase, "I ought". It cannot be defined
or explained; it is knov;n only in experience, Kant writes
that obligation is "a fact v/hich is absolutely inexplicable
from all the data of the sense world and from the whole com-
42
pass of the theoretical use of our reason," In the exper-
ience of obligation, or the consciousness of duty, Kant is of
the opinion that the practical reason deals v/ith a level of
reality which is deeper than that reached by the intellect.
The truths of intellect are second to the truths of the
43practical will, of moral insight.
Hocking is in essential agreement v/ith Kant in regard
to this experience of obligation, although he rejects Kant's
theory of freedom. The postulates of the pure practical rea-
son are assumptions which Kant makes in behalf of the con-
victions which underlie man's higher life. The postulate
of freedom is first and most important. The basis for this
postulate, and thus for all of them, is the consciousness
of duty.
Professor Brightman allov/s objection to Kant's position
42, Kant, KpV, 43,
43. Hocking, IK, 41-43.
FI
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that the autonomy of the will is the sole principle of moral
lav/s, but states that Kant was right "in making it an essen-
44tial principle." In this sense it may be said that the
source of obligation is the will itself. It is part of the
45
natural endowment of the self. The sense of duty is deep-
er than the psychological self. The feeling of obligation
is "a strand of self- Judgment which is original with every
individual, and in this sense belong to original human
nature." (HNR, 118)
But to say that a sense of duty is native to the human
will is not to locate the source of this feeling of obliga-
tion. Is there any actual source? According to Alexander,
"human nature is wholly empirical, and obligation arises
46
within its empirical limits." The consciousness of obli-
gation, then, is a consciousness of non-conformi ty to the
collective mind. Alexander seems to stop short of individual
ideals and obligations. In his view there would not be any
basis for one' s obligation to correct the collective mind.
Hocking rejects this empirical theory of the origin of ob-
47ligation, and insists that the true source "must be some-
thing that unites the living reality of fellov/ men and
44. Brightman, ML, 110.
45. The whole of this section is related to the dis-
cussion on "The natural endov;ment of the self."
46. Alexander, STD, II, 331.
47. Cf, the following discussion of Conscience.
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society with the totality and finality of the Kantian law."
(HNR, 486) Kant's theoretical tentativeness in regard to
the existence of God would not allow him such a conviction.
It is in Thomas Aquinas that Hocking finds a historical
48basis for his position.
The moral law exists for the sake of man's destiny;
man's obligation is to it. Kis central instinct, the will
to power, indicates this ideal to him. Sin is a failure to
keep one's rendezvous with his destiny; and is an offense
to the appointer of destiny, or God. God desires that man
achieve this goal not only because he devised it, but also
because he participates in man's destiny. The Psalmist,
David, was of this same view, or at least he expressed it
when he v/rote, "He leadeth me in the paths of righteousness
for his name's sake."^^
This view of the source of obligation is confirmed in
actual moral experience. The conception of moral obligation
would lose much of the dignity usually ascribed to it "unless
the universe has a central and unified life in which our des-
tinies are involved, and which gives these destinies a higher
importance than they can have for our ov/n finite vision,"
(HNR, 487)
48, Reference is to the Summa , !•
49. Ps. 23:3b.
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The cosmic significance of the self will be discussed in
a separate chapter. It should be noted here, however, that
this destiny is not only in terms of some far-off event. It
involves actual co-operation with this "central and unified
life" in the creation of an unfinished world, and thus in the
50
realization of the destinies of both God and man. Man's
feelingof duty toward his destiny is his conscience, which
remains to be discussed.
(2) Conscience , Conscience is a consciousness of obli-
gation to do this and to refrain from doing that. It involves
the feeling of ought or duty, which has been described.
Some sense of duty and obligation is necessary if social
relations are to exist. And it might be expected that society
or social experience is the source of conscience. Certain
dispositions v^ould naturally emerge as permanent conditions
for peaceful living. Conscience would then be a bunch of
habitual dispositions representing the policy by which the
self is related to its fellows. This social conscience re-
sembles but is not identical with moral conscience. In fact
the resemblance is superficial. "Custom which is taken up
into the individual will and reissued as habit bears the mark
of the issuer." (HNR, 194) There is a vast difference betv^reen
the statements: "I ought to do this" and "It would be prudent
50. Gf. Hocking, HNR, 488, 423
1
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for me to do it.
"
The "You ought" of society is addressed to a free indi-
vidual, and unless it awakens in him an original "I ought",
it accomplishes nothing. This inward ought is presupposed in
the social expression; such an ought cannot be created by-
social pressure. Regardless of how earnestly parents,
teachers, or judges say "You ought", unless the meaning
strikes home the pleas are in vain. "Every new person must
find this angle of vision for himself." (HNR, 118)
If conscience is not a social product but belongs to
original human nature, is it an instinct? Conscience is akin
to, and behaves like, the general instinct of sociability.
Also, a universal trait of conscience is the disposition to
seek for an object of devotion, and "to set this object up as
authority in details of conduct", finding its ought from sug-
gestions or implications of this object, "be it family head,
totem, ruler, god, custom, or law." (HNR, 121) But this seek-
ing is not as in the instinct of sociability. The hungering
is for authorities, not for neighbors. Although conscience
often finds its authorities in and through the social context,
and although every neighbor may be in some sense an authority,
conscience cannot be identified with the instinct of sociabi-
lity. Nor can conscience be identified v/ith this trait of
seeking an authority, because the authorities are not merely
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acceptedj they are chosen. There is originality in the
choice of authorities; and each individual's authority calls
forth his ov/n moral originality. Authorities are often re-
jected from the same motive from which they were adopted.
Conscience is often arrayed against custom. The role of
heretics in the progress of civilization is evidence that
conscience cannot be identified with its almost universal
trait of seeking for authorities.
Tlius it appears that conscience is not an instinct, and
that it is set apart from all innate tendencies. It stands
as a critic over against all instincts. It is a censor for
every act of the self. But this does not mean that conscience
is a different and particular consciousness which applies
standards to behavior. Conscience represents an ideal which
is the v/hole v/ill to power in its completest or most inclusive
realization; it is "a companionship, an intimation of destiny,
a perception that human choices have some bearing upon an
52
eternal order of being,"
Conscience is not an instinct; it stands outside instinc-
tive life, not as distinct from it, "but as an awareness of
the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status
51. "Conscience resembles the aesthetic consciousness
in being a continuous source of nev/ requirements, not trace-
able to any 'lessons' of previous experience." (Hocking,
Art, (1908)2, 140)
52. Hocking, Art
. (1935) 43,
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and its growth," It is a conserving force of past achieve-
ment, a check against impending disintegration. Conscience
is occasioned as a possible increase or decrease of being
becomes an object of perception. Its voice is not heard but
rather felt or thought. Its observation is: Tliis course pro-
mises to increase, or to decrease, the hold on reality. It
is the characteristically human capacity of being self-con-
scious concerning destiny. "It is the latest and finest in-
strument for the self-integration of instinct." (HNR, 123)
Hocking locates conscience on the "growing edge of
human nature." (HNR, 124) Its outstanding importance is
evidenced in the fact that the failures of conscience are
recognized as the failure of man, and in the fact that there
is constant warfare against man's moral errors. Moral error
results in sin.
4, Sin .
(1) The idea of original sin , and the idea of sin . The
idea of original sin, that man is born in sin, and is a sin-
ner at birth,, is a fiction, created by man' s attempt to
54
account for his own wickedmess. Professor Knudson calls
53. Hocking, HNR, 123. Italics his. This is not in
contrast to, but is more complete than, an earlier statement
in which conscience is described as "the perception of flux
in the awareness of the whole." (Art .( 1908) 2, 141)
54. Ps. 51:5.
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attention to the ingenuity of the biblical v/riter who sought
to account for the fall of Adam, and thus for the origin of
55sin,^ Hie stimulus offered satisfaction for a number of
man's instinctive longings: a physical craving: "the v/oman
saw that the tree was good for food"; a longing for aesthetic
enjoyment: "it was pleasant to the eyes"; and the impulse of
curiosity: it was "a tree to be desired to make one wise,"
Eve was burdened with a prohibition; in the face of it, es-
pecially since she was led to believe that she would not
surely die, the self-assertive tendency took possession of
her and she "did eat". And the instinct of sociability
56gained expression in that she "gave also unto her husband,"
The idea of original sin has been fostered by religion;
it was given a place in the Catechism, Three questions, and
answers to them, are given herewith from the shorter Cate-
chi smt
XVI. Did all Mankind fall in Adam' s first trans-
gression ^^
Answer, The Covenant being made with Adam, not
only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind
descending from him, by ordinary generation, sinned
in him, and fell with him in his first Transgression,
XVII. Into what Estate did the Fall bring Man-
kind?
Answer. The Pall brought Mankind into a state
of Sin and Misery.
55, Gf. Knudson, DR, 260.
56, All the quotes, with italics as given, are from
Genesis 3:6,
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XVIII. Vy'herein consists the sinfulness of that
Estate whereinto man fell ?
Answer. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto
nan fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin,
the v/ant of original righteousness, and. the corruption
sin; together v^lth all actual transgressions which
proceed from it. 57
The fictional character of this notion is generally
recognized today. Professor Knudson, whose view is essential-
ly the same as Hocking's, makes the following statement on
this point: "The doctrines of original sin and of the fall
complicate and confuse the problem rather than throw light
58
upon it." But merely to recognize the fictional character
of this notion does not remove the fact of man's sinfulness,
Man is a sinner despite the modern attempt to expunge the
charge. As to why he sins v;ill be discussed later; it remains
just now to point out what, if anything, there is in its
natural endowment v/hich inclines the self toward evil. Hocking
states clearly that "there is nothing in original human nature
which taken by Itself can be called evil." (HNR, 135) Al-
though original expressions of instinct are crude, crudity
and sin cannot be identified. There are many innate disposi-
tions which may be called dangerous, but they cannot be
called sinful.
57. Questions 16-18. Quoted from Samuel Willard, CAT,
194, 201, 205.
58. Knudson, DR, 261.
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Impulses, in and of themselves, are promises of satis-
factions, and thus are good. Ihat they cannot be taken as
evil in themselves, however, does not imply that these crude
impulses are good, nor does it mean necessarily that they
are devoid of moral quality. If they are neither good, bad,
nor indifferent, then what are they? Impulses are like atoms
they are hypothetical. No impulse is ever found by itself,
except the first one, which is also hypothetical. They al-
ways have an environment.
The moral quality of impulses depends upon their mental
environment; it is determined by their relation to this en-
vironment, which is consciousness itself. Each impulse has
its ov/n particular goal; but all impulses have a bearing upon
and no one of them is wholly independent of, the will to
power. The moral issue arises whenever any particular im-
pulse aims only at its own goal, and rejects all responsibi-
lity for the complete life of the self. For example, the sex
impulse may seek satisfaction regardless of consequences to
the whole self. The moral issue represents a conflict be-
tween the individual impulse or habit sind the society of
59impulses or habits which is the self. The particular im-
pulse has a two-fold obligation to the central will. First,
the particular impulse should aid in creating the supreme
59. There is analogy between the individual and society
r
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ideal; and then it must subordinate itself and express this
master sentiment. The ideal is the complete integration of
instinctive behavior, and a completely rational interpreta-
tion of the v;ill to power. Sin is the refusal to interpret
an impulse in terms of this completeness. (HNR, 140)
The y;ill, to begin with, is so feeble; the impulses are
so strong and unruly; the ideal is so dim and appears so
nearly impossible, it is not altogether wrong to say that
man at birth is inclined toward sin. Although there is no
such thing as original sin, every man is, indeed, his ovm
Adam. (HNR, 161) If there is not that in their nature to
make them do so, then why do men sin?
(2) Wh^ men sin , and the moral requirement . Sin can
be described; it cannot be explained. To explain it is to
show how the moral error was determined, and thus to remove
the guilt of sin. Ihe concept sin is a misnomer apart from
the type of metaphysical freedom discussed in sections one
and tv/o above. The topic for this discussion might better
be "Hov/ men sin". The reason as to v;hy men sin cannot be
given other than to say that, apart from ignorance, they de-
sired to do as they did, or v/ere willing that the die be cast.
It bears repeating that there is no innate tendency in
man by which he may be called sinful. As Knudson, in his em-
pirical theory of the origin of sin, points out, original
human nature is non-moral. The natural endowment includes
1II
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instincts or impulses and a capacity for activity. But
ethically all these are neutral. Moral life does not begin
until the arrival of a conscious will v/ith a standard of
values. Sin results as the will yields to or releases its
control of impulses which are partial, the expression of
which is not in keeping v/ith the most complete realization
of the v/hole self.
According to Knudson, the rav/ material of our emotional
and conative nature, the power of self-direction, and a diffi-
cult goal to be attained - these are the only essential factor
finin the origin of sin. Thus although man is not "bj nature
sinful, the situation is nevertheless such that it is easier
for him to sin than to do right. Right requires effort, where
as sin may result even from inactivity. Sin "has the advant-
age of the natural slope." (HNR, 150)
"This is not to erase the term sin, however, and to allov/
indulgence on the basis of natural slope or natively stronger
motive. It has already been stated that the master sentiment
is represented by the will. Therefore the stronger motive
is always made so by the self. (Even the law of inertia can-
not be appealed to as an excuse, because the appeal to any-
thing else implies the recognition of guilt.) Unless the
right is v/ithin reach there is no obligation. Sin involves
60. Knudson, DR, 261.
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an abrogation of one's ovm abilities. Sin is a matter of
personal experience. It is possible because the individual
faces real moral dilemmas, or ones v/hich he imagines are
real, in the course of life.
Once entered upon the process of living, there is no
stopping, short of death. The self meets new and untried
situations constantly; each situation presents possibilities
of error. Some decision must be made because time is real,
and time marches on. Ihe self must decide, but not too
quickly; the self should deliberate, but not too long.
Living well involves the task of combining theoretical
relativism and practical absolutism. Men sin because this
task is too difficult for them.
The moral life cannot be lived in solitude. Yet social
relations involve alliances vi^ith the imperfect, because cul-
ture is a mixture of virtues and vices. It is almost impos-
sible to be free from contejnination in a v/orld v/here there is
so much evil. Life is a continuous series of compromises,
not only from v/hat one ought to be to v/hat he wants to be,
but also from what he desires to become to v/hat he has to
be. Men sin because it is too hard to do right.
The habit of conscience is to seek moral authority, and
to use this authority as a guide for conduct. The tendency
is to accept the authority completely. If there is more than
one authority the self is split accordingly. In the case of
a conflict of authorities the personality becomes dual or
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neurotic unless the conflict is resolved. It is difficult
to accept an authority half-heartedly. Yet the authority
must be tested; the ideal must be evaluated critically.
Thus, the individual must have only a tentative devotion
for his ideal lest he be betrayed by it. "Moral disillusion-
ment is the severest of experiences." (ENR, 155)
This does not mean that the self should reject all
moral authority. It is to suggest that to live a moral life
is exceedingly difficult. There comes often a time when the
self must surrender its ideal or else fight for it. This
is particularly true in time of war. But it should be kept
in mind that the effort to overcome aggression, or opposition,
is apt to issue in moral wrong v;hich will destroy the good
aimed at, or at least so blind the devotees that they will
be unable to appreciate the ideal which originally inspired
them.
Hocking states that "the dangers of hostility are ob-
vious; but those of peace are incomparably deceitful." (HKR,
157) The truth of this statement, though, is in practice,
not in theory. The method of peace has been morally seduc-
tive, akin to the unclean person's method of dealing with
dirt. The existence of cherished v/rongs is not recognized.
61. Hocking, HNR, 156. There is another alternative
which Hocking does not suggest, namely, to suffer for the
,
idea, in the belief that truth crushed to earth will rise
again.
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and thus left unsettled. The true lover of peace, like the
clean soul, is diligent in ferreting out the unsightly and
evil spots, and seeks to settle them without physical con-
flict.
This is added evidence of the difficulty with which the
self lives a moral life. It helps to suggest that the moral
life involves a moral risk. There is a moral peril to living.
Although the instinctive activity is soon subdued and con-
trolled by consciousness, this consciousness even with the
help of conscience, is unable to perceive the evanescent line
which so often divides virtue from vice.
According to this interpretation men sin, in large
measure, because they are unable to help it. Sin seems to
be necessary for moral grov/th, because the achievement of the
moral life is a process of trial and error. The thing to
keep in mind, hov/ever, and the thing which counts, is the
total will, and the direction of the striving for power. It
is this v/ill which determines the moral character of an act.
Provided this will to power is at the same time a will- to-
good, the whole of life is a moral adventure, a genuine
search for truth; and the contingent lapses become required
by conscience. Innocence due to ignorance is not virtue.
Morality must be original. Unless this v/ill to power is also
a will- to-good the individual is a sinner. But given the
will- to- good there are two forces v/hich make for achievement
r
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of the moral ideal, one negative, one positive. The former
is remorse, the repulsion of evil; the other is the intrinsic
attraction of the ideal. The complete moral motive is two-
fold, involving the "push of rue" and the "pull of the ulti-
mate good." (HNR, 160)
5. The remaking of the self .
"It is human nature to change itself." (HNR, 17) Such
is Hocking's attitude toward the position that human nature
cannot be changed. In fact the fundamental tendency of human
62
nature is to remake itself according to expectation. This
is not to go back on what has been said above about the free-
dom of the self; rather it is to emphasize it. The only
thing knovm is that the self v;ill be changed in the process
of time. It is not known just what the new product will be.
There are three factors in the remaking of the self, namely,
experience, society, and the actual self involved. These
factors v/ill be discussed in turn.
It is a literal truth that experience is the mother
teacher. Experience in its broad sense includes contact with
nature and v/ith other selves in society as well as one's own
thinking and dreaming; but here the term experience is limited.
62. Hocking, PLR, 64,
63. The reader is referred to the section "The natural
endov/ment of the self" as a preliminary to the following.
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It means only that outcome of influence in one's behavioral
response which tends to color the response in any similar
situation, and indeed in all future situations. "To exper-
ience is to experiment and to read the returns of experimen-
tation." (HNR, 180n)
A study of the role of experience in remaking the self
involves a review of the dialectic of the v/ill to power. Ex-
perience reveals what v/ill satisfy the instincts, and exper-
ience reveals which of these possible satisfactions may be
enjoyed. One never knov/s until he tries. The tools by which
experience remakes the self are pleasure and pain. The
dialectic is a series of successive hypotheses. Pleasure is
positive whereas pain is negative. Pain, however, is the more
powerful implem.ent in the remakinf: process. Pleasure is a
type of ex-perience which is inviting, and tends to produce
more of the same. Change is at a minimum as long as life runs
smoothly and is characterized by pleasure. As the self meets
a problem, and suffers pain, changes v/ill be made in the in-
terest of relief. The self is stimulated to think and to
65
reorganize its life.
64. The child is more amenable than is the adult, yet
both are subject to. the process.
65, This is essentially the position of John Dewey,
Life is spontaneous and habitual until a problematic situa-
tion arises. But v/hereas for Hocking mind is present con-
stantly, in Dewey's thought the mental makes its appearance
when the organism "experiences" an obstacle. (Cf , RIP, 88;
QC, 187; EAN, 245; LOG, 172.)
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The pleasures and pains are definite sense experiences;
they offer no reasons for their existence. The self which
enjoys or undergoes them gives meaning to them. It is not
until the self is able to assign the experience to the situa-
tion, and to interpret the experience in terms of its own
desire that remaking begins. There is a mental after-image
which is connected v/ith the experience; it represents the
self^s comment on the whole situation. "It is the reaction
of the whole v/ill upon the partial impulse, when the full
meaning of that impulse is perceived in the light of its
„66
results." The mental after-image is the most important
determinant of future conduct. If the image is positive
the concern of the self will be to foster the stimulus. If
the image is negative the self v/ill seek to eliminate the
stimulus or to avoid it: the self will develop a nev/ hypo-
thesis for dealing v/ith any similar situation. The remaking
of the self, as fostered by experience, consists in this
continuous formulating of nev/ hypotheses in the dialectical
development of the will.
Society, as a factor in the remaking of the self, in-
cludes the state and its institutions; society represents
66. Hocking, HNR, 186. Italics his. Dalliere describes
the mental after-image as the total reaction of the will which
evaluates in a just measure the good that has been realized
throuffh the expression of some particular instinct. (Gf,
Dalliere, WEH, 42.)
r
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the social will or custom, in contrast to the individual
will. The tools used by society are called sanctions, rewards
and punishment. These sanctions are not now as powerful as
they once were. Yet they still play a part in determining
the life of man. The instinct of sociability is so basic
that man will not willingly exclude himself from society; he
fears the disfavor of his fellows. (HNR, 201)
Individual experience, in large measure, is dependent
upon the social will. In view of this it may be said that
the social will provides the possibility for the remaking of
the self; and that its own influence in the recons tmction is
in that direction talc en by individual experience. Knov/ledge
is cumulative; through its records and histories society ab-
breviates the trial and error process of the individual self.
Others have already done most of the things which the self
will undertake; through^ a study of others' methods the indi-
vidual may profit by both their successes and their mistakes.
The cumulative nature of knowledge is the basis of progress.
If the self is to achieve much it must draw upon society's
storehouse of proven techniques. Besides this accumulated
capital of wisdom society "preserves a common direction of
growth, and at least a minimum level of achievement in a
great number of individuals." {mm, 205)
In spite of the advantages which society affords, how-
ever, the social will is actually repressive. The standards
r
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and ideals of the social will are in terms of the interests
of society; they represent primarily what is good for the
group, and not necessarily the most desirable thing for the
individual. The acceptable patterns of behavior are so fixed
that life can hardly be lived outside these bounds. Fur-
thermore the means and equi-oment which society supplies are
so limited that life in society is necessarily competitive.
It is true that the social will which seeks to remake the
self is not altogether altruistic.
Conflicts arise between the individual will and the social
will. Principles regarding these conflicts will be discussed
in the next section on the rights and duties of the self.
It should be noted here, though, that although some form of
the state is necessary the primary right is to the individual.
(HNR, 212) The state exists for man, not man for the state.
WTiatever is required of an Individual, therefore, must be for
his own good also. This not only gives first place to the
more basic rights, it is the most effective means of accom-
plishing the desired end. The ideal which the social will
sets up for the individual must effect a favorable response.
This can be done only as the ideal represents also v/hat the
individual desires or v/ants for himself.
67. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 209. This is hardly the case
nov/. Any sociable mode of life is acceptable; yet it must
be sociable.
r
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The most effective method which the social group has
for remaking the self is education. Education effects social
reproduction, but it does more. The type is communicated and
a means is provided for growth beyond this type. Here the
social will finds a means of remal-cing the self which includes
what the individual should desire for himself. This is a
type of equipment in which there is no competition. Persons
compete for the opportunity of training; and they use their
training in competing for other things. But the nev/ ideas
are free to all those who can conceive them or think them.
(MR, 231)
Experience, as a factor in remaking the self, helps to
bring the will into existence. Education, as sponsored by
society, should lead the individual in such a way that the
will to pov/er will be evoked and understood. In the process
of education those stimuli should be supplied which will
awaken the several impulses of the self. And with these
stimuli there should be some indication of v/hat they mean.
The individual comes to make the accumulated capital of wis-
dom his own; he finds in the storehouse of culture examples
of the goods and the evils of experience. And thus his own
sojourn in the realm of illusion may be shortened.
In the effort to transform man, hov/ever, both through
social sanctions and in the process of education, the work of
society is superficial. The intention is only to civilize
r
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him, to make him a polite member of the social group. But
this is not enough. The practical attitude, of putting a
68
man "on his feet by putting him v/here he works well" is an
inadequate basis of social work. It is necessary that social
work begin v;ith the concrete but the transformation just sug-
gested is not complete; social regeneration is not possible
until the delinquent has recognized the intangible nature of
the trouble, and until the problem has been dealt with co-
operatively through a re-orientation of ideas, i.e., through
some new motivation. The unifying impulse in life has been
called the will to power. The best effort of society fails
to satisfy or to save the human being. "It fails to provide
within its own resources the reality and independence which it
demands, and in fact uses; it is living upon borrowed capi-
tal." (HNR, 313-314)
This defect is overcome through art and religion. Art
and religion are fostered by the social will, and thus may be.
spoken of as resources of society for saving and remaking the
self. Both of these, however, are personal interests; their
appeal is directly to the individual. In art as v/ell as in
religion the role of society (in remaking the self) depends
69
upon the role of the individual self. Tliese interests are
68. Hocking, Art. (1925)^, 361.
69. In the following, tv/o of the three factors (society
and the actual self involved) are being discussed together.
They are inseparable.
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in society but they are also beyond it. "Art is the region
70
which man has created for himself," In this region man can
express his powers; he can achieve success in it; and thus
gain a testimony to his own reality, "The work of art is the
71
dream made objective
.
permanent
,
self-conscious
,
mutual."
The effect on the self is tremendous. The enjoyment of art
enlivens one's v/ishes; it strengthens one's faith in their
achievableness ; and thus increases the meaning of life,
"Heightened energies of action are transmuted into energies
of creativity," (HNR, 345) The satisfaction, however, which
art affords is not actual but only symbolic. Art is only an
anticipated triumph of the will. The self must grasp its
70. Hocking, HNR, 515. Italics his.
71. Ibid., 340. Italics his. Hocking disagrees with
Freud, for whom art forms aremanif estations of repressed
v/ishes. According to Freud, art is a path from phantasy back
again to reality. The artist, urged on by instinctual needs
(honor, power, riches, fame, love) v/hich he is unable to
satisfy, takes refuge in phantasy. In persons other than
artists this might easily lead to neurosis. But the true
artist is able to elaborate, to modify, and to express his
phantasies in such a manner as to make them enjoyable to
others and socially acceptable. "Then he has won, through
his phantasy, what before he could only win in phantasy:
honor, power, and the love of v/omen." (Freud, ILP, 315)
Hocking agrees that repressed wishes are expressed in art
forms; but there are not particular wishes which receive
such expression. Rather it is "the total v/ish of man - the
will" that is expressed.
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object through concepts. If this is to be done the art form
must be transcended,"^^
If you v/ant to save social impulse, save the
worth of men; and if you v/ant to save the worth of
men find the worth of the cosmos in v/hich man
breathes and thinks. . . . The thing that holds
these tv/o
. . .
together is . . , religion, the
living thought- filled intercourse of man v/ith the
whole •'^^
Kie special province of religion is the sphere of the super-
natural. The concern of religion is "v/ith what is behind,
beyond, beneath, and within the world"; the object of religion
stands "in contrast with all that is apparent, finite, and
controllable by systematic thought," (ENR, 551) The aim in
religion is to unite the finite v/ill with this pov/er which is
behind and beyond the world, and which is looked upon as the
will of the world. Hocking runs dangerously close to panthe-
ism as he speaks of the union of these tv/o wills. The union
does not obliterate the finite will, but rather prepares it
and strengthens it for the further tasks of life. This union
is a return of the self to its ov/n real basis; it makes for
an allisJice with the source of all power. The history of
great religious leaders is evidence that the devotee has a
72, Hocking, KNR, 344. This is the position of Hegel.
Hocking, however, doesnot go beyond religion to philosophy
as does Hegel. But religion as Hocking conceives of it is
philosophical. Indeed the subtitle of his magnum opus
,
MGHE,
is A Philosophic Study of Religion .
73, Hocking, Art , (1935)'^, 39.
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strength not his own. But not all devotees "become great re-
ligious leaders, and v/hat of them? In its union v;i th God
the self gains a perspective which may result in the desired
transformation.
'This transformation of the self is a part of all reli-
gions, of religion in its contrast v/ith the other interests
of life. Hocking finds in Christianity the religion which
shov/s best "v/hat religion may mean for the transformation
74
of instinct."^
In the discussion of Christianity the role of the actual
self involved in the remaking becomes even more prominent.
75According to the Sermon on the Mount Jesus states that he
departs from tradition in shifting the requirement; no longer
is the requirement from outward appearance but from the
heart, Christianity "intends to state its requirement in
terms of a complete transformation of the instincts." (HNR,
367) As the self experiences union v/ith the Christian God
it comes back into the world with a prophetic conscious-
76
ness; it has a cosmic assignment to fulfill. The imperfect
takes the perfect for its object; the perfect dv/ells in, and
is realized by, the imperfect as it does the work of the
74. Hocking, HNR, 359. Hegel regarded Christianity
as the highest religion.
75. Matt. 5-7.
76. Cf. Hocking, MGHE, Ch. XXXII.
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perfect. (HNR, 413) Thus the instincts come to be trans-
formed and the self comes to be remade. "Mysticism, as wor-
ship, is only a moment of refliix in the movement of living:
but in that moment human nature is dissolved and recreated,
shattered and remoulded - a little nearer to the heart's de-
sire.
"'^'^
It ip necessary, however, in the interest of freedom to
point out again the exact role of the actual self involved.
The Christian God invades the world, and seeks to win the
self. God is forever restless in his pursuit of v/hat is lost
and in his effort to correct that which is wrong. (HUE, 422)
But this divine aggression is not strong enough to determine
the self's choice. Man can never be more than a consenting
child of God. Although the self changes constantly in the
process of time, the actual transformation of the v;ill can
78be effected only by the individual self.
77. Hocking, Art. (1912), 61.
78. Hocking, HNR, 171. Karl Deschweinitz has written
an excellent little book on The Art of Helping People Out of
Trouble . One thing is lacking, however, and that happens to
be the main thing. There should be a discussion concerning
the art of awakening in people a desire to be helped out of
their trouble, and helping them to see the vision of what
they might become. There is indeed an art of doing this;
and the ability to do it deserves the honor of being called
an art. The first requisite, however, is the frank recogni-
tion that the individual cannot be helped permanently without
his ov/n co-operation.
r
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6. Rights and duties of the self .
This section is a treatment of the self's rights and
79duties in social relations. Hocking insists almost as
strongly as Hegel on the social meaning of human duty.
"Morality is too narrowly conceived when expressed either
in terms of the rights of self and the duties of others, or
in terns of the duties of self and the rights of others."
The true conception of morality "is to be found rather in
the over- individual laws of progressive common life, which
afford a rule at once, of personal duty and of personal
privilege.
"
"The human being may be described as a set of ideas
striving for control over a physical body and its neighbor-
hood." (PLR, 86) The individual develops as the ideas become
clearer and stronger, and gain mastery. Ideas develop and
mature only as they are used by the person who has them. And
unless one uses his own ideas in governing his undertakings
he is not growing because this represents the permanent con-
dition of growth.
Since there is not one individual only but a v/orld of
79. It is a discussion in ethics; therefore its proper
place is in this chapter rather than in the following one,
which is a study of the problem of social experience and
communication. Placed here it serves as a transition be-
tween the tv/o.
80. Hocking, UEA, 4.
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them, their neighborhoods overlap. And since each human
being is striving for control over his ovm physical body
and its neighborhood for himself conflicts are apt to arise.
Consequently it is necessary to determine boundaries for
these neighborhoods, to determine for the self its station
and its duties, or to formulate principles to govern its
social relations. The self has certain rights in contrast
to the rights of its fellov/s and to the society in v/hich it
lives, yet it has duties which correspond to these rights.
A better statement might be, the self has certain rights in
81
co-operation v/ith the rights of other selves in society.
Rights represent those conditions believed best condu-
cive to the full development of human powers. (PLR, 72, 73)
This includes the concept of duties also. Else it may be
said, duties represent those conditions believed best con-
ducive to the mutual development of human beings. Any scale
of values among rights is determined by the bearing which
the values have on the mental development of individuals.
(PLR, 82) It is evident from this that the hiiman self is
of supreme importance in Hocking's theory. "The heart and
81. The moral hope is a foundation stone in civiliza-
tion; it is basic in human nature, if not by choice at least
by necessity, "A moral hopefulness, i.e., a tendency to
believe in the response-begetting character of the moral
nature, is the most universal trait of mankind," (Hocking,
SWP, 496, Cf, also 493ff.)
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focus of ell ultimate value is in persons not in such ab-
stractions as society, culture, history."
In sharp contrast to the views of Hobbes and Hegel, who
sanctioned any pressure which the state might impose upon
its members. Hocking sets up "the individual life, v/ith its
natural dialectic, as the standard to which social pressures
must confirm,"
There are tv;o necessities for any lasting state or
union. in the first place there must be a commotive function,
i.e., some Cause for 'v/hich men move together; this function
must be continuous or else the union will dissolve. Regard-
less of how important the economic motive is, or even the
desire for security, this function must include the social
and ethical interests, for it is these Interests which draw
84
and keep men together* "Economic facts become social DOwers
only when they make connection with intelligence, moral vim,
a degree of courage; their force comes wholly from the
82. Hocking, MAS, 173-174.
83. Hocking, Hl^, 209. It is interesting to note the
surprising difference in the views of Hegel and Hobbes in
regard to the state's priority. For Hobbes the social re-
pression v/as a necessary evil, a tax on natural liberty;
the state is really an unnatural or artificial construction.
For Hegel, however, subordination of the v/ill to the state
is freedom. The value of an individual is in his social
relations and loyalties. Cf, Hocking, HNR, 226; Brightman,
ML, 212; Hobbes, works. III, 160-161, .199-200, 308-322;
Hegel, PR, Sect. 261.
84. Hocking, LEI, 114, Cf. 110-115.
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Imponderables." VJhat are the imponderables? They "belong to
85
the realm of values, and in this realm pov/er is powerless,"
The second necessity for any lasting state or union
is the incompressible individual. This is the lasting ele-
ment in individualism. Man is prior to the state, and the
principle of any lasting state must be the practice that
86
" every man shall be a. who 1 e man, " Individual thought and
conscience must be free. The state must produce its own
critics if it is to last and grov/, "No nation can exist
unless the idea of the nation finds an intelligent resonance
in the minds of the individual citizens." (LEI, 13)
A man' s right is to his own development. This is pri-
mary and original, "The right of society exists only v/here
its own interest and that interest coincide." (MR, 212)
There is only one natural or absolute right belonging to an
individual, i.e,, "to become v/hat he is capable of becoming."
(PLR, 74) Hocking is consistent in his emphasis upon this
point. "The form of the state's aim is the making of history;
its substance is the making of men." (MAS, 123) The state
may be spoken of as a self v/hich seeks to exist for itself,
but it is no mind nor does it have one. Its mind and conscience
85. Hocking, Art. (1936) , 151-153.
86. Hocking, LEI, 133. Italics his.
87. Hocking, Art. (1934)^, 86-88.
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are only those of the Dersons who compose the state. If
the minds and tongues of the people are crainped to fit a
mold, then the mental life of the society is limited or
destroyed. The most characteristic function of the state
is as educator, and its outstanding contribution in history
88is the men it produces.
This natural right of man, i.e., "to become v/hat he is
Capable of becoming" involves freedom of self-direction as
well as of self-control; it involves the right to use one's
own ideas in governing his undertaking. Hocking calls this
89the "right of liberty ". It remains to point out the im-
plications of this right of liberty in the three areas of
88. A test for a nation's advancement or backwardness
is the condition of the common people. (Hocking, SWP, 16)
It is the spirit of this testing principle v/hich causes
Hocking, in The Spirit of V<orld Politics
.
to be most em-
phatic in his discussion of "Forced Labor". (402-420) It
is not economic first and ethical afterv/ard, but is ethi-
cal first and economic afterward. The solution, if ever
there is one, must follov/ this order. Man is different
from the animal in that he is able to see a moral point;
therefore he requires moral treatment. Forced labor, i.e.,
labor to which men are driven without regard to their v^ills
is immoral, and will defeat the end in view. The will of
the worker must be enlisted, if not in the complete plan at
least in the part affecting him.
In contrast to the view that the more primitive a
culture the more freedom in exploiting the people. Hocking
insists that this is the reverse of what is true. "In
proportion as culture is primitive the ethical basis of
dealing becomes momentous." (SV/P, 419)
89. Hocking, PLR, 86. Italics his
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man's undertakings: control of self, control of others, con-
trol of physical things.
Man seeks to control and direct his own life; in this
experiment others should respect his freedom of worship and
the privacy of his inner life. This respect represents the
right of liberty in s elf-direction.
In order to develop his life man needs associates, and
contact with other minds. In these contacts each should
respect the right of the other to propogate his own ideas.
The right of liberty in undertaking social control involves
the freedom of speech, of the press, and of association.
These tv/o undertakings, control of self and of others,
are dependent upon, or are effected largely through, the con-
trol of physical things. There is no principle of attraction
between empty minds. "It is the other mind as knowing and
mastering Nature that v/e first care about." (MGHE, 256)
Aristotle observed the necessity of wealth and physical things
90for personal development and happiness. All selves are
undertaking to control physical things so that there must be
reciprocal respect. The right of liberty in the control of
nature represents the right of property.
All that the right of liberty implies is dependent upon
the more fundamental right to security. Thus the right of
90. Aristotle, Eth. Nic, 1099a ff.
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liberty in self-management depends upon the right to securi-
ty of one's person; the right of liberty in undertaking
social control is based upon the right to security of one's
agreements and contacts; and the right of liberty in the
control of nature is meaningless without the right to secu-
rity of one's property. (PLR, 88-92)
Such are the rights of man in the three areas of his
undertakings. The basis of these rights is not in the fact
of man as a psychological center; nor are they based in so-
cial utility.
Rights are based in the last resort on a source of
obligation which both the individual and his group
are bound to respect. That source is metaphysical,
^vhen the individual conceives his desires and im-
pulses not as psychological facts but as elements
in a life-purpose which has been implanted in him
by the cosmos, and v/hich as a cosmic duty he ought
to fulfil, then these desires and impulses acquire
a sanction v/hich both individuals and groups are
bound to respect, irrespective of their immeaiate
v/ishes ,^3.
But to each of these rights there is a corresponding
duty. Man's rights are inalienable only so long as he aims
to develop his powers. Rights exist only in the presence
of moral responsibility and ambition. The discussion of
"Rights without Duties" (LEI, 51-57) is a vigorous one. Hie
shirker is condemned mercilessly. Rights are not rights un-
til they are looked upon as privileges and as responsibilities.
91. Hocking, Art. (1931)^, 495-496.
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Liberalism has failed in that it has fostered, or at least
has allowed to develop, the belief that there are inalien-
able rights apart from corresponding duties. "The conditions
of all rights are moral conditions; without good will all
rights drop off."^^
Because "the heart and focus of all ultimate value is
in persons" (MAS, 173f.), all these duties, just as is any
scale of values among rights, are determined by the bearing
which they have on the mental development of individuals.
(PLR, 82) Such a determination of duties is manifested in
the follov/ing statement v/ith regard to the right of property.
" The ultimate basis of all -pro-perty right is -power to use ;
but the chief of all uses is the making of men , as realized
93through systems of ov;nership .
"
The liberal spirit belongs to human nature; it repre-
sents human nature's attack on its own natural selfishness.
Selfhood involves selfishness or self-csnteredness , because
a self must live from its center. Every self, because of
its unique vision of value, its individual point of view,
is naturally self-centered. But the self must revolt and
92. Hocking, LEI, 54. Cf. also 172ff.
93. Hocking, SVVP, 524. Italics his. Cf. 520-532

149
try to correct this perspective. It is necessary, for the
self's own development, that this revolution or reformation
take place. As Professor Brightman notes in his "Proof of
95
the Law of Altruism" , unless the individual acknowledges
and obeys the Law of Altruism he "implies that others need
not treat him as a realizer of value." Persistence of self-
centeredness prevents the individual's own fullest realiza-
tion, because he misses the needed associational values as
v/ell as those values which can be realized only in co-opera-
tive endeavor.
Immanuel Kant expressed what he regarded as a Categori-
cal Imperative as follows;
So act as to treat hiimanity, v/hether in thine ov/n
person or in any other, alv/ays as an end and never
merely as means, 96
Hocking goes beyond Kant in this regard, in that human beings
94, Hocking, LEI, 39. This is especially true for the
popular hero, for seiaom does he escape v;ith his sanity.
Hocking finds in Christianity a system of thought, or
an ideal at least, which gives full satisfaction to the in-
stinctive life of man. Christianity, hov/ever, "intends to
state its reouirements in terms of a comrjlete transformation
of the instincts." (HNR, 367, Cf. 362-439,)
95, Brightman, ML, 225. The lav/ is stated thus:
"Each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in
themselves
.
and a_s far as possible , to co-operate v/i th
others in the production and enjoyment of shared values .
"
(P. 223, Italics his.)
96, Kant, CMS, 54.
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are to be treated, not only as ends in themselves but "as
ends which I am helping to achieve".
Treat human beings accordlnj^ to what they ma^ be-
come v/i th the best available aid_, and our own.^
Every human relation involves an obligation, that of treating
the other person not merely in terms of what he is but in
terras of v/hat it is possible for him to become, i.e., ac-
cording to what he is capable of being. (MIE, 185-186)
Hocking's ethical principle shows influence from Kant,
from Hegel, and from Royce. Yet he goes beyond them. It is
98
stated, as follows ;
"
Universalize thyself . " Each human being
represents a unique viev/ of reality. The destiny of the
individual is the universalized expression of this latent
idea.
The simple command to "universalize oneself" includes the
two most prominent and impressive statements of Kant's cate-
gorical imperative, which are:
Act only according to that maxim by v/hich you can at
the same time will that it shall become a universal law.
and
So act as to treat humanity, v/hether in thine own
person or in any other, alv/ays as an end and never
merely as means. 99
97. Hocking, SV/P, 514. Italics his
98. Hocking, TP, 518. Italics his.
99. Kant, GMS, 44, 54,
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It embraces also Royce's principle of loyalty to loyalty.
In so far as it lies in your pov/er, so choose your
cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice
and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in
the world rather than less. . . In choosing and in
serving the cause to which you are to be loyal
,
be,
in any case
,
loyal to loyal ty . 1^1
Kant's ethics is admittedly formal; he sought to develop
his formal principle in such a v/ay that it would yield of
itself the criteria of morality. But Kant had to forsaJke
this principle of consistency, in order to decide the right
and wrong of concrete acts, and appeal to the concrete end of
human v/elfare. Royce did not intentionally develop a formal
ethics. But his ideal of loyalty to loyalty affords no help
concerning the concrete causes to which one should be loyal.
Yet it is this particular insight which is most necessary to
morality. Everett makes the following statement concerning
the inadequacy of the formalism of Kant and Royce:
Mere universality - Kant's test of consistency -
affords no practical rule of conduct. , . . Nor
is loyalty in a better position to tell us what
causes we should serve. The claim that the spirit
of loyalty will itself be able to 'furnish us the
unmistakable answer to this question' , is Itself
essentially a repetition of Kant's claim that the
good-will can yield us guidance in the specific
choices of moral life.1^2
It mig-ht appear that Hocking's principle would lend
100. Royce, PL, Lecture III.
101. Ibid., 121. Italics his.
102. Everett, MV, 45-46.
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itself to the same charge. But that such is not the case
will become evident in the following contrast with Kegel and.
Bradley, For Hegel the world is a living process; human in-
dividuals are immersed in this process, and they get their
freedom as v/ell as their worth through participation in it,
Kegel observes that there is a dialectical development
103
of the individual's freedom and of his worth. First there
is the negative freedom of aloofness. The individual seeks
to live his moral life in solitude because social relations
involve alliances v;ith the imperfect. Tliere is so much evil
in the v;orld that the self wants to abandon it. This course
of life is soon found to be empty and unsatisfying. 'Then
the individual tries the positive freedom of eccentric self-
assertion. But this path also leads to meaninglessness and
despair. At last the self achieves a concrete and satisfy-
ing freedom in belonging to what he formerly looked upon
with disdain; an individual member of an imperfect society,
V^hereas previously the defective means were thought of as
chains, now, through an understanding and mastery of them
they have become wings. The task is to perceive that which
103. Hegel is often accused of using the dialectic as
a tool for constructing a theory of reality. The accusation
is not v/holly unjust: He is a methodological dogmatist. His
theory of freedom in v/hich the will of the individual is
subordinated to the state is an example. His ideal is the
state, and all else mustmove in that direction. Gf , note
83 above. Cf. also Hocking, HNR, 209, 226.
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is universal and to ally oneself with it. The ideal for
Hegel is identification with objective Reason as it is rea-
104lized in the institutions of mankind.
Hegel's concern for the state and society caused him
105
to neglect the individual. Hocking admits with Hegel
that the ethical life cannot be lived in solitude; the indi-
vidual must ally himself with mankind or society. But this
is the first step only. This alliance should not be too
complete to prevent criticism. Alexander's view of obliga-
tion, a consciousness of what the collective mind wills, as
well as his view of guilt, a consciousness of non- conformity
to the collective mind, was rejected because he disregarded
individual ideals and obligations. Alexander does not have
any place for the individual's obligation to criticize and
^ ^v, -,14-. • ^
•
correct the collective mind.
Hocking was influenced by Hegel, as v;as also F. H.
Bradley, but in both cases the follower has gone beyond the
104. Hegel, PR, Sections 260, 141. Cf. Hocking, TP,
316ff
.
105. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 209, 226; Brightman, ML, 212.
But, for Hegel, the individual finds his fullest realiza-
tion in the state. Cf. Hegel, PR, Section 261.
106. Cf . Alexander, STD, 331; note 46, above, and ff.
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leader* They supersede Hegel in their emphasis upon the
individual. bradley's discussion of "My Station and Its
Duties" almost parallels Hocking's treatment of his ov;n
ethical principles. The end is the realization of the good
will (universal) which is superior to one's present out-
108look. But good v/ill is meaningless apart from the will
of living finite beings. The duty to criticize affords the
individual an opportunity to express what is unique in his
own ideal; he is freed from complete subordination to the
state or church. (TP, 519) But Bradley condemns as foolish
the setting of the ideals of one's head over against the
reality of the world. For the individual to insist that he
knows better, or that he is better, than the moral organism
smacks of youthful self-conceit; it is actually immoral.
One's- duty, as Hegel recognized, is to take the best there
is and live up to it. But one's duty involves more. The
individual must stand on the basis of what is, and while
incorporating in his ovm life the best of v/hat is, he must
107. This does not mean that in Hegel's theory there
is no place for the criticism of society. The individual's
duty is to identify himself with only that which is univer-
sal. This is an effective means of correcting the institu-
tional life of mankind, and of eventually re-creating it.
But the fact remains that the will of the individual is
subordinated to the v;ill of the state. Of. Hegel, PR,
Sec. 261.
108. Bradley, ES, 162.
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seek to make himself and his world better. Right is the as-
sertion of the universal will in relation to the particular
will; duty is the assertion of the particular v/ill in affir-
mation of the universal will; good is the identity, not
109
merely the relation, of both. In contrast to Hegel, it
is not in alliance with the institutional life of mankind,
nor in criticism of it, "but in the remaking of ideas and
thereby of institutional life" (TP, 319), that the individual
realizes his highest good. His worth is not so much in the
psychological fact of personality as in that good will
v/hich leads him to effect a desirable change in the "uni-
versal current of life." (TP, 320)
109. Bradley, ES, 212.

CHAPTER V
THE HTJI/IAN SELF AND OTHER SELVES
1. The Tproblem of social experience .
There are three fundamental classes of the substantive
objects of human experience. Nature is thought of as all
physical objects and their relations; the self consists of
psychical objects and their relations. Society is made up
of minds, social objects, and their relations. This third
class may be called the Spiritual World; in a general v/ay
the self is Included in it, as a social object or as a mem-
ber of society. There are sciences pertaining to each of
these classes of objects, the natural sciences, psychology,
and sociology,^
The immediate problem is to ansv/er the question how is
social experience possible, how can the self knov/ and com-
municate with other selves? It is a consideration of the
2
relations betv;een the self and society.
Locke suggested that there is an inner sense for know-
ing one's own mind, and an outer sense for perceiving objects
of nature. But he did not suggest any sense for discerning
1. Hocking, MGHE, 241f.
2, In the course of the chapter, however, it will be-
come evident that relations betv/een these tv/o are dependent
also upon their relations to the first class of objects,
nature.
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other minds. The nearest thing to this social sense that
the sociologists are able to offer is a "consciousness of
kind" or some other social instinct. But this consciousness
of kind is not an actual organ of knowledge whereby the self
can perceive other minds. There is no such perceptive or-
gan known. Strictly speaking, social experience is a mis-
nomer; there is no such thing in the literal sense of the
term. There is social knowledge but it i.<^ of necessity
built on hypothesis.
Just hov/ is the hypothesis built? One person exper-
iences the physical -oresence of another; he sees the other's
expressive signs and bears his words. All that is experienc-
ed directly is the presence and expressive signs of the
other person both of which are physical. Each infers the
reality of the other. The inference is so completely con-
firmed in experience that each becomes as convinced of his
social environment as he is of his physical environment. In
this way the self becomes practically certain of its social
world.
3. Locke, ECHU, Book II, Chapter i. He simply as-
sumes the reality of 'minds and of external things. The
matter is inouired into in Book IV, Chapters iv, ix, xi.
But nowhere does he -prove the existence of these two
classes of objects. He writes in Section 8 of Chapter xi
that the certainty is as great as is necessary. Our fac-
ulties are not suited to give a "comprehensive knowledge
of things free from all doubt and scruple; but . . . they
serve our purpose well enough, if they will but give us
certain notice of those things, which are convenient or
inconvenient to us." , .
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Ttiere are v/ide and constantly varying extremes in re-
gard to social experience. At times experience is oppres-
sively social: the self seeks for privacy but finds only
fragments of other characters and echoes of others' opinions;
its own individuality is almost obliterated. On other occa-
sions the self may experience aloneness in a crowd; it seems
impossible to bridge the chasm betv/een self and other selves,
even in a practical v;ay.
To try definitely to know one»s neighbor is to realize
the impossibility of such knov/ledge. The self experiences
social relations but is at a complete loss in trying to
understand the relationship. Experience belongs, somehow,
to individual selves. I'here is an inevitable self-centered-
ness in selfhood. Sensation is of the not-self, but sensa-
tion appears as self-stuff, and to go further it alv/ays
4
appears as particular- self- stuff. It becomes evident,
therefore, that in the nature of the case the other mind, as
a thinker of objects, must be beyond the reach of direct ex-
perience. As a thinker of objects the other self is sub j ect
also; thus it can be thought only; it cannot be sensed.
Otherness is assured by virtue of the fact that the thoughts
of no tv/o persons are the same. This v/ould be true even
though both were thinking the same object, because each would
4. Hocking, DIS, 150
J
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have his own thoughts. One self may conjecture the thoughts
of another self; but each self has an infinite thought-fund
which is inaccessible directly to other selves, and which is
accessible to itself only as it masters ideas. (MGHE, 244)
The difficulty in understanding hov/ social relations
are possible has been intensified by the "presupposition
that the S-object is to be known after the same general
scheme as is the T-object, or not at all." Since the other
self is intrinsically subject it cannot become such an ob-
ject nor Can it be cognized as is the thing-object.
But if this is the only genuine knov/ledge, self-knowledge
is impossible also. The self cannot achieve any physical
knowledge of its ov/n mind; it cannot quit being subject in
order to become object. Any explanation of self-knowledge
might account for the possibility of knowledge of other
selves. Locke's suggestion of the inner sense, reflection,
as a means of knowing the self, is misleading; "of special
organ there seems to be none for self-knowledge, any more
than for knowledge of other minds." (MGHE, 252) In fact,
knowledge of all three classes of objects, nature, the self,
and other selves, stands on the same footing. It just hap-
pens that social knov/le.ge was the last one to be critically
investigated, and so was the last of the three to be de-
clared impossible. It remains to examine the possibilities.
5. Hocking, DIS, 99. S-object means social object and
T-object means thing object or object of nature. Gf
. p. 2.
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2. Solipsism ,
To raise the problem of social experience is to be con-
fronted with solipsism, the thesis that "nothing beyond ray
6 7
self exists", or that "nothing but my experience exists."
Ihe question of social knowledge arose with Descartes in his
Q
deterra. nation to find out v/hat he could knov/. His finding
represents the solipsistic position: the only certainty was
9
that of his own immediate existence, Descartes did not con-
sider the problem of social experience as a primary demand
on thinking. Nor did Leibniz, who also touched upon the
matter, ^'^ But it was considered as such in the thought of
Berkeley, Berkeley wrote as follov/s:
It is plain that v/e cannot knov; the existence of
other spirits otherwise than by their operations,
or the ideas by them, excited in us , I perceive
several motions . , , that inform me there are
certain particular agents, like myself, which ac-
company them, and concur in their production.
Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is
6. Bradley, AR, 248.
7. Hocking, TP, 268.
8. Descartes, DIS, pt, iv.
9. Unless Descartes had chanced upon the ontologlcal
argument for the existence of God he v/ould have remained in
bondage within himself, because it was God who guaranteed
even the existence of the self, and who provided the self
with its fellowsand external nature.
10. Cf. Hocking, MGHE, 246,
11. In his study of the principles of human knov/ledge.
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not immediate, as is the knov/ledge of my ideas;
but depending on the intervention of ideas, by
me referred to agents or spirits distinct from
myself, as effects or concomitant signs,-^^
Berkeley' s escape from the prison of the self is not unlike
Descartes' s. Both depend upon God; they vitiw experience as
the result of an external activity. Berkeley knows that he
is passive in sensation, and Grod is postulated as the effi-
cient Cause of this sensation.
Professor Perry condemns idealism, and especially Berke
14leian idealism. Idealism is established through falla-
cious arguments. Idealists are guilty of what Perry calls
initial predication; and they suffer from the "ego-centric
12. Berkeley, Works, I, 339. Italics in text. Thus
Berkeley's belief in the reality of other minds is based
upon the argument from physical causes, and by analogy. His
view is stated again in Section 148, as follows: "A human
spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an
idea. When therefore v/e see the colour, size, figure, and
motions of a man, v/e perceive only certain sensations or
ideas excited In our own minds; and these being exhibited to
our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out
unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like
ourselves. ... It is plain we do not see a man, if by
man is meant that v/hich lives, moves, perceives and thinks
as we do: but only such a certain collection of ideas, as
directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought
and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented
by it." (Works, I, 341)
13. Berkeley, Works I, 341, 342. Cf. 270, 286, 290.
14. Perry's interpretation of Berkeley is not accurate
It is false to attribute to him the theory that "to know is
to generate the reality knov/n. " (PPT, 119) That is not what
Berkeley m^ant by the statement esse is percipi .
15. Perry, PPT, 126ff.
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predicament." But hov/ can an idealist, or anyone else,
escape from his own experience? There is even danger that
the loneliness of the ego-prison will lead to the conviction '
that "nothinf^ but my experience exists." (TP, 268)
Leibniz v/as convinced that the "monads have no windov^s
17through which anything can enter or depart." According to
Perry, this presupposition that minds are accessible only to
their possessors, is "as ill-defined and unreasonable as it
is universal." The notion arises, he says, from the fal-
lacy of exclusive particularity. In Perry's realistic theojTy
other minds are known by general observation. "Mental action
is a property of the physical organism. . . . elements become
mental content when reacted to in the specific manner charac-
19teris tic of the central nervous system . " But this course
leads to more questions than answers. Perry comes later to
admit that this method of general observation "obscures" the
content factor of mind, and so must be supplemented by the
20
method of introspection* Thus even Perry finds himself
imprisoned.
16. Perry, PPT, 129-152.
17. Leibniz, PV/L, Monadology , 7.
18. Perry, PPT, 286.
19. Ibid., 298-299. Italics his.
20. Perry, PPT, 204f.
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Solipsism cannot be refuted simply by refusing to be-
lieve in it. But once considered the problem arises from
time to time until it is refuted. How can this be done?
Miss Calkins believes that personal absolutism constitutes
an escape. The self is immediately certain of itself and
Its experioncings . But among the self's experiencings are
those of being hindered and of being thwarted, against its
will. Being limited is a transitive experience. Knowledge
21
of limitation involves an awareness of a limiting something.
But is not this awareness of a limiting something an idea in
the mind? And might it not be only that? The self's cer-
tainty is in its experiencing only and not in its interpre-
tation of experiences.
Solipsism can be refuted best by showing it to be a
self-refuting position. In order to prove the position direct
experience, i.e., the given, must be transcended. But to
transcend the given is to go- into the universe at large, and
22
so to refute solipsism. For one to insist that he can know
only his ov/n ideas is to imply that he has an idea of knowing
something else. Until one transcends his ov/n experience he
21. Calkins, PPP, 452f . This is not far different from
the escape suggested by Berkeley. (Cf. note 12 above.) Sen-
sation is a transitive experience, according to Berkeley; but
the idea of passivity and the idea of a causal agent might
still be only in one's mind#
22. Bradley, AR, 250.
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cannot assert that minds are confined v/ithin themselves.
For example, Leibniz had to be standing outside before he
could observe that the monads had no windov/s. To make such
a statement about other selves Involves a knov/ledge of them.
(TP, 269) There remains the problem of finding out how
they are known.
3t Knowledge of other selves .
The purpose of this section is to examine critically
several theories of how other minds are known. The ground
has been prepared by the foregoing. The rest of this chapter
is a presentation, by contrast, of Hocking's theory of how
social experience is possible.
It is not possible to formulate a set of infallible
criteria or signs v/hereby one may discern the presence of, and
enter into relations with, an other conscious being. This
suggestion is better than the method of analogy. Yet it is
impossible, because there are no such criteria. James's
description of the self as a "fighter for ends" serves as
a basis for the suggestion that the recognizable pursuit of
23. In the method of analogy the self infers the presence
of other mind because of expressive movements analogous to
its own actions. The difficulty is that a knowledge of one's
own self must be presupposed. But self-consciousness is a
late development; it is a product of social exi? e ri enc e , rather
than serving as a basis for it. (Of. Hocking, TP, 288; Royce,
SGE, 194, 196, 201; Alexander, STD, II, 32.)
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ends with choice of means is an adequate test. Such a test
is helpful in social judgment but is not sufficient. These
criteria are but physical signs; they do not arise from any
direct experience of other mind, "Every physical change must
and may be referred to a physical cause," (MGHE, 247) Given a
consciousness of the social object these signs v/ould be of
great help in continuing the investigation. V^ith the aid of
these criteria the self would be able to pair off states of
mind v/ith sets of actions; but they would not enable the self
to determine whether or not there were a state of mind.
Professor Royce suggests that other minds are "known to
be real, and to have their own inner life, because they are
25
, . . the endless treasury of more ideas, " The self finds
a needed supplement for its fragmentary meanings. The self
attributes mind to those things which respond to it, and
which help the self to develop its own thought. The more
consistent and integral the response, the more convinced the
self is that it is dealing v/ith other mind. Practical cer-
tainty is achieved through the continuous and successful
social intercourse. The self becomes as convinced of its
social environment as it is of its physical environment.
Yet this method does not lead to an original experience
of fellov/ minds, Royce' s criterion of response may serve to
24. Of, James, PSY, I, 140-143.
25. Royce, Vil, II, 171, Italics his.
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answer the question, "How do we know that we know other
minds?" But it lends little help as to how other selves are
actually known. It is based upon the presupposition that
there are minds v/hich can be known, and which will respond.
The reality of other mind is only an inference; "a faith , . .
not a knowledge in experience." (MGHJi, 249)
Alexander goes beyond Royce and speaks of the double as-
pect of the experience of sociality. Other selves "excite in
us the social or gregarious instinct, and to feel socially
tov/ards another being is to be assured that it is something
26like ourselves." The reciprocal response of mind to mind
gives rise to the mutual apprehension of kindred otherness,
Alexander's view depends upon the instinct of sociability or
the consciousness of kind; but this consciousness of kind is
not an organ of knov/ledge for perceiving other minds. In
fact there is "no such organ". (MGHE, 242) The futility of
this instinct of sociability for knowing other minds is
recognized even by Alexander. It offers no help as to what
sort of mind there is. The nature of the other mind must be
27
divined "sympathetically on the basis largely of analogy."
Although Alexander insists that assurance of the other mind
is "not invented by inference or analogy", he goes on to
26. Alexander, STD, II, 32.
27. Ibid., 37. Yet he has rejected the method of ana-
logy. Gf. STD, II, 31ff.

167
speak of this assurance as "an act of faith forced on us by
28
a peculiar sort of experience." It is necessary to seek
elsewhere for the knowledge of other selves.
4, Social experience and experience of nature .
Unless the other mind can be located in ntiture there
can be no individuality and particularity. Minds, as pure
minds, are so much alike that there is no attraction between
them. In fact the only mind that is of interest is "a mind
which has its ov/n objects, and is at work upon them," (MGHE,
255) An empty mind is no mind at all. It was pointed out
in Chapter II that the characteristic activity of mind is
that of actualizing possibility, of making determinate an
undetermined future. Yet the other mind cannot be known
simply by knov/lng its objects; they must be known as being
common objects, as being known by the other mind. The mater-
ial for experience is found In nature; thus it may be said
that the only mind which can be known is mind-in-union-with-
nature. This is not to identify the mind and nature, because
the mind is that which is united with or deals with nature*
Nature is brought into the equation only for the sake of
gaining knowledge of the mind which is manifested.
The possibility of mental telepathy, even if it were
real, would not remove the necessity of knov/ing mlnd-in-union-
28. Alexander, STD, II, 37
J
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with-nature. The value of telepathic communication would
depend upon the possibility of its being verified. The self
would not depend upon its strong impressions until it could
verify them. Communication must be carried on indirectly,
29
and through the medium of external appearances. The other
mind must be known as it is: in its conceiving of possibili-
ties, and in its deeds v/hich make them actual. Nature is the
field wherein definiteness of position or location is pos-
sible, and in which individuality may be characterized. It
is not necessary that a man enter one particular profession
in order to gain a livelihood; but it is necessary that every
man shall live in the v/orld, and that nature shall serve as
his material-for-experience. (MGHE, 259)
It follows, therefore, that other mind is experienced,
if at all, in and through nature. Social experience and ex-
perience of, nature seem to be inseparably united. Nature
tends to separate one mind from its fellov/s, but whatever
separates also connects, and hence nature, though separating
minds, makes possible their knowing relationship. In separat-
ing, nature fixes and defines the other-ness of the other.
At the same time nature provides a more tangible knowledge
of the other than could be had through an experience of its
thoughts alone. Hiils becomes evident in considering the
29. Bradley, AR, 346f
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value of the body in knowing other selves.
In Chapter III the body v/as spoken of as language of
the self; it is the means whereby the self actualizes its
possibilities. The body is that v/ith which the self handles
nature, just as the idea is that with which the self thinks
nature. The body may thus be spoken of as a symbol of the
idea; but it is more, "The body is an incredibly intricate
and exact metaphor of every inner movement of that Other
30Mind," As with Schopenhauer the body represents the ob-
jectified will.^"^
The surface of the body is the shore-line where
outgoing and incoming purposes meet, conflict and
cross; and one tale confuses the clarity of the
other, - yet adds the data v/ithout v/hich the other
were less than time, (MGHS, 263n)
But for the hodj other minds ?/hich are known v/ould be ob-
literated: The experience of body cannot be dismissed from
the idea of social experience. Such knov/ledge is not a
literal knowing of other mind, nor does it afford any direct
experience of the other mind, but it is a necessary consti-
tuent of social experience.
Social experience involves the world of nature. It
remains, now, to show that an experience of nature is de-
pendent upon social experience. The first statement is
30. Hocking, MGHii;, 262. Italics his.
31, Schopenhauer, Vi/WV, Sections 18, 60.

170
granted more readily than is the latter, "because nature-
consciousness is constant whereas social experience is inter-
mittent. Therefore, to show that £in experience of nature
depends upon social-consciousness is to moke the latter
continuous also. But as v;as noted in Section One of this
chapter all three types of knov/iedge (of nature, of self, and
of others) stand on the same level. Self-consciousness is
recognizedly intermittent; yet it is reckoned as persisting.
In like manner nature is an object of direct awareness only
occasionally, hut nature is always present. So also does
the social consciousness persist. Although this persistent
awareness of other mind is not as ready to hand as is the
nature-consciousness it is "inseparably bound up • . . with
the continuous experience of Nature." (KGHE, 269)
The persistence of this social-consciousness is more
evident if, instead of considering only the body of the other,
one takes thought of the world of nature which is common to
both. It is through a known common v/orld that the other is
first known. Though his body disappear the objects, knov/n
as common objects, as his objects, never cease to be his ob-
jects. If any experience of nature has ever been a social
experience it never loses its social reference. (MGHE, 271)
This seems to suggest that social experience has a be-
ginning after and apart from physical experience. But such
is not the case. It may be of help to consider the infant
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and his social environnent. His earliest experiences of
nature are apparently social experiences. He begins exper-
iencing nature as though it v;ere animated, ready to respond
to his demands. Knowledge of nature and consciousness of
other mind are inseparably related from the beginning. A
time cannot be found v/hen nature was regarded as other than
common. The self does not first know the physical v/orld as
a world of objects, and then as a world of shared objects.
Physical experience acquires objectivity through a prior
recognition of other mind. (TP, 288ff.)
Communication would be impossible unless two minds had
something in common. Communication may build from little to
32
more and more, but never from none to some. Thus, if ex-
perience is ever actually social, the condition for it has
always been present, and is present continuously. The posi-
tion may be stated thus: social experience is either never
present or is alv/ays present. If it can be shown that the
self ever has an experience of other mind it will be proven
that such experience is continuous.
These two things may be proven at the same time. To
suppose that experience is never social is to contrast sup-
posed non-social experience with supposed social experience.
To conceive experience as limited to the self and its object
32. This common object is the v/orld of three-dimansion
al space. (Hocking, TP, 290)
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is to imply an idea of experience as being not thus limited,
is to imply a conception of what social experience is, or
would be like. On the other hand, an idea of social exper-
ience would not be possible unless social experience v/ere
actual: to conceive an experience of other mind is to have
such an experience. It takes a non-subjective experience
to judge one that is merely subjective. If Leibniz knew
that the monads had no windows, that they did not actually
experience each other, he knew their relations to be other
than they seemed. Therefore Leibniz, at least, v/as an inter-
monadic mind.
Objection may be raised. It may be claimed that such
an idea of social experience is an ideal construction, a
conception produced by the imagination. But such is not the
case; there is no way in which it can be constructed. It
cannot be derived from physical ideas in physical relations,
nor from psychical ideas in psychical relations; nor can it
be derived from any combinations of these. "To reach the
idea from these, we must use the special relation of Other-
self-hood, which is the idea itself." (MGHE, 276) The idea
of social experience, of other minds, is given; it is innate.
This may be justified in Kantian fashion by saying that such
an idea is "a native and necessary form by v/hlch the Self
orders the material of its experience, as otherwise given,"
(MGHE, 276) There is no possible test for this idea save
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In social experience. If it be only an hypothesis the idea
is nevertheless a genuine social experience. Even as the
idea of self is simultaneously an experience of self, so
also the idea of other mind is simultaneously an experience
of other mind. To realize what is meant by other mind is
33
to find an other even as the self is found. Social ex-
perience is real in whatever sense its reality can be thought,
imagined, or denied. (MGHa, 279;
5. Social experience as experience of another' s experience .
Other mind cannot be known simply by knowing its objects;
the objects must be known as being comraon objects; they must
be knov/n as being known by the other mind. (MGEE, 261) This
knov/ing of the other's knovm objects is an experience of the
other's experience. In sharing identical objects the mys-
terious isolation of self from self is obliterated: Minds
which are sharing objects are experiencing each other's ex-
perience. Nature is one, and is a common object j thus in
sha.ring nature minds share each other's experience, and so
34
share each other.
This is a refutation of subjective solipsism; but might
it not represent a mutual sub j s^c tlvism? No, because empirical
33. The meaning of other mind v/ill be discussed in
section 6 of this chapter. (Of. also "God as the initial
Other" in the chapter follov/ing.
)
34. Hocking, GAP, 39if,
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knowing is a sign of dependence. To observe or to experience
the world of nature is to be acted upon from v;ithout.
That objectivity of the physical v/orld v/hereby we
consider it as not-ourselves is due to its source
in this active non-ego, not to the fact that it is
shared by • . . equally passive or receptive know-
ers. (CAP, 392)
Each sees of the other only body and physical objects,
but eaclj is within the other's v/orld; each is within the
mind of the other; they meet and share identical things.
Neither is behind the mask of body but in front of it, press-
ing v/ith his consciousness upon the mind of the other, con-
taining him and that v/hich is his; and in turn, being con-
tained. In so doing each experiences the other's experience;
and thus each experiences the other. (MGHE, 265-266) But in
contrast to this reflection it should be noted that "no exper-
ience can lie open to inspection from outside; no direct guaran-
35tee of identity is possible." The knowledge of the identical
objects, as v;ell as communication itself, depends upon infer-
ence. One must presuppose the other, as well as his particular
experiencing, in order to experience the same objects.
6. Experience of God as basis for social experience .
By other mind is meant "an Other-knov/er-of-physical-
Nature." (MGHE, 261) The initial Other Mind cannot be some
fellow finite mind because all finite selves are equally
35. Bradley, AR, 346.
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dependent. The primary and continuous social experience
must be v/ith this Other Mind, because intercourse with other
finite minds has a beginning, and may have an ending. In-
deed, the big obstacle to finding social experience is a
natural realism. Human selves come and go, but nature goes
on forever, John Dewey assumes "a natural world that exists
36independently of the organism," Unless this Other Mind
is, social experience, as presented herewith, is not pos-
sible. It is an experience of this Other Mind which serves
as a basis for social experience.
No one can deny that nature has an Independent priority.
Nature is obstinate, and those who v/lsh to live must learn
her ways. But the obstinacy of nature is not blank mystery;
to man it is an invitation to investigation. Vi/hy is man so
dependent upon nature? Is nature completely independent or
is there some further source^ Regardless of nature's priority
and obstinacy physical experience is dependent upon the self
whose experience it is. The thing most completely independ-
ent of self is other-self t^*^ It follows then that "the inde-
pendence of Nature hangs from this more fundamental independ-
ence, and not vice versa." (KGHE, 285)
It was stated in the section above that to experience
36. Dewey, ^jOG, 33.
37. "The only thing that can limit or act upon a self
is another self." (Hocking, TP, 270)
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the world of nature is to be acted upon from without.
In this connection experience may be described as "an inter-
play between an active Self and an active External Reality,"
(MGHJtj;, 285) It may be spoken of as "a meeting between a
39
self and a world," Ihis represents a realistic theory
of knov/ledge. But it must be remembered that the mind is
not a mere wax plate upon which impressions are made: the
mind is active, and creative, for it responds in kind to the
Impressions received. The receiving and responding is com-
munication, (GAP, 592ff.)
This External Reality is active; the self receives im-
pressions from it. The experience of obstinate nature is
characterized by coercive sensation, and by ruthless defeat
if the self is in error about her. The disciplinary exper-
ience of correcting errors about nature results in a making
over of minds by nature. To experience nature in the sense
of being made over by her is to experience her as a mani-
festation of an other mind. The self's knowledge of the
external world increasesthrough direct communication,
through its e^q^erience, with this other mind. It is this
social experience which is as continuous as is the exper-
ience of nature. The tv;o experiences , of nature and of
38, See note 37.
39, Hocking, Art. (1939) 36f,
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other mind, begin together and. are inseparable. The obsti-
nacy of nature is indeed the objectivity of the other mind.
It remains to ansv/er the question, Vi/hat is this Other
Mind? It was pointed out at the beginning of this section
that other mind means other-knower-of-physical-nature , But
it was also noted that this initial Other Mind cannot be
some f ellov; finite mind because it too is dependent. Nor
can it be all finite minds because all of them are transient
and empirical knowers of nature, and are thus dependent upon
the Other Mind.^*^ "The entire individuality and permanence
of Nature implies a corresponding individual permanence in
the Subject v/hose communicated being . , . Nature is." (MGIiE,
293)
Since "other mind is experienced, if at all, in and
41through nature", social experience is not possible "until
the objectivity of Nature , , . is found as an intentional
42
communication of a Self v/holly active . " This self is God,
It follows, therefore, that the basic social experience is
not the experience of other men, but is the experience of
God as directly revealed in the experience of Nature, This
40, Cf. Chapter VI, 4, (3),
41, Cf , section 4, above,
42, Hocking, MGHE, 295, Italics his. Nature is divine
language.
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is the Other which is found even as the self is found.
Thus it is that Hocking says of Bergson: "It is Bergson's
greatest service to have shown that Knowledge of reality is
44
possible in concrete experience." The Kantian thing-in-
itself is brought into the world of immediate experience,
" It is through the knov/ledge of God that I^ am able to know
men ; not first through the knowledge of men that _I am able
45
to knov/ or imagine God . " JjJxperience of other human selves
is not direct, but is through analogy of inference, througih
the medium of their bodies or of expressive behavior requir-
ing bodily activity. But these bodily movements could not
logically be interpreted as communication, unless there were
some constant and pervasive experience in which the self has
an immediate awareness of Other Mind; and tthat provides the
self with a category by means of which social relations be-
come intelligible. The initial and persistent experience
is with God; other experiences are derivative.
43. Gf , note 35 in section 4, above.
44. Hocking, Art. (1914)^, 326. Cf. Hocking's article
on "The Knowledge of Independent Reality" (MGHE, Appendix III,
pp. 558-573).
45. Hocking, MGHh), 297-298. Italics his.

CHAPTER VI
THE COSIilC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SELF
!• An analysis of the problem *
The problem of the cosmic significance of the self in-
volves two questions. First, does the world in which the
self lives have any meaning? Second, does the hiiman self
have any part in this meaning?
Whatever answer is given to the question, "is there a
God?", will serve also as a solution of the enigma, "Does
the world we live in have any meaning?"^ If the T/orld has
no meaning its meaninglessness infects the self and all its
doing. In such a case human beings are but "cultivating a
garden in the midst of a desert v/hich in all likelihood
will eventually cover both garden and gardeners; while it,
2
the desert, will never know what it has done." On the
other hand, if the world as a whole has a meaning the self.
1. Hocking, Art. (1933), 329. This article is a review
of the book, Is^ There a God?, by Henry Nelson Wieman, Douglas
Clyde Macintosh, and Max Carl Otto.
2. Hocking, Art. (1933), 329. This is akin to the
position of Bertrand Ruseell in "A Free Man's Worship". But
Hocking's own position is parallel to that of Pascal, who
writes of the greatness of man that though the universe were
to destroy him, man as a conscious being, capable of thought,
would still be greater than the universe because he v/ould
know that he was dying but the universe would not knov/ what
it was doing, and so would know nothing of its advantage.
(Pascal, PEN, 49)
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as a part, may have. Persons would then be freed of worry
about the cosmic concern of values because Grod, as the One
who entertains this meaning, would be a trustworthy Overseer,
But the question of man's cosmic significance is not
answered if God is granted to eocist, or if the world is
judged as meaningful. All the meaning may belong to God,
so much so that man is insignificant. The prophet Isaiah
wrote that "all nations before him are as nothing." God is
so high above the earth that "the inhabitants thereof are
as grasshoppers." Job and the Psalmist were bothered by
the question of maja's worth, although they were apparently
4
sure of God. "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?"
The Psalmist was overwhelmed by the immensity of nature.
He introduced the question after considering the heavens, the
moon and the stars, as ordinations of God. God has so much
to be concerned about, how can he be concerned v/ith the
finite individual? The cosmos is so big, how can man have
any cosmic significance?
It should be noted. In passing, that man's himiility and
seeming insignificance developed as he gained more knowledge
of himself and about the v/orld in which he lives. Man became
3. Isaiah 40:17, 22. Italics in Bible.
4. Psalms 8:4a.
5. Doubtless the shortness of the span of life intensi-
fied the wonder.
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interested in the truth; and his love of truth led him to
banish his earth from the chiefest place in the network of
the cosmos. Thus in coming to know himself as physically
small, apparently insignificant, man has demonstrated his
Q
mental greatness. Man is awed by the quantity of the uni-
verse; yet through the quality of his own reason he comes
to reckon himself superior to mere bigness.
But even so, if there is a God, "he is something as
much greater than the human mind as the human mind is great-
7
er than nature in its mechanical immensity." Gtod, however,
would be such a being as to estimate things rightly, there-
fore the quantity of nature would not blind him to the quality
of the htaman mind. He would certainly be more interested in
those things which have life than in those which do not; and
of these living things, man, with his ability to respond to
the world and his determination to master it; man, with his
eagerness to find out if there is a God, and to know what his
will is, would surely be of interest to any such being.
In the process of evolution new interests arise as high-
er levels of life are reached. "Man, with his hungry and
curious mind, is the most interested of animals, the most
Q
insatiable." Ihis same increase of interests may be noted
6. Hocking, Art. (1916)'', 751.
7. Ibid., 751-752.
8. Ibid., 752.
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In a comparison of levels of development among human minds;
The greater mind has more interests. But God is something
which is greater than the greatest htunan mind. Let it b©
so* Remove all limits! Let God be a mind which is great
beyond all limits, then this mind would necessarily be in-
terested in all objects, including man, because to exclude
any object from its interest is to limit the mind. To say
that God is too great to care for man is a contradiction.
In his presidential address to the Philosophical Asso-
ciation, Professor Hocking pointed out that there are three
presuppositions upon which philosophy is based. IWo of these
are pertinent to this discussion. Ihey are:
First, that things have a meaning;
Second, that • . • htunan beings are competent to
grasp that meaning, or some of it.®
Prom this it may be said that the human self has cosmic sig-
nificance because it grasps, or can grasp, the objective
meaning of the universe. Hiiman existence is not only mean-
ingless but is mockery if the self's highest valuations are
ruled out of order by the world Mind."^^ The self lives on
the presupposition that it is cosmically significant. Reli-
gion may be defined as "a passion for righteousness , and for
the spread of righteousness
.
conceived as & cosmic
9. Hocking, Art. (1928)-^, 141
10. Hocking, TP, 296.

183
deanand « " It may be profitable to examine the origin of
man's religious ideas.
2» The origin of religious ideas *
In contrast to the theories about the source and origin
of religious ideas. Hocking speaks of the three roots of
these ideas, and designates them as the speculative, the
emotional, and the ethical. (TP, 29-37)
(1) The speculative root of religious ideas . Wonder
begins close at home, but is not complete in its beginning.
(Die play of wonder or speculation is limited as far as pos-
sible to factual relations of natural phenomena. But specu-
lation really begins where this boundary ends. Speculation,
as employed here, means adventuring in the realm of ideas;
it stands in contrast to empirical investigation. Specula-
tion involves an Imaginative approach to the mysterious or
unknown. The mystery of the why of the seasons, and of
birth and death, as well as of the stars in their courses,
has doubtless bestirred the minds of every people.
Dreams and hallucinations contributed little, if any-
thing, to the origin of religious ideas. Seldom, if ever,
is there anything completely new in a dream. Besides, the
11. Hocking, LRWP, 26. Italics his. Cf. Hocking,
RML, 350-351. This is akin to Kant^s view that "religion
is (subjectively considered) the knowledge of all our
duties as divine commands." (Kant, RIGV, 229)
II
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gods of the early man are impersonal, and they operate in
his awakened life as well as in sleep.
The God-idea does not arise in abstracto ; Grod is not
first connected with unseen effects. Rather, he is posited
as being the invisible cause of effects which are very evi-
dent. But for these effects the idea of a cause v/ould not
have arisen. Men begin with life as it is lived. "Ihey are
impressed by powers which actually operate in Nature and
society; they attribute to these powers substantial, that is
12
metaphysical, being." In the coiirse of time, as specula-
tion becomes more critical, these various powers are looked
upon as manifestations of only one power; and if the powers
have been called gods, the power is called God. Natural
phenomena imply some basis of reason; even so the world and
man suggest the idea of a creator or sustainer which is in-
eradicable in the human mind. "To the natural man everywhere,
the world is fact but also mystery; and to the same natural
man this mystery is no final blankness but an invitation."
(LRWF, 32) Such is the speculative root of religious idea*.
(2) The emotional root. The deity is not only a power
or force; it is also a quality. The idea of the quality of
the divine arises not from reflection, but in feeling. Fear
played a part, of course, but it was a lesser and later part.
12. Hocking, MGHE, 216
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Die quality of the divine arose first through the feeling of
awe and v/ondur. Speculstion on this emotional experience led
early man to conceive that there were powers back of nature
which really controlled all things, including nature herself.
Man* 3 own experience, then as he reflected on it, led
him to "believe that these powers might be either friendly or
unfriendly. Accordingly, he worshipped through love, or
sought to appease with sacrifice. Man came to assume a super-
natural supplement which conserved life, and added completeness
to it. Robert Marett implies an emotional root of religion,
based on the speculative, as he writes:
The end and result of primitive religion is, in a
word, the consecration of life, the stimulation of
the will to live and to do. This bracing of the
vital feeling takes place by means of imaginative
appeal to the great forces man perceives stirring
within him and about him.^^
Religion, through the emotional root guided by the
speculative, became for man "a systematic defiance of the pre-
tense of nature to be his master," (TP, 32) Objection may
be raised that this discussion but continues that of the
speculative root of religious ideas. Such is not the case;
the idea of quality arises in feeling, but the feeling ele-
ment is emotional; it represents a kind of instability in
consciousness making for continuous transformation. Hocking
13. Marett, Art. (1930).
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is convinced that "there is no such thing as feeling apart
from idea • • • and that it is the whole meaning and destiny
of feeling to terminate in knowledge of an object." (MGHE,
64)
(3) The ethical root . Not only may the divine be
friendly or hostile; it is looked upon as moral, and as re-
quiring morality. The question is, how did the idea of the
divine's relation to morality arise?
There are those who view the connection as artificial*
Hie appeal to the sanction of the divine is but a necessary
device of rulers for compelling obedience to laws. Rousseau
writes concerning the legislator, "It would require gods in
14
order to give lav/s to men." Although it is a recognized
fact that early codes, as v/ell as statements by the Hebrew
prophets, usually begin with a "Thus saith the Lord", Hocking
does not think of it as basically necessary. The moral at-
tribute of the divine arises or is found in human experience.
Life is lived in the face of many restraints and tabus; man's
desires are curbed and hindered from expression. It is true
that to be told, "Such is God's will", made self control
easier, and so made progress more stable, but it is more sure-
ly true that social life is utterly impossible without certain
restraints. This is so evident that the individual recognizes
14. Rousseau, CS, 34.
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the necessity of self-restraint in behalf of his own wel-
fare t "Ihere is something in personal affection which
naturally limits selfishness and sensuality, apart from
all lawgivers." (TP, 34)
To say that there is an ethical root of religious
ideas means that unless man were sensible to something in
the nature of the iiniverse which urges him to order his own
life, and to respect his fellov/s, the pronoimceraent, "Thus
saith the Lord", would have no meaning, or would have met
15
with no response. "There is in every man a dim sense of
obligation which refers outward, and naturally connects with
his notions of the divine if he has them, or may even be
strong enough to beget such notions." (TP, 36)
J. H. Leuba confirms this view that there is an ethical
root of religion.
Morality and religion do not need each other in
order to come into existence, but, v/hen they have
appeared, religious beliefs are speedily called
upon for the gratification of moral needs. 16
15. Moses had a long debate with the Lord about this
matter. There is no record as to how Moses came to be aware
of the moral nature of God. He was conscious of it before
he left iigypt for the first time. (Cf, Ex. 2:11-12) But be-
fore he was willing to undertake the task assigned to him,
Moses wanted every assurance of divine sanction. He could
not believe that "Thus saith the Lord" was enough to per-
suade his people. Cf . Chapters II, 1, IV, 3.
16. Leuba, PSR, 202-205.
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Hflffding's position is much stronger than Leuba's,
Values must be discovered and produced in the wotld
of experience before they can be conceived or assumed
to exist in a higher world. . . . Religion in its
historical development, as well as in its motives,
its content, and its value points back to ethical
presuppositions, even when it has all the appear-
ance of serving as a basis for ethics,^'''
(4) Criticisms of the origin of religious Ideas . There
are three outstanding criticisms concerning the origin of re-
ligion: first, that it arose from fear; second, that it
results from a rationalization of desire, i.e., wishful
thinking; and third, that religion was created, and came into
18prominence, as a social tool or economic device.
What answer does this view of the origin of religious
ideas supply to these criticisms? It is admitted that fear
played a part, but it was a lesser and a later part. It is
denied that fear serves as the source of religious ideas.
But for man to merely assume a supernatural supplement is
akin to wishful thinking. Certainty cannot be had, so that
this assumption may be called a rationalizing of desires, yet
it is a rationalizing of his highest desire, and of one which
meets a felt need, as well as one which aids in the integra-
tion of experience. To view religion as a tool of the ruling
classes, as an artificial social requirement, is out of
17. HSffding, PR, 330, 331.
18, Cf. Brightman, PR, 461-477.
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keeping with Hocking's opinion. Hie ethical root of religion
is intensely personal; the religious person must order his
own life, but also respect his fellov/s. Religion may be
used as a device in class struggle, but such does not account
for its origin; it represents rather the perversion of a
19
natural impulse.
(5) Hocking versus Leuba on religion and theology *
Leuba, an arch critic of religion, affirms the emotional and
ethical roots of religion; it cannot be established by rea-
20
son. He assumes that theism is logically impossible. Re-
ligion is to be Validated by its meeting the needs of human
feelings for comfort, and by its support of man' s moral as-
pirations.
The psychological study of contemporary religious
experience makes it evident that the God of Chris-
tianity continues to be an object of worship, not
because his existence is rationally established,
but because he affords ethical support and affective
comfort. 21
Such being the case, Leuba would reject metaphysics; theology
would give up its intellectual basis to become a branch of
19. This view seems to be a cross between the theory
of natural religion and the religious a priori .
20. Hocking does not claim that it is logically valid.
He does insist that the thelstic position, arising from
speculation. Is Ineradicable in human nature. Cf , ante,
"The speculative root of religious ideas."
21. Leuba, PSR, 201.
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psychology. Religious experiences v/ould be produced, and
22
understood, by scientific methods.
Hocking would not limit the realm of psychology, and
he v/ould accept gladly and use psychological findings, but
psychology has nothing to say of total and ultimate causes.
The peculiar concern of the mind is meanings, and these
elude the grasp of psychology.
While the psychologist is tracing a sensation to the
work of a ray in the retina, the mind is seeing a
star. . • . Our physical sensations belong to psycho-
logy; but to the active mind these sensations mean a
world of nature, and a science not of psychology, but
of physics. Our moral feelings belong to psychology;
but to the active mind these feelings mean a present
social environment and a science not of psychology,
but of ethics. So of these religious experiences;
whatever their causes, their meaning breaks out of
the circle of consciousness and presents the mind
with certain objective facts of its spiritual environ-
ment, 24
The basis for these objective facts is God, The next
section is a study of "God as the Initial Other",
22. Leuba, PSR, 242, 268, 269. Leuba«s earlier book
is entitled The Psychological Origin and the Nature of
Religion . London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1909,
23. In the face of the claims in psychology, man is
the psychologist, (Cf. Hocking, IK, 42.)
24. Hocking, Art. (1913)^, 331-332. Italics his.
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3. God as the Initial Other
.
This section Is a discussion of the priority of God In
man's experience. It is closely related to the treatment of
25
the "Experience of God as basis for social experience."
It was pointed out In the preceding section that reli-
gious Ideas arise within the experience of the Individual.
The speculative and emotional roots of religious Ideas be-
long to man's experience of nature, while the ethical root
is In social experience. Thus there are tv/o realms of ex-
perience In which men come to know of God. Yet it Is impos-
sible to separate these sources of religious knov/ledge.
Neither can be assigned as prior to the other, because they
are Inseparably related,
Ihe religious experience of Nature means nothing
if not finding Nature living, even personal,
thereby socializing that experience. Whereas the
religious meaning of social experience arises in
the first place only as birth, death, and the like
are regarded as the work of that same inexorable
power displayed in Nature,26
At the same time, it must be remembered that neither of
these realms of experience (nor even both of them as one) is
itself the original source of religious ideas. Nature-fear
and social-deference may be religious attitudes, but they
are not the source of religion, because they are based upon
25, Chapter V, section 6.
26, Hocking, MGHE, 231-232.
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the operation of apperceptions already present. "If the
phenomena of experience • • • call forth startled reactions,
it is because man has already begun to consider and judge
the Whole." (MGHE, 233)
Man is limited by the world of nature and he fears it;
but what he worships is more than the world which limits him,
Man*s greatest limitation is his ignorance. He recognizes
that he is not independent even before he can appreciate
the meaning of this dependence. The human being fears be-
cause he does not know. But man*s knowledge of his ignorance
is not religion; such knowledge becomes religious only as it
is clothed with mystery. Nevertheless a true realization
of ignorance involves a consciousness of mystery: the nega-
tive side of one's experience "is made possible by some prior
recognition of a positive being , on the other side of his
28limitation." From this Hocking concludes that "the ori-
ginal source of the knowledge is ... an experience of not
being alone in knowing the world , and especially the world
of Nature.
27. The difference between a knowledge of ignorance
and a consciousness of mystery may be expressed as follows:
"I do not know, but it is known." Perhaps the strongest
element in Eve's temptation was the desire to know good and
evil, and thus to be as the gods. (Genesis 3:5-6)
28. Hocking, MGHE, 236. Italics his.
29. Hocking, MGHE, 236, Italics his. The consciousness
of mystery characterized by the "I do not know, but it is
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Man's basic social experience is with this other knower
30
of physical nature, as an other mind. This other knower
or other mind cannot be any one finite self, or even all
finite selves, because the original source of knowledge is
the same for all human beings. It is through the development
•I -I
of religious ideas that this initial Other becomes man's
companion, and his God. Hocking's position on the initial
Otherness of God may be expressed in the words of Berkeley.
After proving that other minds are known only through infer-
ence from "certain sensations . • • excited in our own minds",
Berkeley goes on to say that God is known in the same manner,
except that
whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of
ideas denotes a particular human mind, whitherso-
ever we direct our view we do at all times and in
all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity;
everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive
by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of
God; as is our perception of those very motions
which are produced by men.32
29. (continued)
known", may give rise to religious experience; but with such
a basis religious rites become a celebration of inferiority.
It is only as the expression can become "I do not know, but
he knows" that man can achieve a self-respecting reconciliation
with the mysterious world in which he lives. This is achieved
gradually through the development of man's religious ideas.
30. Chapter V, section 6.
31. See section above.
32. Berkeley, V/orks, I, 341, 342. God, as the efficient
cause of all things, is the initial Other. Nature is divine
language. Cf. 270ff., 286f., 290ff, (Cf. Kocking, MGHE, 300.)
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^* 'SiQ One and the many ,
God. as the initial Other represents the One, and all
human selves represent the many. This treatment of "The One
and the many" is a discussion of the ways in which the many
are dependent upon the One,
(1) The many are dependent upon the One for the imity
and identity of, the world in which they live. In discussing
the speculative root of religious ideas, it was noted that
as sp«5Culation becomes more critical various powers come to
be viewed as manifestations of one power. This one power is
here spoken of as God or the One.
!• Hocking points out that the unity of the world
has significant bearing on the possibility of optimism.
(MGHE, 167-179) Unless the world is one it cannot have the
character of dependability. In a universe there is some
basis for confidence in prediction and there is some founda-
tion upon which man can build his hopes. The true optimistic
outlook "involves a judgment about a Reality, which has a
character, and is therefore One," (MGHE, 168) This Reality
is behind mere appearances. Yet a place for the apparent must
be made. Unless the Real can account for, and accommodate,
the appearances, the individual is justified in holding on to
them. Hocking is in agreement with Bradley in insisting that
appearances are real because they are real appearances. To
deny their existence is nonsense. All that exists must belong
i
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to reality. "If monism is to be of service to our expec-
tations, it must affect the apparent as wall as the Real."
(MGHE, 172) Monism tends to such a solution as the actual
processes with which man is acquainted, as well as the pro-
cesses of man, are recognized as being cases of one process.
But optimism requires more than a unity of the conscious
processes of the v/orld, A further judgment is necessary,
namely, "that the Real is the good , and not the evil ; i.e.,
that evil is . . . conquerable • • • not a reality co-ordi-
nate with the purpose that is against it."
ii. The many are dependent also upon the One, as
a changeless Ultimate, as an Absolute, for the permanence
and identity of the v/orxd in which they live. Apart from
this identity of the world man would not be able to find
himself at home in it. "Hiese two things, self-identity and
world-identity, go inseparably together." (MGHE, 187) This
is not to suggest that the world is static. Par from it;
the v;orld is in constant process. Yet there is something
by means of which the sameness of the world is recognizable.
World-identity was not suggested as one of the bases
for self-identity; the identity of the self, however, would
not be possible but for this sameness of the Vtrorld. And this
identity is dependent upon the One or God,
35. Bradley, AR, 132.
36. Hocking, MGHE, 174. Italics his.
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(2) The need of the One or Grod is most evident per-
•zrr
haps in religion.^ "The only possible justification of the
act of adoration is the existence of an object of adoration."
Religion, to be signif icsint, must be about the cosmos, about
the whole of things because the meaning of the part is de-
rived from its relation to the whole of things.
"The centre of religious thought must always be the
conception of God , In a dead world, man is already dead.
Unless he has a living iiniverse, he knows himself to be ulti-
39
mately lost." The center of religious thought is the
37, Answer will be made later to those who ruling out
religion thus rule out the need of God, and also to those who
would say that the group spirit is equivalent to God, The
extreme importance of religion for Hocking may be noted from
his evaluation of Bergson; "It is Bergson*s greatest service
to have shown that knowledge of reality is possible in con-
crete experience," (Hocking, Art. (1914)^, 326) Ihis state-
ment, by itself, is not so significant. Its importance is
emphasized, however, by recognizing the place which Hocking
gives to those v/ho do know reality in concrete experience,
i,e,, to the mystics. He considers mysticism as the conclud-
ing type of philosophy. (TP, 379-421; Cf. also KGHE, 341-441
P6IC, 215.) Gabriel Marcel, Art. (1919), page 19, writes that
the philosophy of Hocking may be described as a dialectic of
instinct which finds its fulfilment in a philosophy of mys-
ticism. Dalliere, another French writer, agrees with this
characterization. (Dalliere, WEH, 49) Hibben writes that
Hocking's big task is that of rationalizing immediate reli-
gious experience, and calls his philosophy an "idealistic
mysticism." (Hibben, Art. (1913), 206) Hocking speaks of mys
ticism as a possible savior of Idealism in the Preface of
the book which Professor Hibben was reviewing. (MGHE, xviii-
xix) Cf . also section two of this chapter, and part three
of this section,
38, Hocking, Art. (1922)^, 439.
39. Hocking, RML, 358, Italics. his.

197
conception of God, but the center of religion Is a perception
of God. (RML, 562) Religion cannot be identified with meta-
physics. Religion must be time, but to make it consist in
truth is to cut the cords which bind religion to history and
to personalities. And to separate religion from history and
from personality is to kill it. "Religion, as the perception
of God, is the ability to say * Thou' to the universe, as God
is the 'Thou' of the world," (RML, 365) Man's conception of
God is an abstraction apart from a personal intuition of him.
Genuine religion depends upon the individual's perception
through immediate experience of God, It is through such ex-
perience that the self gains its cosmic appointment; and be-
comes able to give a reason for its faith.
The commission, however, has implications for the self
as it lives in the worj.d, as one among the many v/ho also
may bear cosmic appointments. The self must remember that
it is only one of these many. Ihere is danger that in cen-
tering attention on the One the awareness of the many v/ill
be lost. There is danger also that in the process of deal-
ing with the many the vision of the One, the definite appoint-
ment, v/ill fade. The exclusive direction of the mind toward
either is self-destructive. The self develops through al-
ternating attention from one to the other. "God and the
world . . . must be worked in with one another forever; for-
ever they must be pursued in alternation." (MGHE, 407)
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This principle of alternation is applied constantly
but only in fragmentary fashion* The lack of Its complete
and intelligent application accounts for much of the inef-
fectiveness of human living. Aspects of life apart from
alternate parts become mechanical. Its full usefulness is
found in
doing v/lth the whole self, and consciously, that
which in blinder and more fragmentary fashion we
are doing at every moment of our waking lives, and
especially in the moments of partial return. (MGHE,
422)
It means to pursue the world and God in alternation. As this
is done "the whole of human existence falls into two phases,
work and worship j the domain of duty and the domain of love,
40
respectively.
"
Worship has two functions which are increasingly im-
portant in human life, namely, "the continual restoring of a
continually declining freedom and of a continually declining
41power of making genuine connection with fellow-minds."
Worship cannot perform these functions unless it is in very
40. Hocking, MGHE, 426. Of. Cabot, miLB. Cabot speaks
of four things: v/ork, love, play, and worship. Hocking means
more by worship than the word usually connotes. "Worship
naturally allies itself outwardly, as well as inwardly, with
recreation, social enjoyment, ajid beauty. Worship uses
these, and goes beyond them: it recognizes in them the ab-
solute which is its ov;n and discards the rest; puts behind
its back all but the One which is in all, and is the condi-
tion of them all." (MGHE, 421)
41. Hocking, Art. (1925), 578.
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truth what it pretends to be: "a worshipful contemplation
of things as they are; and this Implies that it attains a
42
metaphysical knowledge of reality, and finds it good,"
Worship requires God; and unless God is, then worship will
cease, perhaps gradually, hut cease nevertheless,
(3) God meets a need in the life of man that cannot be
met in any other way, Man reaches out toward a metaphysi-
cal foundation; his values can survive only if he finds It,
The vital energy of man' s values droops unless there is a
44
vital attraction from outside man's own creations. The
true basis for optimism involves "belief in an individual
Reality not-ourselves which makes for Tightness, and which
actually accomplishes rightness when left to its own work-
ing," (MGHE, 177) The real need of God, the way in which
he is of most value to man, is not as a miracle worker, or
as a vindicator, but as an
intimate, infallible associate, present in all ex-
perience as That by Which I too may firmly conceive
that experience from the outside. It is God in
this personal relation . • • that alone is capable
of establishing human peace of mind, and thereby
human happiness .45
42. Hocking, Art, (1923), 581.
43. This is a continuation, in large part, of the dis-
cussion of the need of God for religion, but the particular
aim is to make answer to those who think that the group
spirit, humanity, is equivalent to God.
44. Hocking, Hl^R, 436. .
45. Hocking, MGHE, 224. The problem of evil will be
treated in the three sections immediately follov;ing.
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In answer to Edward Scrlbner Ames Hocking insists
that the group spirit is not equivalent to God for all prac-
47tical purposes. It is more nearly true to say that soc-
iety, rather than serving as an object of worship, is made
possible through worship, Ttie human self as an empirical
knower of its world is a dependent being; it is dependent
upon what is presented to it. On the other hand the world
is limited by and is dependent for its being known upon the
conscious self. In the same way the whole of society is re-
lated to the world, as an empirical knower of the world, as
limited by and as limiting the environing world. But society
is more dependent than is the individual self: "It depends
upon the prior being of its members." Society is an or-
ganization of persons; and this organization becomes possible
only through a "prior relation of individual minds to that
which is true; and that which is true is, in its most obvious
49
aspect, the world of nature." But the world of nature is
not itself independent; rather it is dependent. Thus
"society depends ultimately on the relation of individual
46. Of. Journal of Religion . 1 (Sept., 1921), 462-481.
47. Hocking, Art. (1921)^, 482-496. Cf. MGHE, 293ff.
48. Hocking, Art. (1921)^, 494.
49. Ibid., 495.
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minds to that upon which nature itself depends," Such a
series of dependencies point to something which is inde-
pendent. In religion the independent being is God, In re-
ligion the worshipper seeks for a personal response from
this ultimate reality. Thus it becomes more evident, not
only that the group-spirit is not equivalent to God for all
practical purposes, but that society itself is dependent
upon the relation of individual minds to God: God, as the
One, is the object of common adoration which makes the unity
51
of the social group possible; he insures the objectivity
of the values which the social group seeks. The teleologi-
cal interpretation of the world remains to be examined,
5. Teleology in metaphysics .
Teleology in the organism is evident in the fact of
freedom. The organism lives tov/ards ends. All thought is
52teleological. But does the cosmos move toward an end?
Is there a metaphysical teleology? This question has been
dismissed largely in the effort to interpret the universe
in terms of science. The work of a philosophy of nature
consists in pointing out the causal relations existing
50. Hocking, Art, (1921)^, 495.
51. Hocking, Art, (1922)^, 439ff.
52. I,e,, can the things of nature be regarded as
purposed, and as reciprocally instrumental in achieving a
common end?
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between phenomena. Apart from the causal series Intelli-
gibility is impossible so far as the explanations of science
are concerned. According to Kant, to expect to gain object-
ive knowledge of nature through any teleoiogical explana-
53tion of phenomena deals a death blow to natural science.
This section becomes then a contrast betv/een the con-
cept of purpose and of mechanical causality. In both cases
the causation is from the past, but in the former the causa-
tion is in terms of some future end. Mechanical causality
is represented by the nexus effectivus . whereas purposive
caussility may be described in terms of nexus finalis . Mech-
anism operates without motive, and without end; there are no
termini for such causation. Teleology operates from motive,
54
and stops when the end is reached.
It is the duty of man to find out v/hatever truth he can.
If, however, in the interest of science he rejects teleology,
it is the task of natiiral science and the theoretical reason
to provide an intelligible explanation for the v/hole system
of experience. If this cannot be done, then at least for
the remaining items of expedience the way is open to appeal
to teleoiogical explanation. Hocking suggests three empiri-
cal conditions which must be met in order to make a
53. Kant, KU, 3l5f,
54, Hocking, Phil 9, 4/ll/40. (Cf. (3), ii, below.)
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teleologlcal judgment necessary. First, there must be a dis-
covery of an objective end or value. Second, it must be
shown that the pattern of the universe led up to this end
causally, and that the universe has tended to preserve this
value. Third, it must be shown through calculation that
the achievement of this end by chance was highly improbable,
55
I.e., its coefficient of probability must be low. Hie re-
sort to teleology docs not replace mechanical e^ lanation;
it only supplements it. But if there are items of experience
which can be explained only teleologically then there is a
55
metaphysical teleology.
(1) Life as an evidence for teleology . Mechanical
explanation fails in regard to the living organism. Life
can be explained only by an appeal to other life. Ihe
permanent form of life, as organized matter with a capacity
of reaction, is an irreducible fact which can never be ex-
plained through the mechanism of inorganic matter. The
reciprocal causality in the living organism, through which
55. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/18/40.
56. Causality is only a postulate with no more verifi-
cation than the postulate of teleology. (Cf. IV, 2, (2),
above.) The idea of teleology leads to fruitful discoveries,
whereas the notion of causality fails to explain too many
things, for example, the quantities involved, the propor-
tioning of elements, the pattern of things, or their quality,
and even the concept of causality itself. In any causal
theory all these things are taken for granted. (Cf. Hocking,
Phil 9, 4/18/40.)
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the whole is determined by the parts, as well as the parts
by the whole, makes Inevitable the impression of purpose, and
of conformity to purpose. Kant admits that the organism
cannot be understood through mechanism; but Hocking insists
that it can be understood only through teleology. The
world must be viewed as an organism producing world. The
possibility of the organic form must be injected into the
original arrangement, or configuration, of the world: there
must have been a pointedness toward organic life. "The as-
sumption on which the naturalistic emergentist relies is un-
58founded: form has no inherent tendency to rise .
"
5'
(2) Value and consciousness as evidence for teleology .
Among the facts of the world is the fact of value. This fact
is an unaccountable mystery in a mechanical world. The epi-
sode of value is an important one; apart from the fact of
value and of the valuer the whole universe is meaningless,
just as the organism, apart from consciousness, has no mean-
ing whatsoever. The advent of mind^^ bestows meaning on the
67. A teleology which includes mechanism.
58. Hocking, TP, 114. Italics his. (Cf. 107-116;
Phil 9, 4/16/40. Cf. also Kant, KTJ, 283ff., 292f., 298ff.)
59. This is in part a continuation of the previous
discussion. The experience of value belongs to the living
organism; and this experience is the evidence for belief
in teleology.
60. The advent of mind is scientifically inexplicable.
I
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organism, and. is the means whereby the organism enjoys value.
In bestowing meaning and in discerning value mind has
the role of servant. It has; but mind serves only as it
masters. Consciousness has outwitted nature. Arriving as
a servant it has become master of the house. It has usurped
the place of nature, out of which it came; and even dares to
effect changes in nature through using her own pov/ers. Mind
may be the handiwork of nature, but the compliment is being
fin
turned around.
The whole world-picture becomes colored with mind»s in-
terests and ends. The conscious being begins to feel that
nature existed to produce him, and continues to exist for his
sake. One of man's eternal questions has to do with the ob-
jectivity or subjectivity of his values. Unless they are
objective, i.e., not illusory or temporary, then nature must
62be bifurcated into mind and matter. The dialectic drives
the biologist beyond biology in his search for the meaning of
hioman life. Consciousness is biologically useful, and thus
serves nature. Yet any ends of nature achieved by the aid of
consciousness are pseudo-ends unless nature is the expression
of a purpose. The permanent validity of man's values depends
61. Hocking, IDL, 249f,
62, After consciousness arrives, as in man, it seeks
its own ends, which are not identical with the ends of nature,
(Cf. TDL, 246ff.) Professor Compton writes that "the evolu-
tion of consciousness ... is not to be expected if con-
sciousness is ineffective," (HMS, 50)
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upon their status in an objective mind apart from nature.
This represents a transition from biology into metaphysics,
"from v/hich follows an ancient intuition, that in the nature
of things life is deeper than matter, and mind deeper than
life." (TDL, 255)
The future influences the present, not only in the case
of human beings but in the universe; final causes are deter-
mining events throughout the world. "It seems • • • incredible
that the course of events in the universe is merely drifting,
or merely impelled from behind, that interest in what emerges
63is foreign to its nature." Hocking is of the opinion that
"v/herever there is process, there also is finality, the quest
and the achievement of value.
The basic assumption of philosophy is that things have
a meaning. This means that "there is nothing meaningless in
the world (taking things one by one) and (taking them col-
65lectively) the world as a whole is not meaningless," This
is not mere subjective idealism, because to postulate that
things have meanings is to put "the meaning on the same plane
fifi
of objectivity with the things." Therefore the meaning
63. Hocking, Art. (1925)"^, 822.
64. Ibid., 822-823.
65. Hocking, Art. (1928)^, 142.
66. Ibid., 148.
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which the philosopher sets himself to seek is the meaning
v/hich is really there. The meaning is not invented; it is
67discovered.
(3) The specification of nature and the infinite
particularity of the universe as evidence for teleologT- .
1. The human mind can comprehend, to some extent,
the structure and order of the cosmos. Nature is intelli-
gible. That the physical universe is compatible to the mind
of man is a presupposition in all scientific inquiry. Kant
suggests that we must look upon the world als ob it had been
arranged with specific reference to our needs of knowledge.
Although man cannot knov/ that the world-order has been so ar-
ranged, he does know that were it not thus arranged the world
would not be intelligible. Even though it may have been an
accident man is forced to look upon it as having been deter-
ge
mined by design.^
ii# This given universe is not a necessary one,
because there is an infinitude of possible arrangements. The
coefficient of probability for this universe is extremely low
its degree of particularity is infinite, Therefore if it can
be said that this is a desirable universe the teleological
67. Hocking, Art. (1928)"^, 151f.
68. Kant, KU, XXXVII, 291, 355, 374; Hocking, Phil 9,
4/23/40.
I
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Judgment may be applied to it. One cannot say legitimate-
ly that this is the best of all possible worlds, because there
is no such class as all possible worlds. Yet the description
of a desirable universe usually fits this one.
Particularity is accidental, i.e., it is the result of
an arbitrary act. Desires art* universal, but after desiring
one must act or particularize. Individuals as part of a
particular world are accidental. But there is a coherence
of the accidents. Persons are co-accidental. And there is
a coherence of accidentality and particularity between man and
70
the physical world. This coherence of accidentality leads
to a dramatic teleology in which there is unlimited continuity
and infinite growth, Kach thing exists as an accident, but
Is co-accidental with every other thing. Nothing has meaning
In and of itself; but everything is potentially significant
71in that it coheres in or serves the whole.
Teleological explanation is necessary as a supplement to
mechanical causality in understanding some items of experience.
But there is also the fact of dysteleology which is more
69. But with no more certainty than in the above, be-
cause this universe may represent simply one of the infinite
possible arrangements, by chance.
70. Cf. Chapter VI, 5, (3), i.
71. Hegel interprets the meaning of life as the
putting off of particularity and the putting on of univer-
sality, (Cf, iiection 8, below,)
I
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nearly explainable on the basis of mechanism. Metaphysical
teleology cannot be affirmed until some settlement is made
with the problem of evil,
6, The fact of dysteleolop^T ,
Cosmic dualism is not easily refuted, "After every
synthesis of the cosmic opposition, the fundamental struggle
and restlessness of the world have led some nev/ thinker to
hazard another form of duality in metaphysics." (TP, 243)
This struggle and restlessness constitute the fact of dys-
teleology. No monism will ever be accepted as final until
the cosmic drag is overcome or at least understood.
It may be well to catalogue the evils to which man is
subject as a means of defining the problem. There are four
types: (1) Natural evil, which arises from nature's extrava-
gance, from physical disorders, earthquakes, hurricanes,
72
storms, etc., as well as from disease and pestilence.
(2) Evils of fortune and circumstance that result in failure
and frustration, (3) Moral evil which originates in the free
choices of man. Hence come misunderstandings and wars,
(4) Constitutional evil, i,e,, evil without which there could
be no good. For example, hope is dependent upon the
72. John Stuart Mill speaks of nature as bestial, cruel,
and unjust. Nature commits crimes, mercilessly, for v/hich man
is hanged. The course of natural phenomena is replete with
those things which if man were to do he would be most wicked.
(Mill, 3ER, 64, 65.)
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determent of satisfaction. Restlessness of the will Is de-
73
sirable and necessary.
Of these four, constitutional evil, and moral evil,
must be set down on the credit side of the ledger. The uni-
verse is not to be blamed for them but thanked for them.
Inherently, contrast is necessary for quality. Evil must
be in the presence of possible good to be knov/n as evil. In
like manner good can be realized only within the presence of
possible evil. (TP, 239) Moral evil arises by means of man's
greatest blessing, the freedom of will. Although this is
the source of most evil not even for life itself would man
forego his freedom to persecute his fellows, and to relieve
their suffering. The fact of dysteleology is thus limited to
evils of fortune and circumstance, and to natural evil. It
is with these that the account must be settled.
Religious feeling and thought has tended toward some form
of dualism, as a means of freeing the Divine of responsibility
74for the evil that is in the world. Hocking rejects this
tendency, "In such a view, the Good is simply not the supreme
being • , , and the mind seeks some more ultimate reality
which may account for the existence and contact of both." (TP,
238) On this basis the idea of a finite God is rejected as
73, Ihis is the psychological refutation of Schopenhauer
and of Buddha, (Of. Hocking, Phil 9, 5/2/40.)
74, Witness the role of the devil in Christianity,
(Of. Matt. 4.)
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of no worth. It involves "a danger hardly less seductive
than the danger from atheism." (MGHE, 225) And a finite God
loses his significance as creator, "for there is something
else in the v/orld which can exist by its own right as well
as he." (TP, 238) But finitism need not necessarily result
in a dualism. For example, it does not in the theory of
Professor Brightman. Brightman speaks of The Given which is
not external but internal to God. The Given represents "the
eternal necessities of reason" and the "eternal experiences
of brute fact." It is "an aspect of God»s consciousness which
eternally enters into every moment of the divine experience
and into everything that is, either as obstacle or as instru-
ment to the will of God."*^^
In this view the power of God is reckoned as finite, but
76
his v/ill for good is infinite* It is a reasonable explana-
tion of the fact of dysteleology. But a full explanation of
the evil does not relieve the suffering endured. Relief de-
pends upon the possibility that the evil may be transmuted,
upon the possibility that seeming defeat may become a genuine
victory.
75. Brightman, PR, 300.
76. Ibid., 319. God's goodness is greater than his
power. No other type of God would be worthy of worship.
God is relieved of the responsibility for evil, yet there
is no dualism. God is seeking eternally to overcome the
evil with good. And there is the incentive for "eternal
co-operative moral endeavor - a co-operation between God
and man." (Brightman, PR, 314. Italics his.)
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7, The transmutation of evil .
Human happiness is "inseparable from confidence in
action", and this confidence Involves "poise of mind with
reference to everything I may possibly encounter in the
chances of fortune." (MGHE, 218) Thus it may be said that
human happiness depends upon the transmutability of evil.
The transmutability of evil, in turn, depends upon a monism
of the good, in which it is held "that evil is an essentially
conquerable thing, not a reality codJrdinate v/ith the purpose
that is against it." (MGHE, 174)
The fact of dysteleology is the chief hindrance to a
general acceptance of the theistic hypothesis. It must be
noted, however, that the problem of evil arose prior to theo-
logy. It arose in nuclear experience. It was because life
was reckoned as good that evil became a problem. (LRWF, 218)
Choice has to be made in the original nuclear experience be-
tween regarding it as subjective or as objective. Tb say that
experience is objective mesins that experiences must be referred
to objects, v/hereas to say that it is subjective implies that
experiences are wholly of the subject. Objectivity is the
course v/hich leads to development and maturity, but it is the
harder one to take. It involves the idea that experience is to
be understood, and that although it may not be now, experience
is intended to be good. Life presents the self with a varied
fare of casual values. But no one wants to live at the mercy
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of an \mimderstood circiimstantiality. Life must be understood
if it is to be truly good. There is an original value preju-
dice that life is good, the more awareness the better; evil be-
comes a problem because of this prejudice, not because of the
theistic hypothesis. The problem of evil represents the chal-
77
lenge which life makes to the experiences that threaten it.
The realistic view of evil is that things are what they
are found to be; evil and good are thus both real; it is in-
78
sisted that "evil is evil, and not something else." Realists
oppose any delay of the value judgment; time makes no differ-
ence in quality, hvil is to be expunged; good is to be in-
creased. Hocking agrees that evil and good must be taken in
this realistic attitude, as phenomena to be considered.
Biologically the realistic attitude is self refuting.
Every basic impulse or instinct tends tov/ard some environing
condition to be conquered. The impulses aim at or lead to
goals, and thus to satisfactions. First there is the recogni-
tion of peril, and then the personal or racial achievement of
safety and satisfaction. If there were no hunger there could
be no enjoyment of food. Life without risl^ and evil would be
a blank v/orld. An adventure may and usually does involve the
evil of peril or danger. There is a joy of fighting for
77. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/30/41 ff.
78. Hocking, Art. (1923), 582.
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fighting's sake. Games involve risks. The major sources of
satisfaction are in dealing with the major evils; and the great
satisfactions are impossible apart from evil. In this light
evil is an element in good: it is a necessary part of a good
world*
This dialectic, whereby the realistic viev/ of evil is
refuted, is present also in social conflicts. Opposing sides
condemn each other mercilessly; but then there develops the
brotherhood of battle. Before there can be any real contest
the opponents must meet. Genuine fighting Is doubleminded.
The reason for the conflict is the determination to secure an
affimation, to expunge an evil. But to do this the winner
must go where the opponent lives; and show him where he is
wrong; thus the winner must enter into the opponent's life,
and so become his brother. This represents the true situation
whether the fight be a Kentucky feud or a war between England
and Germany.
Hocking insists upon a doubleminded attitude tovmrd evil.
To maintain that evil is evil, and nothing else, is an in-
stance of what Professor Perry calls "the fallacy of initial
79predication," It is an observable fact that many evils are
also something else. A kindness for a beloved friend may
involve the evil of disagreeable labor, or suffering. Every
79. Of. Perry, PPT, 126ff
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experience, while maintaining its identity, becomes something
else in a different context. "If according to the advice of
Solon we will call no man happy until he is dead, neither can
we safely call any man unhappy until we know we have the com-
80plete account," Pain has a way of blunting Its own edge as
it reaches extremity. This is not proof that evil is unreal,
or that the universe is good; yet it does prevent a universal
negative: evil is evil, "but may be also something else. Some
evil is transmutable.
There are four things by means of which much evil is
transmuted: it is made something else besides just evil,
(1) Time . Time is real; it makes a difference in the
lives of all living things. It is with truth that the young
lady, hardpressed by her suitors, makes answer: "Time v/ill
tell". Mountains of sorrow are often whittled down to mole
hills by the healing hand of time, and past evils become pre-
cious memories. Time, as a healing agent, may be likened to
81
the Nisus in the thought of Alexander, Time, coupled with
the original value prejudice, makes for a song v/here once
there was weeping,
(2) Aesthetic reflection . This involves a detachment
from life. Life is beautiful from above. Men are good when
80, Hocking, Art. (1923), 583.
81. S. Alexander, STD, II, 38ff,, 362,
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looked at from a distance. Basically this method is sound;
it makes for an objectivity which enables the evil to be
viewed in its true perspective. There is a possible danger,
however, in transmuting evil through aesthetic contempla-
tion. It may become an apology for crime. The sublimity
of the storm may blind one to the suffering. One may stand
and appreciate the beauty of the fire while the forest
burns. Schopenhauer looked upon art as a means of salvation
from the bondage of life, of the will to live, primarily be-
cause the aesthetic reflection means detachment from rela-
82tionst But this is the beginning of non-being and of
death.
(3) Ethical consideration . Evil is looked upon as a
means of character growth. It is an observed fact that many
of those who suffer most have developed the finest characters
and the most congenial dispositions. But since this is not
universally the case it seems more nearly the truth to say
that the noblest characters maintain congenial dispositions
in spite of the suffering. There is so much more suffering
than is necessary for moral gymnastics, and it is so unwisely
distributed that this moral apology for evil has little real
82. Schopenhauer, ViW, Section 34.
L.
217
83
Value.
(4) Social consideration . Companionship is one of the
greatest of all values; and complete ennui Is one of the v;orst
evils. Any and all evil which can be shared is alleviated.
"Ihe evil that admits companionship is neither devoid of hope
nor devoid of meaning." (RML, 361) This is the Buddhist apol-
84
ogy for evil. Suffering makes men social, and co-operative.
It makes men religious, in that they are driven to philoso-
phize about the whole of things. The solidarity of society
is due, in large part, to the fact that all people suffer.
It is a common human experience; but one v;hose disagreeable-
ness is alleviated largely through companionship.^^
Thus much suffering is transmuted, but there are so
many evils which are not transmuted and which are not trans-
mutable. The sickly infant may never know relief from pain;
83. It must be admitted that suffering often deepens a
person* s life; he has so much more time to think. And some-
times an accident saves a person from moral ruin. But these
cases are offset by the fact that many people are embittered
by suffering, and that so many "good" people suffer. Job is
something of an ideal representative in this regard. His faith
was strengthened in the experience. "Though he slay me, yet
will I trust in him." (13:15a) Job's bitterness, for the most
part, was against his would-be comforters.
84. For better or for worse the evil of the war is a
great levelling force among the social classes in England,
85. Schopenhauer made pity his fundamental ethical law.
(Schopenhauer, GE, 20B-209) St. Paul interpreted Christianity
in this light as he advised the Galatians: "Bear ye one
another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." (Gal.
6:2)
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and what of the lingering death of the wounded soldier? Too
often the transmutation Is cut short by death. In such cases
the doublemlnded attitude is not possible. "Evil Is evil, and
nothing else." There Is so much of this suffering that con-
temporal^ society Is characterized by the attitude of "get
your own happiness now", and Is thus unfriendly to the atti-
tude of a vicarious transmutation. Evil Is evil, and nothing
more, to the self which does not live to experience the good.
According to this logic, however, past evil is past. The
problem of that past evil v/as not solved, but the question
disappeared with the questioner. The account was not only
closed but it v/as cancelled.
Although the problem of evil antedates theology, if the
thelstlc hypothesis is to survive, the charge against the uni-
verse for past evils as well as for all evils must be settled.
Those past sufferers have a claim upon the future. But to
grant this claim a status Is to assume a responsible Arbiter,
and to assume that evil is transmutable ; it represents the
doublemlnded attitude toward evil. If evil were only evil,
"it could not become at the same time an object of concentrat-
ed attention. The fighter of evil must define it as something
else , , , and as such an object , , , so far something else
than evll,"^^
86. Hocking, Art, (1923), 586-587.
I
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Ultimately one's view of the transmutability of evil
depends upon his view of God, and of man's relation to God.
Such is the case in the philosophy of Hocking. The possibi-
87lity of survival will be discussed in a section; it remains
here to examine as nearly as possible, to try to discern,
what God's attitude must be tov/ard man's burdens. Royce is
credited with having brought the principle of vicarious trans-
mutation to its philosophic fulfilment. (MGIIE, 498) Royce
says that comfort in the self's stiniggle with evil does not
consist in the temporal attainment of a goal. The self, as a
servant of God, must have a goal which cannot be attained in
time. Viihen then comes its comfort?
In the consciousness, first, that the ideal sorrows
of . . . finitude are identically God's own sorrows,
and have their purpose and meaning in the divine life
as such significant sorrows; and in the assurance,
secondly, that God's fulfilment in the eternal order -
a fulfilment in which v;e too, as finally and eternally
fulfilled individuals, share, - is to be won . . ,
through the very bitterness of tribulation, and
through overcoming the v/orld.8Q
Thus for the self to view its existence sub specie aeternl-
tatis brings an emancipation from evil. But the happiness
is a vicarious one. The comfort comes after the fact. The
attitude involved is passive. Before the quality of genuine
happiness can be enjoyed the attitude tov/ard evil must be an
87. The concern will not be to suggest immortality as
a solution to the problem of evil, but to examine the logical
possibilities involved.
88. Royce, WI, II, 407ff.
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active one: the self must be prepared to go out and meet the
ills of its destiny, "No man • • • can be v/holly happy in
defeat unless he foreknows and goes to it, not as Napoleon to
his island, but as Socrates to his death. Not resignation,
89but renunciation . " Renunciation in the face of life's
troubles, "made significant by some consciously known purpose
which in the midst of defeat is not defeated", is the culmi-
nating virtue. (MGHE, 501) In sharp contrast to Royce's
pantheistic view, positive happiness depends upon a conscious
control of one's ovm fortune, such that "in whatever sense God
is to triumph in history, in that same sense must I triumph
also." (MGHE, 502) This requires what Hocking calls the pro-
phetic consciousness, a conviction on the part of the self
that its acts will succeed and hold their place in history.
(MGHE, 503)
The self gains its prophetic consciousness through exper-
ience of God. It is a consciousness of personal worth, and a
challenge to spt;ak for the Ruler of the v/orld. As an inter-
pi'eter of the Divine the self finds its v/orth in life. And
in companionship with God, as an "intimate, infallible asso-
ciate" (MGHE, 224), the self finds relief from most of its
suffering and strength to endure gracefully that which cannot
be alleviated.
89. Hocking, MGHE, 501. Italics his.
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8* The meaning; of life.
(1) Does life have meaning? This question is not an
90idle one
, notwithstanding the fact that the normally sane
person is one who has an unquestioning assurance that his
life and deeds are meaningful, and notwithstanding the fact
that the individual is most sure that life has a meaning
when he is not reflecting about it, Uie question most fre-
91quently asked of psychiatrists, according to C. G. Jung,
is, what is the meaning of life? suid, what is the meaning
of my life?
Sanity will be restored as the individual comes to be
possessed of a sense of mission, to be possessed of the idea
that life has meaning. If the question were raised in normal
life from time to time, while life is reckoned as meaningful,
the conviction that life has meaning might become stronger,
and thus serve as a stabilizing factor. Once gone, the as-
surance that life has worth cannot be restored easily, and
least of all by reason alone; indeed, there is danger in
90. The phrase, the meaning of life, may be either de-
finitional or valuatlonal. The former has to do with defin-
ing the meaning of life, with the meaning which life has.
The latter has to do v/ith meaning in life, with the meaning
enjoyed in life or in living. A recognition that life has
a meaning is basic for the continued experience of meaning
in life. Yet to find meaning in life is a step toward find-
ing the meaning of life. The definitional meaning of life
and the valuatlonal meaning of life are closely related.
91. Jung, MMSS, 267.
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trying to make every aspect of life rigidly reai^onable. To
find the meaning of life is a difficult problem; yet the
difficulty is exceeded by th= importance,
(2) Ttie dual reference of meaning . In the search for
meaning in life or for the meaning of life, it should be kept
in mind that meaning is a twofold thing; and to understand
the meaning it is necessary to seek in both directions,
Universals can be explained only in terns of particulars, and
particulars have meaning through reference to universals.
Failure to recognize this dual reference of meaning has given
rise to a great deal of one-sided thinking in philosophy.
Prom one side the meaning ascends from the particulars to the
universal; if there are many particular pleasures or satis-
factions they color life and give meaning to the whole of
life. But from the other side, meaning descends from the
v/hole to its parts. The life of the self has meaning only
if there is a meaning in the world which the self shares.
And particular satisfactions add meaning only as the whole
has meaning,
Philooophers have too often arrayed themselves on one
side or the other throughout the course of history. In Greek
ethics the Cynics as extreme relationists condemned, and were
in turn condemned by, the Cyrenaics who were extreme hedon-
ists. The intensity between these extreme positions lessened
during the next century. But still the formal Stoics sought
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the meaning In the universal, the whole, v/hile the Epicur-
eans found the meaning in particular, though permanent,
mental pleasures. In modem ethics the utilitarians and
the pragmatists have supported the actual and particular
satisfactions while the formalists have found life's mean-
92ing in the universal.
The dual reference involves a recognition of the sig-
nificance of both particulars and universals. Pleasure forms
an important part; it is integral to the meaning of life.
"The animal meaning is a part of the meaning of life." ( TDL,
160)
This part, however, is not all. Meaning comes also
from the universal to the particular. To view the particular
experiences from the point of the whole life is to gain per-
spective. The detached self is most free, and is thus most
capable of free attachment. The pursuit of pleasure, or
happiness, is self-defeating because values are falsely at-
tributed to specific objects. All experiences must form a
unity. Unless this unity is real, life has no real meaning;
it is only a disorganized aggregation of experiences.
Lack of attention to this direction of meaning, i.e.,
from the universal to the particular, accoimts in large
measure for the epidemic of meaninglessness in life. Meanings
92. Cf, Brightman, ML, 289-296
i
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do not constitute a problem for science; and man has given
himself over too completely to the findings of the indif-
ferent scientists. The world, so far as the scientists go,
is meaningless. And "a meaningless whole implies a meaning-
less part." (TDL, 161) There must be a re-evaluation of
the particular satisfactions in terms of the universal to-
ward which they point; and also there must be a renewed at-
tachment to some v.'orthy universal or ideal which will add
meaning to the struggles of life and will give confidence
in the face of seeming defeat.
(3) How the meaning, is to be found. Supposing that
life has some meaning, how is it to be found? To know what
it is will add to the m^^aning, and if there is none it is
still the duty of the honest man to search for it, F. H.
Bradley writes that "where all is rotten it is a man's work
93
to cry stinking fish." It is as difficult to prove demon-
strably or to disprove that life has meaning as it is to
prove or disprove the existence of God. The truth is that
the two, genuine meaning in life and the existence of God,
go hand in hand.
There are four possible methods of investigation: action,
intuition, psychology as a science of mind, and philosophic
reflection.
93. Bradley, AR, xv.
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Action is a suitable method for beginners, or in special
cases, but action of itself is dumb. Action seems to have
lost its savor. There is an abundance of action but not
much understanding of life's meaning.
Bergson appeals to intuition in contrast to intellect,
94
as the way to understand life. The intellect raises too
many questions, while to interpret life through intuition
is to vie?/ it from within, and to be free of the questions
posed by intelligence. But since intuition does not raise
any questions to be ansv/ered there Is no genuine understand-
ing of life's meaning.
Man has looked to the field of psychology as a science
of mind for help. But for the most part he has come away
empty-handed. Psychologists profess to give a true or real-
istic description of human nature; man, however, in view of
his own self-consciousness, disov/ns the portrait. (P6IC,
204) Psychologists seek to establish their field of inves-
tigation as a natural science. To do so the self with
which they deal must be an object of, or at least within,
nature. (TDL, 64) Psychologists present man not with mind
but with "systems of objects which are equivalent to mind
only for certain restricted purposes." (P6IC, 203)
Psychologists, as natural scientists, deal only with
94. Bergson, EC, 191ff.
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causal series. But the self engages in activities or pro-
cesses which are also rational. These tv;o series cannot be
identified: causes are not reasons nor are reasons causes.
"A causal system can at best be but a Near-mind." (P6IC, 205)
Consciousness, as an explanatory factor, is looked upon as
an intruder by the psychologist. And since meaning involves
consciousness meaning is eliminated also. "Ihus a natural-
science psychology is, by necessity of its method, a de-
scription of the meaningful in terms of the meaningless."
(!IDL, 165) Therefore the naturalistic psychologists offer
little help in trying to find the meaning of life, and still
less hope in fostering it. The candid psychotherapist, C. G.
Jung, admits that he does not know what to say to the person
who has lost his assurance that life has meeining.
But the psychotherapist does knov/ what is needed. It is
necessary for the patient to find meaning in life as well as
a meaning for life. It is here that faith or imagination is
often brought into play. Faith is better because it provides
a more secure basis for conviction. But if the resources of
faith Cannot be tapped and developed, resort is made to an
imagined meaning. This is an admitted fiction; yet it is a
"healing fiction", and is thus a time instrument. John
Dewey, a naturalist, despairs of finding the meaning of life
95. C. G, Jung, MMSS, 267.
i
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through science and also turns to the realm of Imagination.
This is a strange field for a naturalist. Hocking suggests
that Dewey was brought here by "the sterilities inherent in
physical naturalism." (TDL, 171)
Ihe resort to imagination by Jung and by Dewey is only
half-hearted. The effort to provide life with a meaning in
this way is circular. "The self must first of all, in imagi-
nation, constitute that outside value, and lend the incommu-
nicative environing world the character of a universe." (TDL,
172)
Reason is not left a free hand. This method is suspect-
ed because of the generalizations arrived at, and because
the analytic inspection tends to dry up the springs of meaning.
But the meaninglessness of life does not result from reflec-
tion; it results rather from a lack of it. There is activity
enough; the need is for a different kind of activity, for
action which is guided by and understood by better thought.
(HNR, 35-36) Hocking proposes "a remarriage between vitality
and intelligence" (TDL, 154) in this search for the world of
life.
The meaning of life cannot be found or understood apart
from raising questions and seeking ansv/ers. This is the task
of reflection. Philosophy is the attempt to imderstand and
96. This position is developed in Dewey, CF, 43ff., 49.
I
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Integrate all the experiences of life. The basic assiimption
in philosophy is that the universe has a meaning; the great
task of philosophers is to discern this meaning, Therefore,
though the aid of philosophic refltiCtion may be suspected,
philosophers cannot avoid the question of the meaning of
human life. The task of philosophy is to holp one find his
97
meaning in life.
!Ihis basic assumption that the universe has a meaning
Is the counterpart of, yet gives concreteness and objecti-
vity to, Jimg's and Dewey's resort to imaginary and imaginated
meaning. Meaning for life involves an integrated life; this
in turn involves a harmonious integration of life's satis-
factions or values. This integration is more nearly possible
if there is an objective ideal or meaning which serves as an
inspiration. The ideal becomes then not pure invention but
a discovery made as the self is living in the world. (TDL,
190) And the meaning of life is increased as this objective
ideal is embodied,
(4) The meaning of life . That life has a meaning or
does not have meaning cannot be proven. That the greater
majority, however, have fo\md or do find meaning in sind for
life might well imply that the evidence is affirmative.
Then the one v/ho has not found meaning should not declare
97, Hocking, Art.(1937)2, 217
I1
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that life has no meaning but simply state that he has not
yet found It.
Just where might this meaning be found? And after all,
what is it? The fact that the normal porson has an unre-
flective conviction that life has meaning might signify that
the meaning is in merely being alive. Living does afford
Intrinsic satisfaction. Pew persons really want to die or
even to surrender their state of being conscious. The first
law of nature, reputedly, is the law" of self-preservation.
The self maintains itself because it enjoys, i.e., finds
worth in, selfhood. Although one may reject this position
especially when he thinks of the drifter, the parasite, or
the misfit, it represents the basis for all other values in
life and achieved meaning for it. Unless some self exists
there can be no meaning in the world, ( TDL, 215)
It does seem, though, that the value in static life is
purely potential. Meaning for life must depend on partici-
pation in life, in doing and in things done. This is akin
to Dewey's theory of art. Not only must the artist be es-
thetic, the perceiver must be artistic if his appreciation
Is to be genuine. The perceiver "must create his own expe-
rience. And his creation must include relations comparable
98
to those which the original producer underv/ent," Meaning
comes through activity. The degree of agency on the part
98, John Dewey, Aii, 54, Italics his.
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of the self is determined by the intensity of work. Life is
lived for its high moments and these come often in times of
intense activity. In contrast to James' idea of a moral
equivalent of war, Hocking thinks that in order to maintain
peace "we need an intensity- equivalent of combat." ( TDL, 125)
But this cannot be the whole story. Many v/ho do not
know achievement find even greater meaning for life in love
and appreciation. Love is a key to the quality of meaning.
True meaning comes in perceiving value and in appreciating or
enjoying such value. The hunger for a deeper appreciation
is a stimulus for study. Learning is instrumental to an in-
creased sensitivity to value and meaning. Yet love is often
selfish; and may be even self-defeating unless there is a
relation to something outside of and beyond the individual
person.
There must be a synthesis between the intense activity
and love. This results in a union of love and pov;er in the
service of a cause. The bounds of self-interest overflow in
the concern for an objective ideal. The self goes beyond
itself; and finds its meaning through serving the interests
of humanity. Albert Schweitzer gave up several promising
careers as a concert organist, author, teacher and preacher,
because he found the meaning for his life as a medical mis-
QQ
sionary in Africa.
99. Schweitzer, LT. Cf. also Regester, AS. Schweitzer
does writing even now but his time for it is limited.
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The dialectic of meaning for life, however, does not
end in altruism. Altruism usually involves an assumption or
at least a hope concerning the ultimate destiny of the cause
and those represented in it. The basis of altruism, or at
least for endeavor in particular fitslds, is often traceable
to a sense of mission. The individual finds his meaning for
life in fulfilling a destiny, assigned by whatever powers
that be. V/ith some the assignment is clearly outlined. For
others the task is hardly discernible. These search for it,
however, and their assurance that life has a meaning depends
upon their conviction that they have a mission to fulfill.
Many persons are wholly unaware of any cosmic appointment;
and these view the idea as a superstition. Might it not be
said of these, as it was said of those for whom life is so
far meaningless, that they have not yet found it? At any
rate many people are possessed of a sense of mission, and
their evidence must be considered. The prophet Jeremiah was
convinced that his appointment was made before he was born.
(Jeremiah 1:4-5) Josiah Royce lays great stress on this
sense of mission, of fulfilling a destiny. He writes that
"to regard the life of our most fragmentary selfhood as the
divine life taking on human fom ... is of the deepest
essence of religion. "^^^ This is the position also of Hegel,
100. Royce, WI, II, 429.
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in whose thought meaning for life depends upon the laying
off of particularity and the putting on of universality,
l.e,, freedom from illusion and wilfull attachment to the
rational whole. "^^"^
As has been admitted throughout this section, whether
or not life has meaning cannot be demonstrated. The evidence,
however, points to an affirmation of life. What is this
meaning? That depends. But if human life has any adequate
meaning life must be viewed as an Invitation to become real,
102
real in the sense that God is real,
9, Immortality as an achievement ,
Ttie problem of immortality is an empirical problem for
which there is no empirical evidence; it is "a non-specula-
tive question which depends for its answer on speculative
103questions." One's view of immortality depends upon his
metaphysics. A metaphysical theory may exclude survival; it
104
may require it; or it may show it as possible. In no case
is certainty to be had. Conviction is often attained, both
affirmative and negative. The negatives, however, usually
101. Hegel, PR, Sec. 131, Sec. 132.
102, Hocking, TDL, 217. The writer of Genesis 1:26-
27, in trying to account for the dignity of man says that
he was created in the image, the likeness of God.
103. Hocking, TDL, 30. Of. p. 3.
104, B.g., impersonal realism, theistic personalism,
and dualism or idealism, respectively.
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consider an absence of positive empirical evidence as a
demonstrative decision in their favor. But this is not a
reasoned certainty. The belief in immortality is evanescent ;
it fluctuates, passing from one extreme to the other, from
certainty at one time to absurdity at another. Hocking
states it thus: "It seems to me at times that a man is a
fool to believe it, at other times that a man is a fool not
to believe it." (MGHK, 144)
The self is empirically dualistic. It is an observer
which observes itself in reflection. This reflective self is
relatively "potential. Infinite, time-inclusive, time-continu-
ous, creative". The observed self is the excursive self
which is relatively "actual, finite, time-limited, time-
discontinued, created." (TDL, 85) Now, in the case of survival
or immortality which self survives? The excursive self is
dated, and death is the end for it; there are no more excur-
sions. But the reflective self apart from this empirical
self is nothing. It is apt to be thought of as a transcen-
dental self, or as an Indostructlble idea. The two selves are
one in the whole self; the empirical duality is all the while
a unity. And if survival is a fact the whole self survives.
There must be at least a kinship to the present empirical
dualism.
There are some objections to immortality which must be
considered. First, as to the cry of selfishness, it may help
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to note that the desire for survival is not necessarily self-
ish. In the first place it is a claim of right, not a per-
sonal wish. It is based upon the view that that v;hich has
been produced should not be snuffed out. ( TDL, 7) And in the
second place, it is not a desire for an object, but for a sub-
ject. (TDL, 8) It is akin to the will to live. It is no more
selfish to desire survival than to desire to live or survive
tomorrow. It is a fundamental tenet of life that survival
ought to be. "For unless there is a way for the continuance of
the human self, the world is full of the blunt edges of human
meanings, the wreckage of human values, and therefore of the
failures of God." (TDL, 111)
The most important objection to survival, it seems, is
the view of science In which it is held that the mind is de-
pendent upon the brain. This is part and parcel of the mind-
body problem. In scientific theories of the mind-body relation,
it is held (follov/ing Aristotle) that the two are working
parts of the same thing. Mind is the living principle or
body. And the body is for the mind a footing in the universe.
The two are so closely related that changes in one involve
changes in the other. But this dotss not mean necessarily
that the brain is the mind, or that this functional co-varia-
tion depends altogether on the brain. It may mean either that
mental-events are images or brain-events, or that brain-events
are images of mental-events. (TDL, 46) This situation demands
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an answer to the question, v/hlch is primary, mind or body?
The answer v/hich offers the completer explanation is that
mind is "the original reality, and the body-and-brain system
is its derivative or representation within the natural con-
text." (TDL, 49) The mind is more concrete, and can come
nearer explaining the body-and-brain system than can this
105
system explain the mind.
Another major obstacle which must be overcome pertains
to the spatial order or orders of existence. Investigation
has left not even stsinding room to the heavenly mansions
which were anticipated as residences. "If there is another
life, there must be another nature. And if there is but one
space- time order, there can be but one nature: for nature is
defined as the system of all events in the space- time universe.
(TDL, 36) Two or more co-existing spaces must be such that
there is no point in common. If there are relations between
them they are spatial relationships. In mathematics, in art,
and in dream, there is at least the possibility of other space
worlds. "The structural relations, the intra-mental transi-
tion from world to world, present the logical qualities which
may enable us ... to use the notion of an 'other' world
without confusion." (TDL, 40, 41)-'-^^
105. Gf. Chapter III, where the relation between the
mind and body is treated more fully.
106. Does the possibility of other space worlds have any
relation to or dependence upon other time v/orlds? Could there
i
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Regardless, though, of how many the objections raay be,
and how strong, the Issue concerning survival is a metaphysi-
cal problem, and one's answer is determined by his metaphysic
In an impersonal resilism, personal survival is impossible; in
dualism or idealism, it is possible; and in theistic person-
alism, it is necessary. It is hard to discern just what
Professor Hocking's view is. It is idualistic. He insists
that being is primary; this tends toward theistic personalism
But he maintains that immortality is an achievement, which is
akin to a pragmatic idealism. The following statement seems
to be against the viev/ that it is achievement:
Our deepest instinct would suggest that v/hat a man
has not yet attained may be vastly more important
than what he has performed; and that v/hat he is,
is more important than either. (TDL, 214)
Then is survival an achievements
In the proposal we here make we have assigned a
place to pragmatism, since active attachment is
necessary to a sound detachment, and one must v/ork
in order to be real. But we make being primary,
(TDL, 2±5)
106. (continued)
be another time v/orld? No; because time is continuous; and
all time is of the same. Any division between time worlds
would be itself temporal. Is not the same true as regards
space? There is just one actual space which can or does
accommodate real existents. Any other space, it seems,
would be part and parcel with this space. The possibility
of survival might better depend upon its being non-spatial
than on the reality of other space worlds*
J
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Hie view that immortality is an achievement adds zest
to life. The more achievement the more nearly immortal. It
is a reversed application of pragmatism: "It is true if you
work," Ihis is close enough to orthodoxy to he acceptable,
but is wholly different therefrom. Just as in orthodox tradi-
tion, heaven and hell, there is here the possibility that one
may win immortality or that he may lose it. Professor Hocking
insists strongly on this point. Justice is on his side.
If there be any immortality beyond this present
scheme of things, it is not in abstraction therefrom;
the destiny of our own deeds, great and small, is an
integral part of whatever future there may be for us.
To deserve to endure is the only guarantee of endur-
ing. I have no faith in an intrinsic indestructibi-
lity of the substance of consciousness. One life is
given us; another may be acquired. (MGiiE, 513, 514)
It seems natural for men to be sinful, and mortal; mor-
tality seems natural; the idea of immortality, strange. But
justice and rationality give assurance that the range of one's
existence will be as the range of his effective wishes. Then
those who care for immortality must take the pains; others,
will have only a finite reward. "Let each have the degree
of life which his own status - by its natural hold on reality -
commands." (HNR, 166) "Human life as we find it Is^ not free,
sacred, immortal. It must be made free; its sacredness must
be conferred upon it; its immortality must be won." (TP, 450)
Survival of death is a possibility but not a neces-
sity of destiny. We have begun this present existence
without our prior consent. ... But being here, we
constitute ourselves judges and administrators of
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the v/orth of living; and what v/e come to conceive
as fit tends . • • to come to pass in each one's
personal destiny, • • • In any event, the quality
of the human aeif ... is not Immortality but im-
mortahili ty, the conditional possibility of sur-
vival. (TDL, 106-108)
The reality of the self is not a fixed quantity. It may well
be, and justice requires that it shall be, "that survival may
be a matter of the decree of reality which the self attains."
(TDL, 109)
I strongly doubt v/hether Immortality is any such
predetermined reality that it exists for any person
apart from that person's v/111 to make it real. The
future life may well be such an object as my de-
cision can make real or unreal, so far as my own
experience is concerned, (MGHE, 141, 142)
The justification for viewing immortality as an achieve-
ment is in the existence of metaphysical freedom. Trouble
arises, however, v/hen one considers those who would have
achieved reality and immortality, had their lives not been
taken, as in war, or in plague, or in natural disasters, or
had their lives not been crippled by poverty or some other
handicap. The calculus of justice concerning immortality as
an achievement is exceedingly intricate. It is difficult to
know just which is more important, being or activity. Being
must be primary. (TDL, 215) There could be being without any
great achievement. Being is the basis for activity, whereas
activity is the test for being. Professor Hocking's emphasis
on the importance of development and achievement for survival
is warranted, although its importance is not in determining
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Immortality itself but only in determining the degree of im-
mortality.
In the position that "being is primary" ( TDL, 215), It
seems that survival is not a matter of achievement, but that
it is a characteristic of being. Since "we care for being
more than for achievement, because being, in this sense, is
an enduring potentiality; and this can only signify potential-
ity for further life", why not say that every person is immor-
tal, and that his achievement determines his degree of immor-
tality? Survival in this case v/ould depend upon capacity
(being, plus potentiality) and achievement. In the next order
individuals v/ould develop in accordance with their present
tendencies, and capacities. "Whatever meaning life may come
to possess hereafter must be simply the ampler Interpretation
of the meaning which it now has." (TDL, 226) This theory takes
care of those v/hose lives happen to be snuffed out, or who may
not have opportunity for the development of their lives, i.e.,
for the achievement of reality, during this period of proba-
tion. Professor Hocking holds that the universe has a meaning,
and that man shares in this meaning. Therefore unless part of
the meaning of the universe is to be destroyed or annihilated
survival is necessary.

CHAPTER VII
EVALUATION OF HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN SELF
To have studied Professor Hocking's writings, and to
have sought to interpret his view of the self is to have
earned the right to evaluate it« To write a dissertation
based on his philosophy is to be required to do so.
1, Characterization of his philosophy .
Hocking is definitely not anti- intellectual. Although
feeling is recognized as the basis of selfhood (MGHE, 44),
"there is no such thing as feeling apart from idea; ...
it is the whole meaning and destiny of feeling to terminate
in knowledge of an object." (MGHE, 64) Nevertheless one is
led to believe, from time to time, that Hocking's philosophy
represents a justification of his intuitions rather than the
development of an idea. They may be ever so profound, but
still they are intuitions. Metaphysics becomes for Hocking
a giving of reasons for what is believed through intuition or
on instinct."^ Marcel and Dalliere, French followers of
Hocking, were right in their interpretation of Hocking as
Bergsonian. They characterize Hocking's philosophy as "a
dialectic of instinct which finds its fulfilment in a
philosophy of mysticism." Hocking states that Bergson's
1. Cf. Bradley, AR, xiv.
2. Cf. p. 196n.
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greatest service was "to have shown that knowledge of reality
is possible in concrete experience." Mysticism is considered
4
as the concluding type of philosophy. The danger in a
philosophy of mysticism is that feeling will be given pre-
cedence over reason, and when this is done objectivity be-
comes impossible.
2* Ambiguity in his view of the self .
Hocking is justified in his emphasis upon selfhood as
the basic category. For without consciousness the world is
unintelligible and meaningless. Ihe self represents the most
ultimate entity which can be discovered. So far his position
is acceptable. But v»hen he insists that the self Includes
the body as an Integral part of its being, that "all the cate-
gories of the body are required in the structure of the self"
(SIBP, 96), his thinking becomes ambiguous, if not unreasonable*
The body is an object of nature, so that nature along with
the body must become an Integral organ of the self. (SIBP,
141)
The essence of the self (the basis of selfhood), even
according to Hocking, is feeling (MGHE, 44), feeling joined
with thinking, and willing or acting. (MGHE, 64-65) There is
no question about the importance of the body for the self»s
3. Hocking, Art. (1914)-^, 326.
4. Hocking, TP, 379-421; MGHE, xvlll-xlx, 341-441;
P6IC, 215.
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being; it may even cause the self, but still the body, as
known by the external senses, is not a part of the self,
i.e., of its essence. The essence of the self is conscious-
ness; and consciousness is not an object, such as the body
is and such as nature is, but consciousness is an intuition
of, or an act of reference to, an object; it is not just an
act of reference, but of reference to an object .
But is not this the real interpretation of what Hocking
means? (It is certainly not v/hat he says.) There is no in-
dividuality or distinctness "apart • • • from a world of
things," The only mind that is of interest is "a mind which
has its objects, and is at work upon them," (MGHE, 255) The
mind is that v/hich has its objects and is referring to them
and working on them. The body is that with which the mind
handles its objects. And nature provides the objects;
nature is the material for experience. Thus both nature and
the body are essential to the self's being; they are so es-
sential that the mind or self cannot be understood adequately
apart from an understanding of the whole universe; but this
intimacy of relationship does not mean, and cannot mean,
that they are of the essence of the self.
5. Gf. pages 76-78, above.
6. Hocking, MGHE, 256; Cf . Chapter V, 4.
I
243
^» catep:ory of social experience .
Again, Hocking's emphasis upon the category of selfhood
is justified, but his deduction of the category of social
7
experience is questionable, Hocking's theory of social
experience includes or is his argument for the existence of
God. The Kantian thing- in- it self is brought into the realm
of iminediate sense experience. This is deduced from or
justified by tv/o premises. First, that sense experience is
a common ingredient of all selves, which coalesce in nature.
(MGHe, 298) Second, a necessary part of nature, experience
is the recognition of its being known by some other mind,
(MGHE, 231, 232, 261) But this other mind cannot be all other
finite selves because all finite selves are dependent upon
nature, as empirical knowers of nature. Therefore this
other mind or other knower of nature must be God, (MGHE,
293) It is the prior knowledge of Goa, as the Other Mind
knov/ing nature, which supplies the category of social ex-
perience and thereby makes social relations intelligible.
The basic social experience is with God; this experience
supplies a principle which enables the self to Interpret his
relations with his fellows.
Hocking maintains that the idea of an other mind in-
volves (or is at the same time) an experience of other mind.
(MGHE, 278) This reduces the concept of objectivity to social
7. Of. Chapter V, 6
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agreement. Social experience is an original datum of exper-
ience if the objective means what selves agree in knowing,
because the objective cannot be derived from pure subjecti-
vity. In this way, God as the other knower of nature must
be present in experience from the beginning, (MGHE, 281, 288)
But why must objectivity be defined in terms of social agree-
ment? Since nature exists independently of the self's
knov/ing it why cannot the self start with an experience of
nature, and why cannot the sense of reality arise from exper-
ience v/ith the world as a physical environment instead of from
the intellectual perception of shared ideas? (Does the Other
Knower' s experience of nature likewise depend upon an other
knower of nature?)
The idea of social experience may involve social exper-
ience itself (MGHE, 278), but this social experience does not
necessarily involve the actual experienced presence of a
further self. The idea of social experience means only the
cognitive acceptance of some self, which need not be directly
experienced but may be only implied in ideal terras.
But there is an oven greater difficulty. Even if God,
as the Other Mind, does exist, how is it that in the case of
God the self does experience an Other Self, while in the case
of other human selves such social experience is deemed impos-
sible? The activity of God must enter the life of the self
through its results, as is true with other human selves, and
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social experience Is equally possible In either case or
nei ther.
Alexander's is a more tenable view of social experience.
Since Instincts or traits are not outlawed why can not the
instinct of sociability play a part in making social exper-
ience possible? Alexander writes, "It is because we are
social beings and have the social instinct that v/e become
aware of others as like ourselves and the possessors of
minds." Uiere is a spontaneous and reciprocal recognition
of kindred otherness. Hocking says that the consciousness
of kind is not "an actual organ of knov/ledge differentiated
for the perception cf other minds" (MGHE, 242), but recogni-
tion is the beginning of knowledge. This mutual apprehension
is the minimal core v/hich two minds have in common. And
from it communication may be built from more to more. (MGHE,
272; TP, 290)
8. Alexander, STD, II, 35.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to present a critical interpretation of
the human self, based on the philosophy of William Ernest Hocking. The
terms self, soul, mind, and person are used as synonyms. The word self is
preferable; it includes what the other terms include but does not dictate the
road which the discussion must follow. The self is a purposing system of
conscious and subconscious behavior which develops as a persistent hope is
realized.
The self may be spoken of as a will to power. This will to power, which
is akin to but not as revolutionary as the Nietzschean will to power, is the
undiscovered unity in life. It may be described as a craving for potency.
Partial satisfaction is realized in the feeling of present worth as a self among
selves; but there is also the longing that the exerted influence will be per-
manent. The self as a will to power becomes the self as a hope. This hope
represents an actual hold on a possible good. Self-identity is realized through
the persistence of this hope as a feeling of value-strain.
The natural endowment of the self is discerned through a study of the
mature person, as well as through a study of the development of the individual.
Findings from the fields of biology and physiology are necessary for any
adequate understanding of the self. The best way to refute the claims emerging
from biologists and physiologists is to accept them, and to let them prove their
worth and their inadequacy. The natural endowment of the human self in-
volves three things: First, and most obvious, there is the body as a storehouse
of energy, of impulses to act, of instincts. The second basic characteristic is
conscious will, which becomes the will to power. The third initial property is
conscience or moral sensitivity.
The body is integral to the mind or self. It enters into the mind's ex-
perience as a visible, spatial object to which are referred certain needs and
wants, certain powers and capacities, as well as the mind's steady sense of
being. The body makes possible a distinction between abstract thought and
concrete deed; it serves as a storehouse of power and of habits; and it is the
means whereby mind interacts with the world beyond. But the body is an
object of nature, and if it is integral to the mind, then either the self goes
into nature or nature comes into the self. Upon examination the self-sufficiency
and independence of nature come to be recognized as an illusion; nature is
also dependent; its independence and objectivity are relative and derivative.
The givenness of sense-data, the orderliness of nature, as well as nature's im-
partial publicity, are evidence that nature is fitted for taking part in the life
of the self.
Hocking's theory of instincts or necessary interests is the counterpart of
Allport's theory of traits. There are two differences. First, while Allport is
psychological only, Hocking is primarily metaphysical. This leads to the second
difference: Hocking identifies the all-pervasive and dominant trait with the
self, but Allport denies that they are identical. An exact listing of instincts is
impossible because all are aspects of one fundamental instinct. The moment of
self-consciousness is that period in the life of the organism when the will to
power is recognized, and owned.
Selfhood is recognized as the basic category. Although Bradley insists
that selfhood is too full of contradictions to represent reality, selfhood is the
most concrete category which can be discovered. The discovery of one sup'
posedly more concrete would reveal the discoverer as one stage more concrete
still. Selfhood is the perfect example of a concept which applies to a part of
the world and also to the whole of it. The world is a self, for the mental life
within it is a unity and all the meanings of things cohere in a single will. The
human self is an imperfect image of the cosmic self.
The problem of freedom is a metaphysical problem. It arises only for
beings who act as a result of choices of will. To say that the self is free means
that in deliberating the self is faced with real alternatives. The most poignant
evidence for freedom is the power of reflection. If both causality and freedom
are recognized as postulates, and as candidates to be understood, freedom will
not seem so impossible. Physicists disclaim finality for physical laws, so that
freedom may represent taking hold of, or obedience to, a more ultimate law.
The source of obligation is God. Conscience is native to the self; it rep'
resents a feeling of obligation which is occasioned as a possible increase or
decrease of being becomes an object of perception. Sin results as the self yields
to or releases its control of impulses which are partial, the expression of which
is not in keeping with the most complete realization of the whole self. The
primary and original right of every man is to his own development; yet this
right is inalienable only if man aims to develop his powers. Rights are not
rights until they are looked upon as privileges and as responsibilities. The
destiny of an individual is the universalized expression of his own unique view
of reality.
Strictly speaking, social experience is a misnomer. There is no such
experience in the literal sense of the term. There is social knowledge, but it is
of necessity built on hypotheses. The basic social experience is not the ex-
perience of other men, but is the experience of God as directly revealed in the
experiences of nature. The Kantian thing-in-itself is known in immediate
experience. The experience of God provides the self with a category by means
of which social relations become intelligible.
There are three roots of religious ideas which may be designated as the
speculative, the emotional and the ethical. The speculative and emotional roots
belong to man's experience of nature, while the ethical root grows in social
relations. But all these roots spring from man's experience of God as the
initial Other. The group spirit is not equivalent to God. God meets a need in
the life of man that cannot be met in any other way. Man's values can survive
only if he finds a metaphysical foundation for them.
Teleological explanation is necessary as a supplement to mechanical
causality in understanding certain items of experience, for example, life, value,
and the intelligibility of the world. But there is also the fact of dysteleology
to be reckoned with; it represents the struggle, the restlessness, and the suffer-
ing in the world. Hocking rejects finitism as a means of accounting for this
fact. He insists that to raise the problem of dysteleology is to imply a double-
minded attitude toward evil, i.e., the possibility of its transmutability. Time,
and companionship, are the two chief means for the transmutation of evil.
Through companionship with God as an intimate and infallible associate the
self finds strength to endure that evil which cannot be alleviated. Certainty
cannot be had concerning immortality: it is an empirical problem for which
there is no empirical evidence. The question of survival must finally be decided
in metaphysics. But in any case the reality of the self is not a fixed quantity.
Justice demands that the matter of survival be determined by the degree of
reality which the self attains.
The main conclusions regarding Hocking's view of the human self may be
organized as follows:
1. The self is to be defined as a will to power; it is a purposing system
of conscious and subconscious behavior which develops as a persistent hope is
realized.
2. Metaphysical freedom is a matter of degree; the tension of the self
toward a coherent hope determines the depth of selfhood and the degree of
the self's freedom.
3. The body as a sphere of empirical particularity is integral to the self.
4. Moral sensitivity, along with conscious will and the body, is a natural
endowment of the human self; conscience may emerge last, but the feeling of
obligation cannot be imported into the life of an individual from without.
5. Selfhood is Hocking's most basic and meaningful category, although
he does not incorporate it into a system of categories; it represents a principle
without which the world is unthinkable, and by means of which the world can
be most coherently understood.
6. The focus of all ultimate value is in selves, yet man's original right to
his own development is inalienable only if he aims to develop his powers:
freedom involves responsibility.
7. Since God is known in sense experience as an Other Knower of
physical nature, this experience of God provides man with the category of
social experience whereby social relations become intelligible.
8. Meaning is to be found in human life by the fulfilling of what Hock-
ing calls a "prophetic consciousness", or a "cosmic appointment"; if there is an
immortality, it is an achievement in the process of fulfilling that appointment.
9. Hocking's view of the self as including the body is questionable,
because the body is a part of nature; this means that the self includes a part
of nature, whereas Hocking holds the essence of the self to be consciousness
(which is always an intuition of, or an act of reference to, an object)
.
10. Hocking's conclusion should be revised to read as follows: The human
self as a purposing system of behavior is dependent upon the human body and
thus upon nature for its present empirical existence; it cannot be understood
completely apart from an understanding of the whole world.
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